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1. INTRODUCTION 
The invention of agriculture that occurred around 
10,000 years ago heralded a shift from nomadic 
hunting and gathering to more managed forms of 
food, feed and fibre production. The domestication 
of crops initially involved the saving of seed from 
one season for planting in subsequent years. Later,
farmers purposefully selected crop varieties and 
so in practice began matching and, by repeated 
selection over many years, adapting crop genetics 
to the environment in which the crop was grown. 
From its inception, enhancing G x E (i.e., gene by
environment) interactions was an intrinsic, if not 
defining, feature of agriculture. 
However, just as the G-part of agriculture changed 
over time because of human activity, so too did 
the E-element. Farmers first began altering their 
local environments by clearing and levelling 
fields, weeding, and engaging in various forms of 
irrigation. Then, as people began to migrate they 
carried their crops with them, found new ones 
along the way, and, eventually, sent expeditions 
abroad scouring the world for new cropping 
material. Viewed from this historical perspective,
the geographical footprint of agriculture has been 
ever changing; even more so when looking at the 
spatial extent of particular crops that get moved 
around both between countries as well as among 
regions and agroecologies within countries. Figure 
1 shows the changing spatial extent of land in 
agriculture, beginning in 1700 when agriculture 
occupied just 9 percent of the world’s land area. 
We see the spread of agriculture to the New 
Worlds and an expansion of land in Africa, Latin 
America and parts of South-East Asia. By 1992, 
agriculture was being practiced on 40 percent of 
the world’s land area. Sizable additional land areas 
have agroecological attributes that make them 
amenable to agriculture, but urban, infrastructural, 
economic and environmental factors circumscribe 
this potential.1 
Despite this long sweep of agriculture, scientifi cally 
bred crop varieties (and livestock breeds) and their 
associated agricultural management practices 
have a history of barely one hundred years. At
1 Contrary to popular belief there remains significant room to 
expand agricultural areas, at least from a biological perspective. 
Using only agroecological attributes to determine the suitability 
of land for agriculture, Bruinsma (2003) estimated that at the turn 
of the 21st century only 34 percent of the potential agricultural 
area in the developing world was being farmed (with much of the 
additional areas located in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and, 
to a lesser extent, South Asia). About 44 percent of the potential 
agricultural land in the developed countries was being farmed in 
1997-99. 
Figure 1: Land in Agriculture, 1700-1992 
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Source: Ramankutty, Foley and Olejnickzak (2002). 
Notes: Agricultural area estimates developed using the methodology described in Ramankutty and Foley (1999). 
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the beginning of the 20th century a number of 
important things changed. For example, the laws
of heredity were rediscovered and there were
substantive improvements in our understanding 
of the role soil fertility plays in plant growth. 
There also emerged an appreciation of how to
better manage agricultural production systems 
and deal with crop and livestock diseases as the 
bacteriology, virology and related microbiological 
sciences began to develop. Introducing the 
results of scientifi c research into agriculture 
accelerated the growth in agricultural productivity 
and production in significant parts of the world,
particularly beginning in the mid-1900s. 
These improvements in agricultural productivity 
have alleviated much poverty and starvation and 
fuelled economic progress. However, as this report 
will show, comparatively little agricultural R&D 
and “technology tailoring” has been done for the 
conditions confronting African agriculture.2 Thus 
it should not be surprising that comparatively 
little progress has been made on the agricultural 
productivity front in this part of the world.
Innovation in African agriculture and other 
regions of the developing world will be critical to
solving the scourge of hunger and lifting the lot 
of the billions of the world’s people who rely on 
agriculture for a living, and all the world’s poor 
who rely on agriculture for their sustenance.3 How 
does this all square with the recent and pervasive 
declines in the growth of spending for agricultural 
R&D that this report will reveal? 
Relying on home-grown technologies is one source
of growth in agriculture. Tapping technologies 
developed in other places—especially in the 
rich countries where the preponderance of the 
2 See DeVries and Toenniessen (2001) for much more 
elaboration on this point. 
3 Cassman and Wood (2006, p. 781) observed that “Cultivated 
systems play a vital role in global economic wellbeing, especially 
in poorer countries. In 2000, agriculture (including forestry and 
fishing) represented 24 percent of total GDP [Gross Domestic 
Product] on average in countries with per capita incomes less the 
$765 (the World Bank 2003 threshold designating low-income 
countries). About 2.6 billion people depend on agriculture for their 
livelihoods, either as actively engaged workers or as dependents 
(FAOSTAT 2004). In 2000, just over half (52 percent) of the world’s 
population were living in rural areas and, of these, about 2.5 
billion people were estimated to be living in agriculturally based 
households (World Bank 2003). The global agricultural labor force 
includes approximately 1.3 billion people, about a fourth (22 
percent) of the world’s population and half (46 percent) of the 
total labor force (Deen 2000).” 
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agricultural R&D has been done—has also been a 
feature of agricultural progress the world over. Big 
changes are afoot, especially in the past 25 years, 
in the ways in which many (rich) countries fund 
and organise their public agricultural R&D, the 
incentives affecting private R&D, the orientation of 
rich-country research, and the intellectual property
and regulatory restrictions that affect the sharing 
and use of the results of research. Taken together, 
these changes raise serious, and yet unresolved, 
questions about the prospects for sustaining 
productivity growth over the next 25 years and 
beyond. 
1.1 GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTIVITY 
Crop Yields 
For thousands of years, farmers eked out yield 
gains by collecting and selecting the best 
and most productive seeds and by improving 
cultivation and organic fertilization techniques. 
The rate of increase in yields was small, and so 
expansion of cultivated areas accounted for most 
of the increases in total production. A century ago, 
Gregor Mendel’s research describing the pattern of 
genetic inheritance, first published by the Austrian 
botanist and monk in 1865, was rediscovered and 
reconfirmed. Thus the modern era of scientifi c 
breeding began. 
Starting in the late 19th century, average yields of 
major crops in North America, Europe, and Japan 
began to increase at rates well beyond historical 
precedent. For example, beginning with an average 
wheat yield of 15 bushels per acre in 1866 (the 
earliest year for which reliable data are available), it 
took 103 years, until 1969, for U.S. yields to double 
(Figure 2). Yield growth accelerated in the second 
half of the 20th century; it took only 48 years from 
1957 for U.S. wheat yields to double and reach the 
42 bushels per acre reaped in 2005. Similar yield 
accelerations occurred in many other crops in the 
United States. 
It would be a mistake to interpret the 
comparatively slow growth in average U.S. wheat 
yields during the 19th century as an indication 
that productivity growth was largely absent and 
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Figure 2: Wheat Yields, 1800-2004 
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Source: Developed by Pardey using data from numerous sources. 
that few mechanical, biological (e.g., new crop 
varieties) and crop management innovations 
were forthcoming. In the early 1800s, U.S. wheat 
production was confined almost exclusively to
the eastern part of the country; mainly Ohio and 
upstate New York. By 1909, areas west of the 
Appalachian Mountains accounted for 92 percent 
of U.S. wheat production compared with less 
than one half of output in 1839 (Olmstead and 
Rhode 2002). Similar spatial and temporal eff ects 
have been evident elsewhere in the world, and so 
reported changes in average crop yields may be a 
misleading indicator of the rate and extent of the 
technical changes in agriculture; be these changes 
attributable to the innovative efforts of farmers 
or more formal forms of R&D. Massive changes in 
varietal use facilitated this spatial relocation of U.S. 
wheat production into new locations—specifi cally 
the Northern Prairies and the Great Plains—and 
new agroecologies, where the varieties suitable for 
locations on the eastern seaboard faltered or failed. 
Moreover, staving off the effects of ever-evolving 
pests and diseases through the use of resistant 
varieties and management practices means that 
reported average yields would have been much 
India Argentina China Canada 
lower absent changes in the biological basis of U.S. 
wheat production. 
Many crops in many developed countries saw a 
sharp up-turn in their average yield performance 
in the middle of the 20th century as an increasing 
number of genetically improved varieties, targeted 
to particular agroecological zones, became 
available. Beginning in the 1950s and continuing 
at an accelerated pace in the 1960s and 1970s, 
improved varieties also became available to
many more farmers in developing countries from 
international and national agricultural research 
centers, and average yields took off in many, but by
no means all, of those countries as well. 
A key to these widespread yield gains was the 
rapid spread of modern (often short-statured, 
so-called semi-dwarf ) rice and wheat varieties 
throughout the developing world; initially 
through the adoption of cultivars developed in 
international research centers over wide areas with 
favorable environments, and then via adaptation 
of this germplasm to local ecologies and consumer 
preferences. Asia was quickest to embrace these 
S
C
IE
N
C
E
, 
T
E
C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
 A
N
D
 S
K
IL
L
S
 
11 
  
 
  
 
new varieties, while varietal change lagged in sub-
Saharan Africa, partly because of the great diversity 
in agroecologies (Figure 3). 
Globally, average yields have climbed steadily for all 
major cereals, at least since the 1960s. Since 1961, 
around 78 percent of the increase in production 
has come from increases in yields, except in Africa 
where about 60 percent of the gains have come 
from expanding the area of cultivation.4 Achieving 
future yield increases is one thing, maintaining 
past yields is another. Indeed “maintenance 
research,” research directed at maintaining yields 
and profitability in the face of pressures that 
would lead them to fall otherwise, is a major 
component of agricultural R&D (perhaps especially 
in relation to crop and livestock disease prevention 
and eradication programs). Such maintenance 
research has become more important in recent 
years as a result of environmental and health-
related laws and regulations. Some pesticides have
4 Pardey and Wood’s calculations based on growth 
decomposition of the production identity (yield x harvested area 
= output) and using FAO data. 
been deregistered or have become progressively 
ineffective, but the cost of registering new 
agricultural chemicals has grown so much that 
many companies are abandoning the development 
of pesticides for crops that are relatively minor in a 
global setting but, perhaps, are still important for 
some farmers in some countries (Kalaitzandoakes, 
Alston and Bradford 2007; Service 2007). A part 
of the response has been increased eff orts in 
integrated pest management, breeding, and 
biotechnology, to develop genetic resistance or 
environmentally friendly pest-control systems. 
Partial Productivity Trends 
In Figure 4, the graphical technique of Hayami 
and Ruttan (1985) is used to plot logged ratios 
of agricultural output per hectare and output 
per worker for nine regions of the world as well 
as the Former Soviet Union and Japan (together 
representing 231 countries) for each of the years 
1961 to 2003. 
Figure 3: Uptake of Modern Crop Varieties by Decade and by Region 
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 Figure 4: Agricultural land and labor productivity, 1961-2003 
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right/top, unless indicated. Diagonal lines indicate constant factor (land to labor) ratios. 
All of the productivity paths move in a
northeasterly direction starting in 1961 and 
ending in 2003, indicating increasing productivity.
A longer productivity locus means a greater 
percentage change in productivity. China, and the 
Asia & Pacific region experienced the fastest rate of 
growth of land productivity (respectively, 3.4 and 
2.8 percent per year), the Former Soviet Union the 
slowest (0.08 percent). With a rapid exodus of labor 
from agriculture, Japan’s labor productivity grew 
the fastest (5.15 percent per year) and sub-Saharan 
Africa (including South Africa) the slowest (0.35 
percent). 
The diagonal lines in Figure 4 indicate constant 
factor (specifically, land to labor) ratios. When 
a region’s productivity locus is fl atter than 
these diagonal lines (e.g., Japan in more recent 
decades), it indicates an increase in the number 
of agricultural hectares per agricultural worker 
in that country as we move from left to right: in 
Japan’s case from 0.59 hectares per worker in 1961 
to 1.57 in 2003. Land-labor ratios in Australia and 
New Zealand have changed little, whereas they 
have risen by some 73 percent in North America. 
They also rose, albeit very slowly, for the Latin 
America and Caribbean region, consistent with the 
region’s labor productivity growing slightly faster 
than its land productivity. Sub-Saharan Africa has 
become much more labor intensive so land-labor 
ratios have declined. In 1961 the region had 10.5 
hectares per agricultural worker, but by 2003 the 
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land-labor ratio had nearly halved to 5.4 hectares 
per worker.5 
1.2 CROP YIELD VARIABILITY 
While raising average crop yields is an essential 
element in improving land and labor productivity,
reducing year-to-year yield variability is also 
critically important, especially for smallholder 
agriculture. The more uncertain is the likely 
harvest outcome the more cautious subsistence 
farmers may be in the selection of crops, seeds 
and management practices to be sure they can 
meet minimum food subsistence. This means, 
for example, persevering with tried and tested 
landraces (i.e., farmer-bred crop varieties) and 
traditional varieties whose average yields are low 
but more assured, even when rains are erratic. The 
greater the chance that crops will fail because of 
uncontrolled weather or other effects, the less likely 
it is that farmers will purchase and use improved 
seeds or other inputs such as fertilizers. The poorer 
the household, the more extreme this type of 
risk-averse behavior may be. Such conditions 
limit incentives for smallholder adoption of new 
technologies—whose higher attainable yields 
often depend on more stable (and typically more 
favorable) production environments. 
Crop yields are highly susceptible to a number 
of factors farmers cannot control, including 1) 
weather patterns and unexpected or extreme 
weather events, 2) the incidence and severity of 
pest and disease outbreaks and weed infestations, 
3) costly and erratic access to labor and purchased 
inputs because of inadequate transport, 
communication and physical infrastructure, for 
instance, and 4) variability in seed quality. Weather-
related production risks include those of unreliable 
rainfall, unexpected frosts, high winds, hail, and 
flooding. Among these, drought is perhaps the 
most ubiquitous source of yield variability in 
developing-country agriculture. Figure 5 depicts 
the spatial pattern of variability over time in the 
length of the annual growing period as a measure 
of the susceptibility of each location to drought. 
5 These substantive differences in productivity paths and 
factor use ratios highlight the need to tailor and adapt agricultural 
technologies to local production realities, a theme to which we 
return below in the context of R&D spillovers. 
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One of the most common risk-management 
strategies in drought-prone areas is varying 
planting dates with variation in the timing of the 
opening rains. Another is investment in irrigation 
capacity (Figure 6). Irrigation provides the double 
benefits of both increasing and stabilizing yields, 
thereby providing greater incentives for farmers 
to invest in complementary inputs. However, not 
all governments nor all farmers have the means 
to invest, and not all locations are amenable 
to irrigation. Areas of high moisture variability 
(depicted in Figure 5) that are not matched by
mitigating investments in irrigation capacity 
(depicted in Figure 6, for example the Sahel) might 
be considered prime target areas for other forms of 
mitigating technologies, such as the introduction 
of crops and crop varieties with greater drought 
tolerance. 
The countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
and West Asia and North Africa (WANA) contain the 
greatest share—more than 40 percent—of their 
cultivated land in drier areas (length of growing 
periods less than 120 days per year). High-income 
regions such as Australia and North America also 
have a high share of low rainfall croplands (36 
percent and 27 percent respectively). These data 
indicate that about a quarter of the cropland in 
South Asia (and a fifth of sub-Saharan Africa’s
cropland) is located in low rainfall areas.6 The year­
to-year variability of moisture availability follows
broadly similar patterns. Australia, the FSU and 
North America have around 60 percent, 45 percent 
and 37 percent respectively of their cropland in 
higher variability areas (i.e., where the coefficient 
of variability of moisture availability exceeds 20 
percent). Only some 24 percent and 15 percent 
6 Substantial and systemic weaknesses in the satellite-based 
estimates of cropland in sub-Saharan Africa, however, indicate 
large degrees of uncertainty in these area estimates (Wood et 
al. 2000). A simple pixel-to-pixel comparison of “cropland” and 
“cropland mosaic” classes for two independent satellite-based, 
global estimates of land cover for 2000 illustrate the problem. 
Only 60 percent of the pixels considered to be cropland in one 
dataset (MODIS) were recognized as cropland in the other (GLC­
2000). In the case of cropland mosaics—the predominant type of 
land cover in smallholder subsistence farming in the tropics and 
sub-tropics—the degree of spatial coincidence between the two 
datasets falls to only 13 percent (Giri, Zhu and Reed 2005). The 
degree of spatial disparity between these datasets is even more 
pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa where, in total, GLC-2000 
detects some 9.8 percent and 7.1 percent respectively of cropland 
and cropland mosaic as a share of total land area. The MODIS 
data, however, based on similar resolution observations for the 
same year only detects 1.9 percent and 0.8 percent respectively of 
cropland and cropland mosaic in the region (IFPRI 2006). 14 
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Figure 5: Variability in Moisture Availability for Rainfed Cultivated Land, 1960-1990 
Length of Growing
Period Variability 
(coeffi  cient of variation) 
0 .05 .1 .2 .3 .4 .6 .8 1 
no variability high variability 
outside the extent of agricultural areas 
Source: Adapted from Wood, Sebastian and Scherr (2000). 
Note: The length of growing period (LGP) is the number of days per year in which moisture and temperature conditions will 
support plant growth. It is used here as an indicator of moisture availability for rainfed production. The map shows year-to­
year variability in LGP calculated over a 30 year period (1960-90). This index serves as a measure of farmers’ likely exposure to 
climatological risk. Areas with higher variability are expected to experience greater impacts from changes in climate. 
Figure 6: Area Equipped for Irrigation, circa 2000 
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Area Equipped 
for Irrigation 
(percent)
 1 – 20
 20 – 40
 40 – 60
 60 – 80
 80 – 100 
Source: Adapted from Siebert, Döll, Feick and Hoogeveen. (2006). 
Note: This map identifies ‘the percent area equipped for irrigation around the turn of the 21th century based on statistical and 
spatial data at a resolution of 5 minutes (10x10 km).’ These data have been calibrated at the country level to FAO irrigated area 
statistics and help improve our knowledge of the location and extent of irrigated areas (for further information see http://www. 
fao.org/ag/agl/aglw/aquastat/irrigationmap/index10.stm). 
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respectively of cropland in WANA and Sub-Saharan 
Africa exhibit these more variable growing seasons. 
The major difference between regions, however, is 
the extent to which irrigation investments have
been made. In WANA, irrigated area represents 
around 37 percent of total harvested area 
(although a much higher percentage of physical 
cropland must be irrigated since multiple harvests 
are made annually from some cropland areas). In
North America, irrigated area represents around 17 
percent of the total harvested area, while in Sub-
Saharan Africa it is just 4 percent (Wood et al. 2000). 
Sub-Saharan African farmers, therefore, are more 
vulnerable to drought than their counterparts in 
other parts of the world, even though the areas 
of agriculture that are susceptible to drought are 
smaller than other regions of the world. 
The discussion leads to two key implications for 
research strategy. First, crop technology packages 
targeted to the poor in areas prone to yield 
variability must be designed to help mitigate
rather than exacerbate such variability if they are 
to find acceptance. Second, it is important to take 
account of post and prospective infrastructural 
investments such as irrigation and roads, as well 
as agro-ecological factors, when considering the 
suitability of technologies targeted to specifi c agro­
ecological and production system complexes. 
2. THE CHANGING CONTEXT 
FOR AGRICULTURAL R&D 
2.1 ECONOMIC REALITIES OF 
 
AGRICULTURAL R&D
 
Market failure in agricultural R&D arises primarily 
from incomplete or ineff ective property rights 
over inventions, which mean that inventors are 
unable to fully appropriate the returns to their 
research investments. Market failures in research 
can happen at the level of farms or firms within a 
state or country, among states within a country,
or among countries—in any context where the 
distribution of benefits from adopting the results 
does not closely match the distribution of the costs 
incurred in doing the research. 
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Evidence on Returns to Agricultural R&D 
Market failure leads to private-sector under-
investment in agricultural R&D, a phenomenon 
that can account for the major result from the 
empirical literature across diff erent commodities 
and different countries, that agricultural R&D has 
been, on average, a highly profi table investment 
from society’s point of view. 
Alston et al. (2000) reviewed the published 
evidence on rates of return to agricultural R&D. A 
total of 287 benefit-cost studies of agricultural R&D 
(including extension) were compiled and these 
studies provide 1,789 separate estimates of rates 
of return. This includes some extreme values which 
are implausible. When the lowest and highest 5 
percent were set aside, the estimated annual rates 
of return averaged 58 percent for research only, and 
44 percent for research and extension combined. 
But these averages conceal a lot, and reveal little 
meaningful information from a large and diverse 
body of literature that provides rate-of-return 
estimates that are often not directly comparable. 
Policies to Address Underinvestment 
in Agricultural R&D 
Evidence of high rates of return to agricultural 
R&D suggests that research has been under­
funded, and that current government intervention 
has been inadequate. However, this does not 
necessarily imply that the amount of government 
spending should increase. Changes in government 
intervention to address the market failure can 
take many forms. Some commentators focus 
on increased funding of R&D from general 
government revenues, but this is only a part of the 
picture. Government can also act to change the 
incentives for others to increase their investments 
in private or public R&D (as well as what research is 
done, by whom, and how eff ectively). 
A premise that government intervention is 
inadequate implies simply that the nature of the 
intervention ought to change so as to stimulate
either more private investment or more public 
investment. Policy options available to the 
government for stimulating private funding 
or performance of agricultural R&D include: 
improving intellectual property protection; 16 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
changing institutional arrangements to facilitate
collective action by producers, such as establishing 
levy arrangements; and encouraging individual or 
collective action through the provision of subsidies 
(or tax concessions) or grants in conjunction 
with levies. In addition to effi  ciency gains from 
increasing the total R&D investment, governments 
can also intervene with a view to improving the 
efficiency with which resources are used within the 
R&D system. 
Changes over time in economic circumstances 
imply changes in R&D institutions. Some research 
activities that were once clearly perceived as the 
province of the government have become part 
of the private domain. Examples include much 
applied work into the production and evaluation 
of agricultural chemicals and new plant varieties. 
Distinctive Features of Less-
Developed Countries 
These general notions about market failure and 
options for government action apply generally, 
but with diff erent specific implications as cases 
change. In particular, for a number of reasons, 
we can predict that the phenomenon of private-
sector neglect and national under-investment in 
agricultural R&D is likely to be more pronounced in 
less-developed countries than in developed ones, 
and this prediction is borne out by the facts. Why is 
this so, and what does it imply? 
First, less-developed countries are commonly 
characterized as having a comparatively high 
incidence of incomplete markets, resulting from 
high transaction costs and inadequate property
rights, which in turn may be attributable to
inadequate infrastructure and defective institutions, 
among other things. To the extent that they exist, 
information problems, high costs of transport and 
communication, ill-functioning credit markets, and 
the like, combined with less-educated farmers, 
are likely to make it harder to capitalize on new 
inventions. In rich countries, we might discount 
the issues of risk and capital costs as factors that 
discourage investment in invention, but in less-
developed countries these factors might take on a 
diff erent meaning, especially if capital markets do 
not function well—for whatever reason. 
Second, the types of technologies suited to much 
of less-developed country agriculture have hitherto
been of the sort for which appropriability problems 
are more pronounced—types of technology that 
have been comparatively neglected by the private 
sector even in the richest countries. In particular, 
until recently, private research has tended to
emphasize mechanical and chemical technologies, 
which are comparatively well protected by patents,
trade secrecy and other intellectual property rights; 
and the private sector has generally neglected 
varietal technologies except where the returns are 
appropriable, such as for hybrid seed (see Knudson 
and Ruttan 1988). In less-developed countries 
the emphasis in innovation has often been on 
self-pollinating crop varieties and disembodied 
farm management practices, which are the least 
appropriable of all. The recent innovations in rich-
country institutions mean that private fi rms are 
now finding it more profitable to invest in plant 
varieties, and the same may be true in some less-
developed countries, but not all countries have
made comparable institutional changes. Only 
when we achieve a reasonable rate of inventor 
appropriability of the returns to the technologies 
that are applicable in less-developed countries, 
combined with an economic infrastructure that 
facilitates adoption of those technologies, can we
expect a significant private-sector role to emerge. 
A third factor is that in many less-developed 
countries, prices have been distorted by policies 
in ways that meant incentives and opportunities 
for farmers to adopt new technologies were
diminished (see Schultz 1978, Alston and Pardey 
1993, and Sunding and Zilberman 2002). 
Fourth, government revenues may be 
comparatively expensive, or have a comparatively 
high opportunity cost in less-developed countries. 
This can be so because it is comparatively expensive 
to raise government revenues through general 
taxation measures. And it can be seen to be so when 
we consider that many less-developed countries 
are characterized by under-investment in a host 
of other public goods, such as transportation and 
communications infrastructure, schools, hospitals, 
and the like, as well as agricultural science (Runge 
et al. 2003). These other activities, like agricultural 
science, might also have high social rates of return. SC
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Fifth, there are political factors to consider. In
rich countries, agriculture is a small share of 
the economy, and any individual citizen bears a 
negligible burden from financing a comparatively 
high rate of public investment in agricultural R&D. 
The factors that account for high rates of general 
support for agriculture in the industrialized 
countries can also help account for their 
comparatively high public agricultural research 
intensities. In many less-developed countries, 
where agriculture represents a much greater share 
of the total economic activity, and where per capita 
incomes are much lower, a meaningful investment 
in public agricultural research might have a much 
more appreciable impact on individual citizens— 
and the problem is that this burden is felt now,
while the payoff it promises may take a long time 
to come, and will be much less visible when it 
does. 
Finally, even among the rich countries of the 
world, most have not had very substantial private 
or public agricultural science industries; so why 
should we expect the poorest countries of the 
world to be more like the richest of the rich in 
this regard? The lion’s share of the investment in 
agricultural science has been undertaken by a small 
number of countries, and these have also been the 
countries that have undertaken the lion’s share 
of scientific research, more generally (see Pardey 
et al. 2006). Typically, these have been the larger, 
economic power-houses, especially the United 
States. Differences in per capita income, the total 
size of the economy, and comparative advantage 
in science (reflecting not just wealth but also the 
nature of the society), may all be factors that have
determined the international distribution of the 
burden of agricultural R&D investments. 
Economies of Size, Scale, and 
 
Scope in Agricultural R&D
 

It might not make much economic sense for small, 
poor, agrarian nations to spend their comparatively 
scarce intellectual and other capital resources in 
agricultural science, on their own behalf, in a world 
in which other countries can do it so much more 
effectively, and are doing so. And, in the past it has 
been an effective strategy for many nations to free-
ride on the efforts of a few others in agricultural 
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R&D. Both inadvertent technology spillovers and 
international initiatives such as the Consultative 
Group on Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and 
bilateral agricultural R&D development aid might 
have crowded out some national investments in 
agricultural R&D in less-developed countries. 
An important consideration is economies of size,
scale, and scope in research, which infl uence the 
optimal size and portfolio of a given research 
institution. In some cases the “optimal” institution 
may efficiently provide research for a state or 
region within a nation, but for some kinds of 
research the efficient scale of institutions may be 
too great for an individual nation (see, for example, 
Byerlee and Traxler 2001). Many nations may be 
too small to achieve an efficient scale in much if 
any of the relevant elements of their agricultural 
R&D interests, except perhaps in certain types of 
adaptive research. Table 1, for example, shows that 
40 percent of the agricultural research agencies in 
sub-Saharan Africa employed fewer than fi ve full-
time-equivalent researchers in 2000; 93 percent of 
the region’s agricultural R&D agencies employed 
fewer than 50 researchers. 
A particular problem for global effi  ciency in 
agricultural science, and for many smaller 
countries, is that we do not have eff ective 
institutions for financing and organizing research 
on a multinational basis for those instances where 
the research is applicable across multiple countries 
and where individual countries are too small to
achieve effi  cient scale.7 R&D clusters or other forms 
of collective action in R&D could be developed as 
a means of achieving an effi  cient scale of research 
operation and the application of the results of 
research, but against that must be offset the added 
costs of collaboration across research agencies, 
perhaps operating in diff erent countries (see 
section 2.3 below and Pardey, Wood and Hertford 
2007). 
2.2 CHANGING INCENTIVES 
TO INNOVATE 
The output of innovation activities can often be 
easily copied and then used by others who had no 
7 Jin, Rozelle, Alston and Huang (2005) provide evidence on 
scale and scope effects of R&D in China. 18 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1: Size Distribution of Agricultural Research Agencies in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000 
Source: Beintema and Stads (2004). 
Number of fte researchers Government Higher education Nonprofi t Private Total 
Principal Other 
(number of agencies) 
Less than 5 7 34 103 7 24 175 
5 – 9 7 27 42 4 5 85 
10 – 19 15 14 32 5 – 66 
20 – 49 29 16 23 3 – 71 
50 – 99 11 3 – 1 – 15 
100 – 200 10 – – – – 10 
Greater than 200 5 – – – – 5 
Total 84 94 200 20 29 427 
role in its production in ways that do not diminish 
the availability of the innovation to other users. 
These characteristics of non-excludability and 
non-rivalry help enhance the social value of an 
innovation by increasing the speed and reducing 
the cost of diffusion to potential users and 
reducing the price of the products of innovation 
to consumers, if the innovation has already been 
made. However, lack of excludability often means 
there is insufficient incentive for the private sector 
to produce the innovation in the fi rst place. Absent 
some form of public intervention, it is often argued, 
the extent of innovation is limited because the 
appropriable returns to innovators are far less than 
the social benefi ts. 
Intellectual property rights (IPR) such as patents,
trademarks, plant breeders’ rights and copyrights 
are among the more prominent public policy 
responses intended to stimulate the creation and 
dissemination of inventions. The scope, economic 
costs and administrative processes of these types of 
IPR vary, such that policy choices concerning which 
IPR to offer and practical decisions about which IPR 
to seek are governed by the nature of innovations. 
The patent system, which provides the innovator 
a monopoly right for a limited period in return 
for the disclosure of the innovation, has attracted 
much attention, partly because of its economic 
and political implications. In recent years, many 
countries have strengthened their patent systems 
as part of domestic initiatives to upgrade their 
national innovation systems (Mowery 1998), or 
to comply with post-TRIPS bilateral or multilateral 
agreements. Plant breeders’ rights are a form of a 
sui generis system specifically geared to protect 
plant varieties, though the scope of protection is 
much weaker than that of patents (Table 2).8 
The incentive effects of patents have long been 
recognized, as have the costs of restricting the use 
of the patented product or process for the duration 
of the patent monopoly. In spite of generally 
wide support—at least among private innovators 
and policy makers—for government-sanctioned 
systems of intellectual property rights as part of 
a modern system of innovation and economic 
development, a substantial minority holds a 
different view (see, for example, Boldrin and Levine 
2002). 
Mechanisms such as research contracts and prizes 
may also be effective in generating new innovations 
in certain circumstances (Wright et al. 2007). One 
way to avoid monopoly pricing, which distorts the 
innovative incentive, is for governments to collect 
research funds using an effi  cient tax system then 
distribute them to researchers through an efficient 
system of research contracts and make the fi nal 
research output freely available. Alternatively, 
a government may award a prize to the fi rst to
invent and pass the innovation immediately into
the public domain. While these types of innovation 
8 Sui generis in Latin means “of its own kind,” and in TRIPS— 
the multilateral Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights agreement among the members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) developed during the 1986-1994 Uruguay 
Round negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariff s and 
Trade (GATT)—the phrase is used to indicate a fl exibility whereby 
WTO member countries can individually design a system of plant 
variety protection tailored to their country circumstances. 
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Table 2: Illustrative Sui Generis Legislation 
Source: Compiled by Koo and Pardey based on the respective legislation obtained from various on-line sources. 
a Plants that require the protected variety for their production 
b Community Plant Variety Right 
c Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act 
Name of System Key Features 
UPOV Convention Plant Breeders’ Rights confers right to exclude others from 
producing, reproducing, or propagating 
selling, offering for sale or other marketing 
exporting or importing; and 
stocking the variety for any of the above 
rights extend to ‘essentially derived varieties’a 
breeder’s exemption from infringement (optional in 1991 Act) 
farmer’s privilege to save seed (optional in 1991 Act) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
United States Plant Variety Protection covers sexually reproduced plants, including first generation hybrids and 
tuber propagated plant varieties 
rights same as 1991 UPOV Convention 
limited farmer’s exemption: seed may be saved for replanting only on farmer’s
own land, but if not used, saved seed may be sold 
breeder’s exemption available 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Plant Patents only covers asexually reproduced plant varieties 
plants may be newly found or cultivated 
protection is for a single plant or genome 
no experimental use or breeders’ exceptions to infringement 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Utility Patents patentable subject matter includes plant varieties, parts of plants, genetically 
engineered organisms, processes of transforming cells and expressing 
proteins, gene or methodology 
can have multiple claims for different aspects of inventions 
no breeder’s or farmer’s exemptions, but has a very narrow experimental 
exemption 
more expensive to seek and sustain, but has stronger and broader protection 
• 
• 
• 
• 
European Union CPVRb rights same as 1991 UPOV Convention 
farmer’s privilege only for a limited number of fodder plants, cereals, potatoes, 
and oil and fiber plants and only available to farmers with small holdings 
breeder’s exemption available 
protection is alternative to that given individually by member countries 
• 
• 
• 
• 
India PPVFRc protectable plant varieties include 
new varieties 
extant varieties 
essentially derived varieties 
farmers’ varieties 
farmers may save, use, sow, re-sow, exchange, share or sell her farm produce 
exemptions for research 
compulsory licensing provided for 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
processes avoid monopoly pricing behavior and 
thereby increase consumer benefits, the problem 
remains of setting the right prize or contract
support according to the value of the innovation. 
More recently, “open source” approaches to
developing software products using, for example, 
Apache and Linux have attracted much attention 
as a collaborative approach to innovation 
development (Benkler 2004). Explanations for the 
incentive to reveal one’s innovations in an open 
source context include the “career concerns” of 
participants who expect to gain indirectly from 
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the reputational effects of involvement in open 
source (Lerner and Tirole 2002), the effi  ciency of 
a decentralized approach to debugging a system 
with millions of potential confi gurations (Bessen 
2004), the intrinsic motivation of delight in 
solving an intellectual challenge, and the reward
of recognition by one’s peers. Some people argue 
that this approach offers a way of reconciling the 
public interest in minimizing restrictions on access 
to new technologies (Lerner and Tirole 2005), 
and thus similar innovation systems have been 
suggested in other areas of industry. The recent 
Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS) 20 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
initiative arising out of CAMBIA is an attempt to
initiate open-source development of key enabling 
technologies for agricultural biotechnology using 
licensing strategies inspired by the open source
movement in software (Nature 2004). In addition, 
the Public-Sector Intellectual Property Resource
for Agriculture (PIPRA) initiative is an attempt 
by public and nonprofit researchers to provide 
mutually consenting parties with reciprocal access 
to their proprietary technologies, while also 
making such technologies available to developing-
country researchers in ways that do not relinquish 
licensing options and potential royalty revenues 
from private-sector entities in developed countries 
(Graff et al. 2003; Atkinson et al. 2003; and Delmer 
et al. 2003). 
Patents—Their Pros and Cons 
The specific characteristics of information goods 
are such that a first-best solution is unattainable. 
Patents are a second-best solution in that their 
positive effects on incentives to innovate are 
balanced against the negative monopoly eff ects 
that come with the market provision of patented 
innovations. Alternative incentive mechanisms, 
such as research contracts and prizes, avoid the 
costs of patent monopolies. However, as Wright 
(1983) showed, the superiority of one mechanism 
over another depends on the relevant information 
held by each party. If innovators hold superior 
information about the cost of research or the value 
of the (pending) innovation, then patents can be 
a superior incentive mechanism to contracts or 
prizes.9 
These insights explain the success of an innovation 
system that has given rise to a high rate of technical 
change in agriculture over the past century, long 
before intellectual property rights became a 
significant force in the agricultural biosciences. 
When the overall objective (more food at lower 
prices or improved nutrition and public health, 
9 Kremer (1998) proposed buying out patents as a means of 
retaining the incentive to innovate advantages of a patent system 
while avoiding the monopoly price distortions that go with such a 
system. Masters (2003 and 2005) has advocated a system of prizes 
calculated as a percentage of the surplus generated in African 
agriculture to partially compensate innovations targeted to this 
sector. Shavell and Ypersele (2001) showed that a reward system 
(such as a prize) when combined with a patent system can be 
superior to the patent system alone. 
for example) was clear and the information gaps 
between those funding and those doing the 
research were limited, block funding or contract
research (supplemented by “prizes,” including 
professional recognition, academic tenure 
and salary enhancements) called forth much 
innovative effort that yielded high rates of return 
overall compared with many other forms of public 
investments. 
Another aspect of the patent system that is 
especially pertinent to agriculture involves the 
dynamic distortion of incentives arising from 
the cumulative nature of many innovation 
processes in agriculture (for example, most 
crop breeding research, wherein each round of 
varietal improvement draws directly on the many 
rounds of R&D that preceded it). A special case of 
cumulative innovation involves the development 
of research tools—that is, products or processes 
whose value stems solely from their input to
follow-on innovations (Koo and Wright 2005). One 
prominent example in agriculture is the suite of 
inventions that make possible agrobacterium­
mediated transformations of plants (Roa-Rodriquez 
et al. 2003). When innovation is cumulative, a 
strong patent on an initial innovation might 
stimulate the earlier-than-otherwise development 
of the innovation but reduce the incentive for 
subsequent innovations, while a weak patent may 
not even induce the initial innovation thereby 
undercutting subsequent innovations. This 
intertemporal, dynamic distortion of incentives 
can be more serious than the static ineffi  ciency 
of the monopoly loss because the entire research 
sequence can easily be blocked if incentives at any 
stage are inappropriate. 
In agricultural biotechnology, concerns have also 
been expressed about research hold-ups arising 
from independent claims on multiple, mutually 
blocking inputs. A frequently cited example is 
the intellectual property landscape surrounding 
the development of Golden Rice technology, 
as described in Kryder et al. (2000).10 Relatedly, 
10 Binenbaum et al. (2003) questioned the veracity of these 
claims in most developing-country contexts. For the specifi c 
case of Golden Rice, the technology timeline described in 
Box 1 of this report makes readily apparent that factors other 
than constraints on access to intellectual property have been 
important determinants of the length of time required to develop 
and commercialize this new technology. 
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by Jorge Mayer, Golden Rice Project Manager, Campus Technologies Freiburg 
Worldwide, more than 10 million children die every year from malnutrition. Simple measures, like 
breastfeeding, vitamin A and zinc supplementation could reduce the death toll by 25 percent (Black 
et al. 2003). The main energy nutrition sources in developing countries are starchy crops low in 
provitamin A and other micronutrients. Some 127 million preschool children or about one-quarter 
of all preschool children in high-risk regions of the developing world are vitamin A defi cient. Vitamin 
A deficiency, alone or combined with other nutrient deficiencies, can lead to night blindness and 
ultimately irreversible eye damage, growth retardation, damage of mucous membrane tracts, 
and reproductive disorders, and increased risk of severe morbidity and mortality from common 
childhood infections such as diarrheal diseases and measles (Sommer et al. 1983). 
Conventional intervention strategies, like industrial fortification of foodstuff s and supplementation 
with vitamin capsules, have achieved notable improvement in a number of countries, yet overall 
coverage generally reaches only 55 percent of children under the age of five, while older children and 
lactating women are not targeted at all (UNICEF 2003). While urban dwellers have access to fortifi ed 
foodstuffs, e.g., provitamin A-enriched oil or butter, the rural poor depend on supplementation 
programs. These interventions are limited by cumbersome logistics and costs that for a country as 
small as Nepal or Ghana amount to about $2 million annually (MOST, USAID 2004). Children receive 
two annual megadoses of vitamin A at best, and their vitamin blood levels will be depleted before 
receiving the next dose. 
Biofortified crop plants that produce or accumulate the desired nutrients can deliver micronutrients 
in a sustainable way. Biofortification can be achieved by conventional breeding, unless the desired 
trait is not available in existing, sexually compatible germplasm, as is the case in rice. This is where 
genetic engineering comes into play. Once a desirable trait has been introduced into a variety,
it can be easily transferred to any locally adapted variety by conventional breeding, as is being 
done at present with Golden Rice. Even though the feasibility of provitamin-A-biofortified rice was 
demonstrated in 1999 (Ye et al. 2000), delivery of this technology to the target population will 
not be achieved before 2012, to a great extent because of regulatory hurdles (Al-Babili and Beyer 
2005).1 The Golden Rice Humanitarian Board is working with national and international institutions 
towards deployment of this technology to smallholders in aff ected regions. 
Technology Timeline 
1992 Golden Rice project initiated by Ingo Potrykus (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich) 
and Peter Beyer (Univ of Freiburg) with support from the Rockefeller Foundation [(Gura
1999)] (Potrykus 2001). 
1999 Breakthrough proof-of-concept Golden Rice at 1.6 μg/g beta-carotene. Two genes, one 
from daffodil and one from the soil bacterium Erwinia uredovora, were introduced into the 
japonica variety TP309. 
2000 Publication in Science by Ye et al. and extensive publicity (for example, July 31 cover story of 
Time magazine). Also, beginning of campaigns by opponents of the technology. 
2001 Humanitarian License Agreement with Syngenta.2 
Establishment of Golden Rice Network; most partners in SE Asia. 
1 See, for example, Kalaitzandonakes et al. (2007) and Manlo and Ramon (2007). 
2 For details see www.goldenrice.org. 
Box 1: Golden Rice 
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2002 Introduction of the trait into indica and javanica (American long-grain varieties) rice varieties 
and improved beta-carotene accumulation levels; work by the University of Freiburg and 
Syngenta, respectively (Hoa et al. 2003). 
2004 First GR field trial in Louisiana. 
2005 GR2 developed, with 23X higher beta-carotene level over prototype; work by Syngenta 
and donated to the Golden Rice project (Paine et al. 2005). Daffodil gene replaced with corn 
homologue. 
Initiated backcrossing of the trait into locally adapted indica varieties in the Philippines, 
India and Vietnam. 
Start of Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation funded 5-year biofortification project (GR + iron, 
zinc, high-quality protein, vitamin E) 
2006 Bioinformatic study and clearance on allergenic potential (Goodman 2006). 
Establishment of Indian Golden Rice Product Development Group. 
Ex-ante socio-economic impact studies for GR in India and Bangladesh (Stein et al. 2006 and 
2007; Zimmermann and Ahmed 2006).3 
2007 Bioavailability studies in the United States. 
2008 Bioavailability studies in China. 
Regulatory approval process in India and the Philippines. 
2009 Multi-location trials planned for India and the Philippines. 
2010 Large-scale open-field trials in both countries. 
2011 Varietal registration process and seed multiplication. 
2012 Anticipated first delivery to farmers in India and the Philippines. 
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Box 1 (continued) 
decentralized ownership of blocking claims in 
the presence of signifi cant transaction costs, 
introduces the possibility of an “anti-commons” 
phenomenon—the underutilization of innovations 
subject to multiple, fragmented (perhaps uncertain, 
or at least legally untested) property rights (Heller 
and Eisenberg 1998). 
Changing Intellectual Property 
 
Rights Regimes
 

Putting policies and legal frameworks into place 
to protect plant varieties is one thing, seeking 
and maintaining varietal rights is a related but 
separate thing. Not least, exclusionary IP rights 
such as patents or plant breeders’ rights are costly 
to obtain and to exercise, meaning economic 
choices based on the benefits versus costs of 
the rights are paramount.11 Notably, signifi cant 
shares of agriculture in many developing countries 
involve subsistence or semi-subsistence cropping 
systems, with limited commercial opportunities 
11 It is worth noting that intellectual property rights only 
pertain to the jurisdiction in which they are awarded, meaning 
obtaining patents or plant breeders' rights in multiple jurisdictions 
(countries) requires incurring the costs of applying for such rights 
in each and every jurisdiction. See footnote 14 for an exception 
to this situation in the case of European member countries of the 
Community Plant Variety Offi  ce (CPVO). 
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to market seed and consequently less incentive to
seek varietal rights, even if a legal option to do so 
existed.12 
Bearing these aspects in mind what is the evolving 
status of IPRs worldwide, particularly regarding 
those rights that pertain to plant varieties? Briefl y,
we observe that 
•	 Among the 150 member countries of the 
World Trade Organization (as of January 2007), 
a total of 63 countries were also members of 
the International Convention for the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants, commonly known 
by its French acronym UPOV (as of November 
2006).13 
•	 A total of 172,629 plant breeders’ rights 
applications have been lodged worldwide 
since the early 1970s. Rich countries accounted 
12 Box 2 describes current efforts to (re-)develop commercial 
seed sectors in sub-Saharan Africa. 
13 Many countries base their plant breeders' rights (PBR) 
legislation on the model PBR system called UPOV. UPOV was 
established by a group of Western European countries in Paris in 
1961, and revised in 1972, 1978 and 1991. The only international 
intellectual property convention focused directly on agriculture, it 
is directed primarily to the interests of commercial plant breeders’ 
and originally aimed to offer them an alternative to utility patents 
for protection of plant varieties, including both sexually and 
asexually propagated varieties. 24 
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for a high of 96 percent of the 
total applications lodged in 1981­
85, declining to 77 percent of the 
Figure 7: Plant Breeders  Rights Applications for 
Countries Grouped by Income, 1971-2003 
applications lodged in 2001-05. 12000 
In contrast, applications for plant 
breeders’ rights filed in upper- 10000 
middle-income countries have
grown steadily since the early 
1980s, but the number from lower-
middle-income countries began 
to rise only in the late 1990s and is 
still negligible (Figure 7). 
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•	 A total of 50,155 plant breeders’ 2000 

rights (PBR) applications were 

lodged worldwide in the period 0 

1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 20032001-2005, of which 5,355 (11 
 
percent) were filed in the United Year
 

States and 12,286 (24 percent) in 
 Source: UPOV (2006).
 

European member states of the 
 Note: The spike in 1995 reflects 3,161 applications reported by CPVO, the 
Community Plant Variety Offi  ce first year that data from this source were included in the UPOV series. 
(CPVO). Nearly one-third of CPVO 
 
applications were lodged in the 
 
Netherlands, and more than one-
 improvement research done in one locale on 
fifth in France.14
 seed market and production developments 
elsewhere in the world. Notably the share 
•	 One-third of the PBR applications lodged in the of resident applications has risen steadily 
57 UPOV member countries during the period in upper-middle income countries, perhaps 
2001–2005 were made by foreigners (Table an indication of an increase in the domestic 
3). There is some variation among regions in incentives to innovate as well as protect locally 
the foreign share of local PBRs. The variation developed plant varieties (Figure 8). 

is even more apparent in individual countries; 

for example, the share of applications fi led •	 Ornamental crops account for more than half 
by foreigners is 87 percent in Switzerland, 50 the total applications in both the United States 
percent in the United States, 27 percent in and Europe (Figure 9), while cereal crops (such 
Japan, and 10 percent in France.This substantial as wheat and corn) is the next biggest group 
fraction of foreign applications indicates (11 percent in the United States and 15 percent 
extensive potential spillovers of varietal in Europe). Other major groups of plants that 
are protected include oil and fi ber plants, fruit 
14 Prior to April 27, 1995 when the Community Plant Variety crops, and vegetables. 
Office (CPVO) was established, a breeder seeking protection 
for a variety throughout the European Union was required to 
Summing up, it is evident that plant variety submit an application to each of the member states. Now, with a 
single application to the CPVO, a breeder can be granted varietal rights are still heavily biased to rich-country 
protection rights throughout the European Union. This European-
jurisdictions and heavily biased to higher-valued wide system—CPVO members currently include Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, fruits, vegetables and ornamentals. The extent of 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
formal intellectual property rights pertaining toUnited Kingdom—operates in parallel with respective national 
systems, although the owner of a variety cannot simultaneously plants is on the rise in selected developing-country 
exploit both a community plant variety right (CPVR) and a national 
jurisdictions—notably Brazil, China and India—, plant breeders’ right in relation to that variety. Individuals or 
companies from member states of UPOV that not members but the vast majority of crops in the vast majority of 
of the European Union, can also apply, provided that an agent 
developing counties are still subject to little if any domiciled in the Community has been nominated. The duration 
of CPVR protection is 25 years for most crops, and 30 years for 
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potato, vine and tree varieties. 25 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
Table 3: Number and Share of Plant Breeder Rights Applications Lodged by Residents and 
Foreigners 
Source: UPOV (Plant Variety Protection Statistics for the period of 1998- 2002, UPOV C/37/7, 2003) and UPOV (Plant Variety 
Protection Statistics for the period of 2001- 2005, UPOV C/40/7, 2006). 
Note: The bracketed figures indicate the number of countries included. 
1998-2005 2001-2005 
Economies Total Residents Non-residents 
Number of applications (count) 
High income economies (23) 87,638 59,268 28,370 14,849 
Upper middle income economies (17) 17,833 9,485 8,348 3,839 
Lower middle income economies (14) 9,144 6,129 3,015 1,886 
Low income economies (3) 662 364 298 175 
Total (57) 115,277 75,246 40,031 20,749 
Share of the total (percentage) 
High income economies (23) 100 68 32 35 
Upper middle income economies (17) 100 53 47 41 
Lower middle income economies (14) 100 67 33 26 
Low income economies (3) 100 55 45 39 
Total (57) 100 65 35 35 
effective, legally sanctioned forms of 
intellectual property protection.15 
Figure 8: The Share of Domestic Applications of Plant 
Breeders Rights, 1998-2005 
100 
2.3 COLLECTIVE 
ACTION IN R&D 
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Much modern (agricultural) research 
entails collective action—be it 
informal, collegial review and advice 
or more purposeful collaboration 
among colleagues working within 
a department; jointly conceived or 
conducted disciplinary or multi­
disciplinary research; more formal Sh
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public, private-non-profit, and private-
for-profit partnerships involving the 
pooling or sharing of tacit knowledge 
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or more tangible forms of intellectual 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
property; or large international Year 
research consortia. Collective action 
spans the gamut of innovation Source: See Figure 6. 
processes, from jointly conceiving 
the research through to its funding, 
conduct and the dissemination- development (R&D). Indeed, the interplay among 
cum-marketing of the results of research and 	 these different elements often lies at the core of 
the conceptual and practical problems concerning 
collective action in R&D, be it efforts to develop 
15 For additional information on the developments concerning “regional approaches” to R&D—such as the Latin 
crop varietal rights in developing countries, see Koo et al. (2006), 
Louwaars et al. (2005) and Srinivasen (2005).	 	 American Fund for Irrigated Rice Research (FLAR), 26 
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agricultural R&D agencies can be 
Figure 9: Plant Breeders  Rights Stratified by Crop 
Categories 
R&D Participants 
In defining the range of agencies 
engaged in R&D, all potential 
categories of partner organizations 
are represented: national government 
100% 
80% agencies, public and private 
universities in developing and 
industrialized countries, NGOs 
in developing and industrialized 
countries, regional organizations, 
60% 
40% development organizations, advanced 
research institutes, international 
agricultural research centers, and the 20% 
private sector; including those who 
conduct as well as fund agricultural 
0% research. Government agencies diff er 
US Europe widely in their resource base and 
(total applications = 25,303) (total applications = 89,545) 
capabilities. 
Others Cereals Oil/fiber Vegetable Fruit Ornamentals 
Following Byerlee and Fischer (2002), 
Source: UPOV (2006, CD rom) for European data and USPTO and USDA 
website for the U.S. data. 
the Regional Fund for Agricultural Technology for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (FONTAGRO), 
and the Association for Strengthening Agricultural 
Research in Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA)— 
public-private joint research ventures, less formal 
partnerships, and so forth. 
Several disparate strands of economic, business 
and legal literatures, including industrial 
organization, contract theory, transaction cost 
economics, strategic management, knowledge 
management, and evolutionary economics, 
contribute to the analysis, evaluation and design 
of such partnerships. While these approaches have
not yet been integrated into a single coherent 
framework (Hagedoorn et al. 2000), several 
partial attempts at such integration are currently 
underway (Spielman et al. 2006; Binenbaum 2006). 
In the section to follow we collate elements from 
this extremely diverse literature and describe some 
practical examples that are particularly salient for 
understanding the potentials and the pitfalls of 
partnerships in agricultural R&D for developing 
countries. 
categorized into three groups. Type 
1 agencies found in developing 
countries such as India, China, 
Brazil, Mexico and South Africa are 
deemed to have comparatively strong capacity 
in molecular biology and an elaborate plant 
breeding infrastructure. Type 2 agencies have
the capacity to apply molecular tools and have
significant breeding infrastructure, while Type 3 
agencies have “no capacity in molecular biology 
and very fragile capacities in plant breeding” 
(Byerlee and Fischer 2002, p.932-3). These wide 
differences obviously have major implications for 
the objectives, suitability and design of various 
kinds of partnerships involving public agencies 
throughout the developing world. 
The “new philanthropists,” including initiatives 
funded by large agri-biotech corporations such 
as Monsanto and Syngenta as well as fi nance and 
expertise originating from other sectors (e.g., the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation or initiatives 
from companies such as IBM or Google) may well 
signifi cantly affect the scope and modus operandi 
of many agri-food R&D partnerships going forward.
Micro-financing institutions—many of which are 
based locally in developing countries—may also 
play an increasing role in collectively funded agri­
food R&D. These newcomers may well generate 
and help fund innovatively designed public-private 
partnerships. 
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by Richard Jones, ICRISAT Assistant Director—Eastern and Southern Africa 
Improved seed of well-adapted crop varieties, along with other modern inputs, increases the value 
and productivity of assets—land, labor or capital. The resulting productivity and quality gains 
should drive the development of viable seed systems and yet most small-scale farmers in sub-
Saharan Africa continue to rely on indigenous seed systems.1 
The ability of small-scale farmers to experiment with improved seed is limited both by poverty 
and their aversion to risk. There are documented examples of the inappropriateness of improved 
varieties—particularly under traditional management (see Jones et al. 2002)—that has led some 
observers to dismiss the benefits of crop improvement programs. However, advances in science 
and technology and the widespread adoption of participatory research methods in response to
these criticisms has resulted in the development of better-adapted material that has been widely 
adopted by some of the poorest farmers when they have been able to access improved seed of 
these varieties (Jones et al. 2001). 
The liberalization of seed markets during the past decade or so has encouraged international 
seed companies to increase their stake in the market. For example in pre-liberalized Malawi the 
parastatal National Seed Company of Malawi (NSCM) was the only company, but just over a decade 
later four multi-nationals were marketing seed and NSCM was sold to Cargill and subsequently to
Monsanto. These same companies market seed regionally in most countries of Eastern and Southern 
Africa. A handful of smaller seed companies have also been established. In Kenya there are now 
58 registered seed companies. However, most small-scale farmers still have little or no access to
new varieties—particularly for open, self-pollinated, and vegetatively propagated crops other than 
maize, vegetables and some cash crops like cotton. Many varieties released by national authorities 
are rarely multiplied for commercial distribution. 
Several factors help explain the limited development of regional seed markets. One explanation 
is that high market transaction costs raise the price of seed to unacceptable levels in rural markets 
and leads companies to concentrate on a few well established seed crops that they know farmers 
will buy (e.g., maize, vegetables, and cash crops). These costs are reinforced by the high overheads 
of larger seed companies—including the costs of maintaining crop breeding programs. By this 
argument smaller seed companies without research overheads may be capable of supplying seed 
of secondary crops at competitive prices. Policy and regulatory improvements are expected to
facilitate the growth of existing seed companies, but there is still a need to support the further 
development of local seed companies. Smaller seed companies without research overheads 
and operating at a state or district level can reduce some transport and delivery costs. They also 
can deliver seeds with local demand that do not have enough broad appeal to be produced by
multinationals. These companies are well placed to have a better knowledge of local performance 
and farmer preference, and are able to facilitate local distribution. 
How to support the development of smaller seed companies? Regular demand for seed needed 
to sustain commercial seed businesses is largely derived from the price and quality demands 
of functioning output markets as opposed to the inconsistent demand for relief seed. Seed 
entrepreneurs wanting to market seed need access to novel varieties, input distribution networks, 
seed storage and processing facilities, technical support, business development services and 
finance, all of which has to be tailored to the special needs of seed businesses. As seed quality 
cannot be observed by the buyer, an effective regulatory environment is required that includes 
the establishment and enforcement of appropriate and relevant seed certification standards to
differentiate seed from grain and to stop opportunists from marketing grain as seed. 
1 Seed is used for convenience and denotes planting material whether botanical seed or the portions of the plant such as 
roots, tubers, corms, vines or planting sticks. 
Box 2: (Re-)Developing African Seed Systems 
continued u
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An initiative has been started to establish Seed Enterprise Enhancement and Development Services 
(SEEDS) across sub-Saharan Africa that will facilitate access to these services. SEEDS are intended 
to be autonomous not-for-profit organizations with public/private oversight, for the sole purpose 
of identifying, promoting and assisting the development of existing and potential private seed 
businesses within a defined geographical area—in summary a one-stop service (fee-based) and 
support (development-funded) center for seed company development. Where plant breeders’ rights 
have been established, an additional role for SEEDS will potentially be to manage the collection of 
royalties on behalf of the national agricultural research system and to use licensing as a way to
stimulate commercial investment in seed production and marketing. 
The poor performance of public institutions in disseminating improved varieties to small-scale 
farmers is broadly accepted, and there is an urgent need to design and test new institutional 
arrangements that combine public investments in crop improvement with commercial seed delivery.
This is the focus of several initiatives including the USAID funded program for the Sustainable 
Commercialization of Seeds in Africa (SCOSA) and the joint Bill and Melinda Gates and Rockefeller 
Foundations Program for Africa’s Seed Systems (PASS). 
References 
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Box 2 (continued) 
R&D Themes—Roles of 
Collective Institutions 
A preponderance of collective R&D institutions 
or undertakings have specific thematic profi les.
Themes may include commodities or crops (e.g., 
irrigated rice in the case of FLAR); location (e.g., 
a region like Sub-Saharan Africa); aspects of agri­
food systems (e.g., irrigation, soil, precision of input 
usage, pest control, or agri-food supply chain); 
ecosystem, climate, or habitat type; or a specifi c 
type of problem (e.g., a specific pest species). Many
R&D partnerships involve a mix of such themes. For 
example, FLAR is both a regional and crop-based 
institution. 
A wide range of roles, in various combinations, 
may be assumed by collective R&D institutions. 
Some partnerships focus on funding and carrying 
out crop-improvement research, such as FLAR on 
rice. R&D activities suitable for being carried out 
through the partnership range from upstream 
research such as genome sequencing all the way to
downstream product development and evaluation, 
involving field trials and communication channels 
for farmer feedback. Other collective institutions, 
such as FONTAGRO and ASARECA, do not 
undertake R&D but rather raise and allocate funds 
to others who perform the research. Part of this 
role is to conduct or coordinate research impact 
assessments. Another important set of roles 
involves coordinating and facilitating collective 
research, distinct from funding or performing 
R&D. Because R&D partnerships have many 
possible organizational structures, membership 
arrangements, incentive issues and solutions, and 
innovation pathways, there is much scope for 
institutional innovation. Moreover, prospective 
partners may not know of each other’s existence,
or they may be unaware of what they can off er 
each other. Hence a potentially useful role consists 
of merely bringing potential partners together and 
helping them catalyze partnerships. ASARECA and 
the International Network for the Improvement 
of Banana and Plantain (INIBAP, part of IPGRI) are 
examples of collective institutions that have taken 
on this role.16 Collective R&D action also entails 
16 Plucknett, Smith and Ozgediz (1990) provide a 
comprehensive listing of the myriad of networking activities in 
the agricultural sciences through the late 1980s. 
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the joint provision and utilization of research 
infrastructure, including facilities for germplasm 
conservation, genetic evaluation, and the storage, 
integration and exchange of information. Examples 
include the genebanks of mandate crops at the 
CGIAR Centers such as IRRI, CIMMYT, CIAT, IPGRI 
(INIBAP) and ICRISAT, and the International Network 
for the Genetic Evaluation of Rice (INGER). Finally, 
educational, training and extension activities are 
often a component of collective R&D institutions. 
Incentives for and Impediments to 
Collective Action in (Agricultural) R&D 
Research is an intrinsically competitive enterprise, 
be it scientists racing to be credited with having 
been the first to discover, or firms to be fi rst to
invent (and patent perhaps), or countries striving to
sustain or create comparative advantage through 
the technological advances that R&D makes 
possible. Why then do scientists, firms or countries 
opt to engage in collective action regarding 
R&D? Arguable the most fundamental reason for 
collective (distinct from individual) action is the 
mutually positive externalities that may arise from 
collective undertakings, as described in some 
detail by Mancur Olson in his 1965 volume The 
Logic of Collective Action. Table 4 provides a range 
of reasons for R&D cooperation, grouped into
seven categories (adapted from Hagedoorn et al. 
2000). 
This is a useful checklist. For instance, to our 
knowledge, there are currently no agricultural 
R&D consortia for developing countries based on 
reason (5). In contrast, almost all formal collective 
action involves projects that are relatively low-risk. 
A well-designed program for collective breeding 
or agronomy such as FLAR is highly likely to
yield a reasonably high rate of return—it is not 
very risky. A genomics consortium is harder to
assess. Venture capital initiatives such as those 
undertaken by the Kilimo Trust based in Uganda 
(and underwritten by the Gatsby Foundation) 
or those envisaged by the Program for Africa’s
Seed Systems (a joint undertaking of the Gates 
and Rockefeller Foundations) to support the 
development of small- to medium-sized seed fi rms 
in Africa are efforts to diversify risks over a large 
number of small, high-risk projects. These are but 
several examples of the unrealized potential for 
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new types of collective action in agricultural R&D 
for developing countries. 
Those engaged in collective R&D partnerships face 
a number of obstacles—including but not confi ned 
to incentive problems—that may prevent them 
from realizing the full benefits of R&D cooperation. 
These impediments are also listed and elaborated 
some in Table 4. 
Partnership Patterns 
Building on the elements discussed so far that 
encompass considerations about the relevant types 
of participants, R&D partnership themes, reasons 
for partnering, and obstacles to partnering, we
identify several key patterns in R&D partnerships. 
Number of Partners—Exclusivity. Partnerships 
of just two or three members have the advantage 
of greater flexibility. Contributions and partnership 
benefits can be fine-tuned to the partner’s
objectives, needs and ability and willingness to
contribute. 
A partnership with a larger number of members 
(“consortium”) is fundamentally diff erent in 
nature. As transaction costs tend to increase 
more than proportionately with the number of 
participants, consortia are typically characterized 
by standardized arrangements. Members will vary
in their willingness to contribute, and standardized 
rules for funding and other contributions must 
satisfy the least enthusiastic members—a lowest­
common-denominator effect. For example, 
WARDA has a mandate similar to FLAR. FLAR, 
clearly a consortium, with about 14 members, 
serves larger numbers of producers and consumers 
while WARDA, an association funded by way of its 
membership of the CGIAR system, receives about 
10 times as much funding as FLAR. This is not to
say that an alternative arrangement with a smaller 
number of members would have made sense for 
FLAR; probably not, but the point is that there are 
compelling grounds to expect to observe under-
funding and a high marginal rate of return in well-
designed and well-managed R&D consortia. This 
is an argument to support developing-country 
agricultural R&D consortia with matching funding 
arrangements from development assistance 
funds. 
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The issue of (non-)exclusivity is a general problem 
for collective action, especially when it involves 
public-private partnerships. When a public 
institution forms an exclusive partnership with 
a private firm, it may expose itself to charges of 
favoritism. However, for-profit competitors may 
be unwilling to join a consortium if that entails 
the mutual sharing of sensitive technological 
and market information. Furthermore, the 
public partner(s) may prefer to establish a trust 
relationship with one or a small number of partners, 
rather than opening up the joint arrangement to
any interested parties. The trust factor certainly 
played a role in the exclusivity of CIAT’s partnership 
with Papalotla (van Schoonhoven, pers. com.).17 
17 Semillas Papalotla S.A. de C.V., launched as a family business 
in 1992, is a seed production, cleaning, marketing and distribution 
firm. The Papalotla Group consists of Semillas Papalotla, based 
in Mexico City; Tropical Seeds LLC, based in Florida, United 
States; and Tropical Seeds do Brasil Ltda, based in Mato Grosso 
do Sul, Brazil. Beginning in June 2000, CIAT entered into a series 
of agreements with Papalotla concerning the development, 
evaluation (in various production environments), and distribution 
of hybrid varieties of Brachiaria (a pasture species) developed 
by CIAT that have various desirable traits, including adaptation 
to drought, resistance to two important pests, spittlebug and 
Rhizoctonia, tolerance to high soil levels of aluminum, and high 
nutritional quality (Binenbaum, Pardey and Wright 2004). 
Table 4: Incentives for and Impediments to Collective Action in Agricultural R&D 
Reasons Obstacles 
1. Imperfect public goods. R&D outputs are typically 
(imperfect) public goods: they are characterized 
by imperfect rivalry and/or imperfect (or costly) 
appropriability, leading to market failure (e.g., Lindner 
2004). A common information base for R&D (such as 
a genome) or an industry standard (relevant to many 
agri-food products and R&D outputs) are important 
examples of consortium themes built on this reason. 
Externalities (to group) / leakage to third 
parties.  Underinvestment and free riding tend 
to be exacerbated if participants are concerned 
that some of the benefits will leak away to non­
participants or to causes that they do not support. 
2. Complementarities. Assets and resources—such 
as intellectual property, genetic and other materials, 
information, and expertise—that serve as inputs into the 
R&D process tend to be synergistic or complementary.
 Asymmetric information. Complementary bits of 
information are dispersed among consortium members.  
These may not be shared completely but instead retained 
as bargaining chips are for competitive advantage.  
Even when the players are committed to transparency 
and truthfulness, information sharing will typically be 
problematic.  Even within firms, valuable knowledge is 
not shared between individuals or units in the absence 
of an effective knowledge management system (Zack 
1999). This is all the more problematic when it comes 
to interorganizational cooperation (Holland 1995). 
3. Scale and scope eff ects. Due to economies of scale 
and scope in R&D, it may be in a group of players’ interest 
to pool resources.  For example, science parks—as 
developed by, and in the vicinity of, CIAT and ICRISAT 
(Spielman et al. 2006)—provide joint infrastructure to a 
group of R&D players (as well as facilitating networking, 
information exchange and inspiration.)  R&D funds 
may also be combined so as to create a single pool 
from which grants can be allocated more effi  ciently.
 Holdup problems. Partners postpone critical investments/ 
contributions with an eye to strengthening their bargaining 
positions in later deals.  For example, when negotiating 
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Agriculture, blocks of negotiating countries refused to
include important categories of crops in the Treaty’s sharing 
mechanism, probably in order to keep these as national 
bargaining chips in later deals, e.g., with multinationals. 
4. Technology transfer costs. R&D does not only yield 
new knowledge but also enhances an organization’s
“absorptive capacity” and hence its learning 
processes—i.e., its acquisition of existing knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1989).  R&D cooperation can 
thus be a superior vehicle for technology transfer. 
Lack of goal convergence. This is the fundamental 
problem underlying the three problems listed above.  
Even non-profits with supposedly similar missions (say,
benefiting the poor in Africa) will often have divergent 
interests because each prefers to receive budget increases 
and credit for any successes.  This may be termed “own­
institution bias” or, in extreme cases, “turf wars”.
5. Risk pooling. R&D cooperation may help players 
share and reduce risk (Dodgson 1993; Mathews 2002).  
Lack of capacity.  It will generally be difficult 
to form partnerships with players who lack 
basic capacities.  National Agricultural Research 
Systems (NARS) differ widely in this regard. 
continued u
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 Table 4 (continued) 
6. Minimizing unnecessary duplication. R&D 
cooperation may help players avoid wasteful duplication 
(Irwin and Klenow 1996; Klette et al. 2000).  
Lack of appropriate definition of rights, responsibilities, 
procedures, objectives and focus. For example: “In the case 
of CIMMYT’s Striga-Resistant Maize project, coordination costs 
were incurred from poorly defined roles and responsibilities 
for African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF), a 
not-for-profit foundation designed to facilitate PPPs for 
the access and delivery of appropriate technologies to
smallholders in Sub-Saharan Africa” (Spielman et al. 2006).  
Similarly, collaboration for Bt maize development involving 
an early Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP, 
an initiative of USAID), CRIFC (an Indonesian public research 
institute), and ICI Seeds (now AstraZeneca, a U.S. fi rm), 
failed due to lack of patent protection.  In contrast, a similar 
but later ABSP project aimed at Bt maize development 
that involved a joint venture between Pioneer Hi-Bred and 
AGERI (an Egyptian public research institute) was successful, 
in part because IPR had been carefully delineated (Lewis 
2000; Byerlee and Fischer 2002; Binenbaum and Pardey 
2004). Mission drift is a related problem.  With multiple 
sponsors, a lack of direction or focus may emerge over time. 
7. Collusive marketing behavior. Players may engage in 
R&D cooperation to establish or enhance other kinds of 
relationships.  For instance, they may use an R&D consortium 
for collusive purposes in output markets (Hagedoorn et al. 
2000). 
Market power. Where competing countries or fi rms 
collaborate in R&D, the danger of collusion in output 
markets or a coordinated reduction in innovation may 
loom. However, increased market power is in some cases 
considered to be a good thing, especially as a counterbalance 
to existing market power.  For example, farmers or 
developing countries may combine forces in order not 
to be played off against each other by multinationals.
 Cultural differences, trust, and such. As pointed out 
by Hartwich et al. (2006) and Spielman et al. (2006) and 
illustrated by them with CGIAR examples, culture clashes and 
lack of trust can be a major impediment to R&D partnerships.
 Upstream/downstream balance. The balance between 
(upstream) research and (downstream) development, 
distribution, and commercialization may be lacking?  Thus 
there is the danger that potentially valuable research 
outputs never realize their potential impact.  The most 
effective way to avoid this is often to bypass other public 
agencies and partner directly with private firms.  A 
successful example is CIAT’s partnership with the Mexican 
seed company Papalotla, whereby the latter helps fund 
the former’s breeding of hybrid grasses for cattle foraging.  
CIAT holds plant variety rights to the grasses; these are 
licensed out exclusively to Papalotla, which takes care 
of multiplication, distribution, and follow-up extension 
activities.  As a result, Papalotla has become actively involved 
in innovation; farmers and consumers benefit from increased 
dairy/meat productivity; and slash-and-burn practices are 
likely to have been reduced (Binenbaum et al. 2004). 
Lack of leadership. To overcome the many obstacles to
successful collective action, leadership is essential.  Factors 
conducive to leadership of one or a few players (and hence 
success factors for collective action) include formal power,
superior resources, connectivity, professional standing, 
moral standing and impartiality, and an understanding of 
the players and the relevant parts of the innovation system.  
In the case of FLAR, most of these factors were in place,
which helps explain FLAR’s success (Binenbaum 2006). 
Source: Developed by Binenbaum. 
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Issues of coordination and complications 
associated with domestic political interests may 
arise in international open-membership consortia 
(see, for example, Alston, Dehmer and Pardey 2006 
with reference to the CGIAR). To avoid these issues, 
membership in the consortium may be restricted 
to one representative organization per country, as 
is the case in FLAR. 
The key downside of exclusivity is that it inhibits 
potentially valuable partnerships with competitors 
of the private-sector partner. Spielman et al. (2006, 
p. 40) identify this problem as particularly serious 
in ILRI’s East Coast Vaccine partnership with the 
firm Merial (discussed below). 
Complementary Resources. Many partnerships 
can be analyzed primarily in terms of their 
implications for access to complementary 
resources. Examples include 
•	 Genomics-related consortia. Data, knowledge, 
information and genetic resources are often 
synergistic. A clear partnership theme is 
critical to exploiting such synergies. Areas of 
bioinformatics such as genome sequencing, 
functional genomics, proteomics and 
metabolomics often lend themselves to
being organized around a species—often a 
crop. Consortia have played and are playing 
an important role in these areas, especially 
by assembling common databases and
information banks that greatly enable and 
enhance more-applied R&D such as plant 
breeding. Prominent examples include the 
Consortium for Maize Genomics (MGC), the 
International Wheat Genome Sequencing 
Consortium (IWGSC), the International Rice
Genome Sequencing Project (IRGSP), the 
International Rice Functional Genomics 
Consortium (IRFGC), the Rice Blast Genome 
Consortium (RBGC), the Global Musa Genomics 
Consortium (GMGC), the Potato Genome 
Sequencing Consortium (PGSC), the Swine 
Genome Sequencing Consortium (SGSC), the 
International Sheep Genomics Consortium 
(ISGC), and the National Bovine Functional 
Genomics Consortium (NBFGC), which in 
contrast to the others is not an international 
eff ort. Among these, RBGC is notable because 
it involves a pest species, and IRGSP and 
NBFGC stand out because they focus on 
 
post-sequencing informatics. Still, the global 
 
medical research community appears to be 
 
ahead of the agricultural community in the 
 
formation and funding of consortia in both 
 
these dimensions (pathogens, and higher-
 
order, more functionally-oriented informatics). 
 
Another notable imbalance is the fact that 
 
major CGIAR mandate crops such as maize,
 
wheat, rice, bananas and potatoes, all have their 
 
international genomics consortia, whereas, and 
 
perhaps not surprisingly, other major crops 
 
such as cotton, coffee, tea, and cocoa appear to
 
lag behind in the formation of such consortia.
 
Some of the aforementioned examples of 
 
genomics-related consortia feature signifi cant 
 
involvement of private-sector partners, 
 
especially multinationals active in agricultural 
 
biotechnology.
 
•	 Breeding consortia. Breeding activities lend 
themselves well to consortium arrangements. 
Breeding consortia, like genomics-related 
consortia, are usually crop-focused—e.g., 
FLAR in irrigated rice, or the Latin American 
Consortium for Cassava Research and 
Development (CLAYUCA) in cassava. There 
is a clear advantage in pooling genetic 
resources to have a larger selection base for 
breeding. There is an upstream-downstream 
complementarity as well: consortium-bred 
varieties can then be fi eld-tested and/or 
used as progenitors for further breeding by
locally based partners. The FLAR consortium 
funding arrangement is an alternative for 
(or complement to) the traditional CGIAR 
donor-based funding (Binenbaum 2006). 
A leading breeding consortium in the 1980s 
 
and 1990s was the Latin American Maize 
 
Project (LAMP), a cooperative eff ort between 
 
various United States research agencies and 
 
11 Latin American countries. LAMP aimed to
 
(1) improve characterization of approximately 
 
50,000 accessions of corn found in gene 
 
banks around the world, (2) regenerate these 
 
accessions, and thus (3) support and enhance 
 
maize breeding efforts in the CGIAR and the 
 
participating NARS (Knudsen 2000). It was 
 
supported by Pioneer Hi-Bred, the largest 
 
S
C
IE
N
C
E
, 
T
E
C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
 A
N
D
 S
K
IL
L
S
 
33 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
commercial producer of hybrid corn at the 
time, and received donations of several 
commercial varieties from another private 
firm, DeKalb. LAMP provided the basis for two 
ongoing follow-up efforts, the Latin American 
Maize Landrace Conservation Network (Taba 
2003) and the Germplasm Enhancement of 
Maize Project (GEM), a successful U.S. public-
private consortium supported by both the 
federal government and major seed companies 
(Knudson 2000). 
•	 Agronomic and ecological systems. Agricultural 
production and technology are embedded 
in ecological, agronomic, and supply-chain 
systems. As these systems consist of intricately 
interacting components, and as diff erent 
individuals and entities possess complementary 
knowledge and other resources relevant to R&D 
involving these components and interactions, 
consortia may provide suitable R&D structures. 
These are often regionally based. For example, 
the Latin American Consortium on Ecology 
and Sustainable Development (CLADES) “is a 
collaborative effort of Latin American NGOs 
to prevent the collapse of peasant agriculture 
by transforming it into a more sustainable and 
productive enterprise” (Altieri 2000). Another 
example in this category is the Inland Valley 
Consortium, which “was established in 1993 to
respond to social and environmental challenges 
in West Africa, related to poverty and food 
security on the one hand and degradation of 
the natural resource base on the other” (Kiepe 
2006). This is a consortium of 10 West African 
countries, several CGIAR Centers (WARDA being 
the leading partner), and several international 
public-sector partners. The consortium’s
research themes are clearly systemic in nature: 
“Research objectives in Phase II (2000–2004) 
focus on four main themes: characterization of 
inland valley land use dynamics; development 
and evaluation of technologies for improved 
production systems and natural resources 
management; socio-economic and policy 
aspects of improvements in inland valley land 
use systems; and technology dissemination 
processes and impact pathways for inland 
valley development” (Kiepe 2006). Membership 
of practically all consortia with an ecosystem/ 
sustainability theme currently appears to be 
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confined to the public and nonprofi t sectors. 
A related kind of consortium focuses on 
specific types of agricultural inputs. R&D on 
inputs often requires an understanding of 
interactions with other inputs and agricultural 
production systems generally. Here we do 
observe signifi cant private-sector participation. 
For example, the Potash and Phosphorous 
Institute of Canada (PPIC), a consortium “which 
receives funding from both private fi rms and 
governments and has research programs at 
universities in the US and Canada and also 
in Latin America, China, India, Sri Lanka and 
most of South-East Asia..., is interested in 
promoting ‘precision’ agriculture that will 
increase the demand for fertilizers” (Rausser 
et al. 2000, p. 504, citing a 1999 working paper 
by Carl Pray). As of December 2006, PPIC is 
active in many countries, and its membership 
includes fi ve private firms (Agrium, Intrepid 
Potash, Mosaic, Potash Crop, and Simplot).18 
Yet another type of partnership or consortium 
is based on information complementarities in 
supply chains (Holland 1995). For instance, a 
large downstream agri-food company might 
support or even drive a partnership aimed 
at increasing, coordinating, improving the 
reliability of, and/or reducing the cost of its 
supplies. The multinational Nestlé, while 
not a formal partner in the CIAT-Papalotla 
partnership, is vital to its success as a distributor 
of grass seeds, credit provider to dairy farmers, 
and purchaser of milk (Binenbaum et al. 2004). 
Another large corporation, Quaker Oats, “funds 
an oats crossing program that focuses on 
developing varieties suitable for developing 
countries. Universities in the United States work 
co-operatively with oats breeding programs in 
Brazil, Argentina, Chile and other countries” 
(Rausser et al. 2000, p. 504). 
•	 Partnerships with key intellectual property assets. 
In addition to intellectual property playing 
a key role in a Bayh-Dole type mechanism, IP 
assets owned by public-sector and nonprofi t 
institutions are often vital in innovation 
18 http://www.ppi-ppic.org/ppiweb/ppibase.nsf/$webindex/ 
article=A1B712C485256970005F6F2F23D096CC 34 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
partnerships where they are complementary 
to and can leverage access to privately owned 
IP. For example, a patent obtained by ILRI 
may have played this role in the Institute’s 
partnership with the private firm Merial for the 
development of a vaccine for East Coast Fever 
which “could reduce livestock productivity 
losses in the order of US$300 million per 
year, thereby curbing the disease’s negative 
impact on the incomes and nutrition of African 
smallholders” (Spielman et al. 2006, p. 40).19 
Type I research agencies, especially those found 
among the government agencies operating in 
China, India, and Brazil, have greater resources 
than the CGIAR Centers for generating R&D 
capabilities and IP assets that can be used in 
partnerships. For example, the Organization for 
Nucleotide Sequencing and Analysis (ONSA), 
a network of laboratories mostly funded by
the Brazilian state of Sao Paulo, managed 
to sequence the strategically signifi cant 
genome of Agrobacterium Tumefaciens (one 
of the principal vehicles for gene transfer and 
hence a key enabling technology for genetic 
engineering) in collaboration with the University 
of Washington (UW) and in competition 
with Monsanto—a genome sequencing race
comparable to the earlier and more famous 
public-private rivalry in decoding the human 
genome. As in the latter case, the public and 
private research groups were both successful 
and ended up simultaneously publishing their 
sequencing papers in Science—but the ONSA/ 
UW paper had the higher scientifi c value. “The 
significance of ONSA’s achievement was that it 
gained a position, indeed a successful one, on 
[the biotechnology] playing field. Recently this 
position has been further consolidated as ONSA 
is providing key expertise on comparative 
genomics for variants of A. Tumefaciens, with the 
University of Washington again and Monsanto, 
now changed from competitor to collaborator” 
(Harvey and McMeekin 2005, p. 647). 
19 The striga case described in Box 3 is another example of 
the aggregation of intellectual property assets plus technical and 
marketing expertise required to bring a crop-based technology 
to African markets. 
Beyond Collective Action in 
Research—Transferring Technologies 
Rausser et al. (2000), Qaim (2001), Byerlee and 
Fischer (2002), and Tollens et al. (2004) all make 
the point that in order to realize agricultural 
biotechnology’s potential benefits for poor farmers 
and consumers in developing countries, more 
public-private partnerships are needed. Although 
we provided a number of examples of such 
partnerships, their total R&D activity is still dwarfed 
by multinationals’ ag-biotech investments that 
are concentrated in a small number of products 
destined—at least in the fi rst instance—for 
affluent markets. With recent increases in available 
philanthropic funds (such as Warren Buff ett’s
multi-billion-dollar gift to the Gates Foundation) 
and given the rapid economic growth in India 
and China (enabling these countries to become 
a significant source of technology transfer), the 
opportunities for such partnerships have vastly 
increased. Innovative organizational and funding 
models such as FLAR have barely begun to be 
emulated, and there is much scope for additional 
institutional innovation. Adding to the complexity 
is the innovative potential of technology users 
such as farmers and farmer cooperatives, various 
manufacturers and service providers, and even 
consumers (Douthwaite 2002; von Hippel 2005). 
While the dividing line between client-oriented 
innovation and collaborative innovation is not clear 
(e.g., in “participatory plant breeding” as described 
by Witcombe et al. 2005), the importance of active 
participation in agricultural innovation by early-
stage technology adopters is well documented 
(Douthwaite 2002). Clearly, the various participants 
(donors, multinationals, smaller fi rms, international 
organizations, universities, government agencies, 
farmers, the CGIAR Centers and so on) have largely 
complementary resources and experiences, giving 
rise to a near-infinite array of potential institutional 
combinations and solutions to the technology 
transfer problem. 
2.4 FINANCING AGRICULTURAL 
RESEARCH 
Collective action features prominently in 
arrangements for financing agricultural R&D, and 
is increasingly being used in some settings as a 
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by Hugo De Groote and Fred Kanampiu, International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center 
(CIMMYT)1 
Striga, or witchweed, is a parasitic weed that severely affects cereals, primarily maize and sorghum. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa it infests an estimated 3.64 million hectares of maize, about a quarter of the 
total area, especially in the mid-altitude zones of East and Southern Africa and the savannahs of 
West Africa (De Groote forthcoming). Striga seeds only germinate in close proximity to a suitable 
host plant, such as maize. After germination, it attaches to the roots of the host plant, from 
where it derives its water and nutrients. It also infl icts toxic damage. Much of its damage is done 
before emerging, so weeding only helps to reduce the seed production, protecting future crops. 
Unfortunately, Striga produces large quantities of seed that can stay dormant in the soil for up to
20 years. It does more damage to weak plants, particularly in areas of poor soil fertility. Therefore,
it is a particular problem in areas where increased population pressure has led to a loss of fallow,
resulting in continuous cropping, the reality many subsistence farmers face. In Kenya, for example, 
the Striga-prone area forms a band around Lake Victoria, up to an altitude of 1600 meters, where 
it affects about 210,000 hectares of maize, and the lives of 6 million people, with 61 percent living 
below the poverty line (De Groote forthcoming). 
To tackle this major problem, a consortium of private and public research institutes developed an 
innovative technology, based on imidazolinone-resistant, or IR for short, maize. Imidazolinones 
are herbicides that are effective against Striga. The gene was discovered in a small Minnesota 
laboratory in the United States, Molecular Genetics Inc., who patented it. The company was sold to
American Cyanamid, which was subsequently acquired by BASF, who currently holds the patent. The 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) obtained IR germplasm from Pioneer 
Hi-Bred International for experimental purposes and started a research effort in collaboration with 
the Weizmann Institute of Science (Israel) and the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), 
supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Herbicide tolerant crop varieties are actually very popular world wide, but mostly they use genetically 
engineered varieties, combined with spraying of a herbicide. Neither of these components is 
currently acceptable to most countries in sub-Saharan Africa. IR maize, on the other hand, is a 
natural mutant, and the technology uses seed coating with the herbicide (in this case, Imazapyr, 
one of the imidazolinone herbicides and a product of BASF), using a minuscule amount of herbicide 
(30 g/ha) compared with conventional spraying. 
The collaborative research effort quickly established that the seed coating of IR maize was very
effective in controlling Striga (Kanampiu et al. 2001). The IR maize plant stimulates the germination 
of nearby Striga seeds, but as the Striga radical approaches the maize it is killed by the herbicide 
delivered through the seed coating. Transferring the gene to well adapted maize varieties was 
fairly straight forward. The breeding effort has focused on crossing this material with other 
CIMMYT germplasm to include traits such as streak virus resistance and tolerance to drought and 
low nitrogen conditions. Several hybrids were developed and tested on-station as well as on-farm 
(Kanampiu et al., 2003), and those that did well have been approved by the regulatory process in 
Kenya. Generally, the technology proved to be very eff ective, although some problems occurred 
when heavy rains washed off the herbicide (De Groote et al. 2007). Combined effects of Striga 
1 The authors thank Joe De Vries (Rockefeller Foundation), John Lynam (the Kilimo Trust), Mpoko Bokanga (AATF), 
Jonathan Gressel (Weismann Weizmann Institute. of Science), Karl Volker-Sthamer (BASF), Joel Ransom (North Dakota State 
University), Dennis Friesen (CIMMYT), and Alpha Diallo (CIMMYT) for their input. 
Box 3: Herbicide Resistant Maize Technology to Combat Striga in Africa 
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control and improved germplasm increased yield two or three times, at an increased cost of about 
$4 per hectare. 
After developing an eff ective, field-tested technology, it still needs to be approved by the 
appropriated regulatory agencies, and disseminated. In Kenya, herbicides typically need to be 
approved by a pesticides board, and new varieties need to go through several seasons of national 
performance trials (NPT). The NPT commission compares the results of new varieties to control 
varieties, and nominate which varieties get released. The minister of agriculture will release the 
variety after sufficient seed is bulked up. 
The first four IR maize varieties, all hybrids, were released in 2005. The same year, 13 more OPVs
and two hybrids were entered into the NPTs by 7 seed companies. They were all approved by the 
committee and their release is expected in 2007. After the release of a variety, companies need to
produce and disseminate seed. The four approved hybrids were registered, and agreements were
signed with three seed companies who produced 100 tons of commercial seed in 2006, for planting 
in 2007. In 2006, free demonstration packages were also distributed to more than 15,000 farmers. 
In East and Southern Africa, unfortunately, rules and regulations for the seed sector are not 
harmonized, and each country has its own varietal release system. Therefore, wide-scale testing 
is on-going in several countries (Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi, and Ethiopia), and varieties have been 
identified for registration by seed companies in other countries. Several seed companies have been 
approached, and agreements have been signed with a seed company in Tanzania, and another 
company in Malawi/Zimbabwe. 
To optimize the promotion and dissemination of the technology, a partnership was formed 
among CIMMYT, BASF, the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF), seed companies 
and NGOs. All IR varieties are registered under the common name STRIGAWAY®. CIMMYT’s role is 
(a) to develop maize germplasm adapted to African maize growing environments which possess 
the imidazolinone-resistance trait originally provided by BASF, (b) to provide NARS and seed 
companies with protocols and testing kits of experimental STRIGAWAY® maize varieties, and (c) 
to provide authorized breeder seed. The role of AATF is to facilitate and backstop registration 
of STRIGAWAY® maize varieties by NARS and private seed sector and advise on issues related to
intellectual property rights and licensing. BASF registers the herbicide, licenses the STRIGAWAY® 
technology to seed companies, and provides all seed treatment required for testing and releasing 
STRIGAWAY® maize varieties. Seed companies produce and disseminate the seed, while NGOs help 
with demonstration and promotion. 
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complement to more-traditional public fi nancing 
methods.20 Other institutional innovations may 
also be used to supplement government funding 
and thus enhance the total sources of funding 
for agricultural science, to lower the social cost of 
funds used for agricultural R&D, or to enhance the 
economic efficiency with which the funds are used. 
This section discusses the expanding range 
of mechanisms for fi nancing agricultural R&D, 
including (a) collective action programs fi nanced 
by commodity taxes (sometimes called levy-
based or check-off schemes), with and without 
arrangements for matching government support, 
and (b) mechanisms for enhancing individual 
incentives to invest, including intellectual property
rights, tax concessions, fees for service and contract
R&D, prize mechanisms, endowment funding (via 
Foundations) and so forth. The discussion here 
stresses the economic and institutional issues 
involved in these arrangements and gives specifi c 
examples of each. It also reports and assesses the 
associated alternative mechanisms for allocating 
R&D dollars. To some extent arrangements for 
allocating R&D resources must be developed in 
conjunction with arrangements for obtaining the 
finance, but these are logically distinct elements of 
the R&D process and should not be confused with 
one another. 
Public- versus Collective-
 
Goods Perspectives
 

Much of the economics discussion of agricultural 
R&D and agricultural R&D policy refers to the 
public goods nature of agricultural R&D, and the 
market failures associated with the reliance on 
private provision. It would seem to follow that 
the natural solution is for the government to
intervene to correct the market failure by providing 
20 The European Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Research is an example of a multinational model for funding R&D. 
The Directorate’s 2002-2006 budget totaled 17.5 billion euros; 
less than 5 percent of Europe’s total spending on civilian research 
(European Commission 2004). Less than 4 percent of the 2002­
2006 budget was directed to agriculturally related (specifi cally, 
food safety and quality) research. The Directorate’s 2007-2013 
budget is projected to be 53.2 billion euros. The Directorate can 
be seen as a means to address the market failure problem that 
bedevils R&D in a multilateral setting. But it is part of a much more 
comprehensive process of political and economic integration 
in Europe and thus may offer limited lessons for collectively 
financing (agricultural) research among (developing) countries 
absent that broader framework of integration. 
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agricultural R&D, like other public goods, fi nanced 
by general government revenues. Such analysis 
and prescription is too simple, however, because 
most forms of agricultural R&D are not pure public 
goods; and, consequently, other interventions may 
be fairer, more eff ective, or more effi  cient ways to
correct problems of underinvestment. 
Agricultural R&D may be a public good in the sense 
of (at least partial) non-excludability and non­
rivalness, but this does not mean that everybody 
in the nation benefits and it does not mean that 
everybody in the nation should pay. Indeed, for 
many types of research and common commodity 
market conditions, the benefits are confi ned 
to those producers who are able to adopt the 
resulting technology because commodity prices 
are not affected. In other cases, the adoption 
of technology that leads to improvements in 
productivity leads to lower commodity prices with 
benefits distributed between consumers of the 
commodity and producers who adopt the new 
technology, perhaps partially at the expense of 
producers who do not adopt the new technology, 
and, sometimes, those who are slower to do so. 
Sometimes the lower prices are transmitted to
producers and consumers in other countries, and 
sometimes foreign producers can adopt the new 
technology, adding further complications to the 
picture of the distribution of the benefits from the 
new technology. Citizens who do not consume 
or produce the commodity in question are not 
beneficiaries even though they may be taxpayers 
and asked to support the R&D.21 
Consequently, rather than public goods, many 
types of agricultural R&D may be better thought 
of as collective goods, for which the relevant 
collection of beneficiaries may be a group 
of producers (and consumers) of a particular 
commodity coming from a particular region. 
Economic efficiency (along with some concepts 
of fairness) is likely to be promoted by funding 
research so that the costs are borne in proportion 
21 Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) elaborate at length on 
the determinants of the distribution of benefits from research 
among producers, consumers, middlemen, foreigners, and so on. 38 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to the benefits to the greatest extent possible.22 
This can be accomplished by choosing funding 
arrangements that reflect the geographic focus and 
the commodity orientation of the research. Thus, 
different agricultural R&D programs and projects 
may call for different funding arrangements—for 
instance, at the state, national, or multinational 
level or using diff erent mechanisms. However,
a more complete accounting of social costs and 
benefits should allow for economies of size, scale, 
and scope in research (e.g., see Jin, Rozelle, Alston, 
and Huang 2005) and various types of political 
costs, administrative costs, and transaction 
costs associated with having diff erent research 
organizations with overlapping jurisdictions. This 
more complete accounting is likely to imply a 
smaller economic number of diff erent funding 
arrangements than would be implied otherwise. 
General Government Revenue Funding 
In most countries, the primary source of funding 
for public-sector agricultural R&D continues to be 
general tax revenues, which may be an expensive 
source of revenues. As first pointed out by Fox 
(1985), it costs society measurably more than a dollar 
to provide a dollar of general taxpayer revenues 
to finance public expenditures. The U.S. evidence 
was reviewed, summarized and synthesized by
Fullerton (1991), whose results indicate that a 
dollar of government spending on agricultural R&D 
may cost society between $1.07 and $1.25 when 
the market distortions induced by taxation are 
taken into account (see also Ballard and Fullerton 
1992).23 A recognition of the fact that government 
funding has a high social opportunity cost helps 
explain the persistence of the underfunding 
22 Incentive problems in agricultural R&D arise from 
inappropriability of benefits and free-riding, and may be serious 
unless some way can be found to ensure that benefi ciaries share 
appropriately in R&D costs. Hence, as argued by Alston and 
Pardey (1996), a criterion for efficiency, as well as fairness, is to 
whom the benefits accrue. These issues pertain to the mechanism 
for allocating research resources among alternatives as well as 
processes for raising the revenues. 
23 Funding from check-offs (commodity taxes) also involves 
potential excess burdens for similar reasons. Against this is the 
view that the required low rates of commodity taxes (less than 
1 percent) are likely to involve smaller marginal excess burdens 
than the prevailing high rates of labor income taxes in most 
countries, especially when it is considered that such commodity 
taxes may in fact reduce distortions resulting from commodity 
support programs in some cases, or from the absence of “optimal” 
trade taxes in others. 
problem; and at the same time adds to the reasons 
for looking for alternative interventions that may 
be comparatively economically effi  cient as well as 
more likely to find political support. 
The available evidence generally supports the view 
that even with the existing, extensive government 
involvement, the world is investing too little in 
agricultural R&D—especially the developing world 
and especially in relation to staple food crops. 
Economists often call for governments to address 
this underfunding problem simply by increasing the 
total amount of government revenues committed 
to agricultural R&D, but that prescription seems 
increasingly likely to fall on deaf ears. Against that 
background, it seems appropriate to look for ways
of developing institutions that are complementary 
with government funding, in particular institutions 
that have a multiplier effect on government funding 
by drawing in funding from industry, as well as 
mechanisms that encourage private investment as 
a substitute for government spending. 
A number of options can be and in many places 
are used instead of, or in combination with, the 
use of general government funds to fi nance 
agricultural R&D undertaken in the public sector 
or the private sector. These include incentives 
for private innovation such as the provision of 
intellectual property protection or prizes to
enhance inventor benefits or the provision of 
tax breaks or other mechanisms to off set private 
costs of research—in some senses substitutes for 
direct government spending on research. They 
also include institutions to encourage collective 
action by producers such as the use of commodity 
levies with matching government grants—with 
levy-based funding serving in some senses as a 
complement for government spending. 
Enhancing Individual Incentives 
Protecting Intellectual Property. The private 
and public roles in agricultural R&D hinge largely, 
but not exclusively, on the degree to which the 
benefits from R&D are appropriable, and, relatedly, 
the distribution of the benefi ts. The nature and 
degree of property rights surrounding agricultural 
innovations determine these appropriability 
aspects and, thereby, the incentives to invent 
and the consequences of those inventions. Thus 
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the pace and focus of biological innovation in 
agriculture (and related industries), who pays
for the R&D and how much, and, ultimately, the 
incidence of the costs and benefits of the research, 
are all affected by the form of the property
protection afforded the results of the R&D. 
A longstanding policy response to the “access 
versus appropriability” dilemma (which at its crux 
involves balancing access for the use of innovations 
in ways that reveal knowledge that can stimulate
further invention, while conferring some degree 
of monopoly rights which generate revenue 
streams that reward successful innovation) has 
been to enact and enforce a system of property
protection in the form of patents for certain types 
of inventions: the first patent act was passed in the 
United States in 1790, and patent systems were
instituted even earlier elsewhere, especially in 
Europe (Huffman and Evenson 1993). Government-
sanctioned property protection over living things 
is a much more recent phenomenon. 
National efforts to protect the intellectual property
of biological innovations are increasingly being 
shaped and circumscribed by internationally 
agreed laws and conventions. Some of these 
international initiatives (e.g., the 1993 Convention 
on Biological Diversity) seem to be driven more by
concerns about the equitable distribution of the 
benefits from biological inventions (both in space 
and time—i.e., within the current population 
and across generations) than by concerns about 
concepts of economic effi  ciency implicit in much 
of the earlier policy responses to this problem: 
there are widespread perceptions that “northern” 
firms (i.e., farmers or agribusiness concerns in 
richer countries) are benefiting at the expense 
of “southern” farmers (i.e., poor farmers in less-
developed countries) from the unregulated use of 
“southern” germplasm in breeding new varieties 
that are sold commercially under the protection 
of national systems of property rights. Other 
changes in property-rights regimes are related 
to broader efforts to strengthen property-rights 
regulations, which form part of the package of 
internationally agreed policies that underpin the 
trading arrangements enforced by the World Trade 
Organization. Indeed, the Marrakesh agreement 
signed by 131 countries to date, which was part of 
the Uruguay Round GATT/WTO trade negotiations 
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that came into force in January 1995, essentially 
committed all developed countries to have a 
functioning system of property protection for all 
types of inventions, including biological inventions, 
within one year (i.e., typically by 1996). Developing 
countries had by 2000 to become compliant with 
the agreement, and least-developed countries 
had until 2006 to enact such legislation. For 
product patents such as pharmaceutical patents,
developing countries were not required to provide 
product patent protection until 2005. However,
on June 2002, the Council for TRIPS adopted a 
decision that extended the deadline for least-
developed countries to apply provisions pertaining 
to pharmaceutical patents until 2016. 
Many of the details regarding the property-rights 
policies and laws covering biological innovations 
are far from settled, and if past history is any guide, 
will continue to evolve as political, economic, and 
scientific circumstances dictate. These details may 
vary markedly in their economic eff ects. Specifi cally, 
the form of the property protection may have
signifi cant efficiency as well as equity eff ects, with 
important consequences for the structure of the 
R&D market in terms of the research that gets done 
and who does it. 
Varietal Royalties. Royalty payments to plant 
breeders for the right to use new crop varieties serve
as a specific institutional form to implement and 
enforce property rights over varietal innovations. 
Thus property rights provide an incentive to invest 
in innovation. In certain settings they also serve as 
a practical means for breeders to extract payment 
for their innovative effort. It is a longstanding and 
generally accepted practice in agriculture the 
world over to charge for the technical changes 
embodied in mechanical and chemical inputs. In
contrast it is much less common to charge seed 
users (i.e., farmers) for new crop varieties. Partly this 
is because of historical precedent, where much of 
the crop-related R&D worldwide was funded from 
the public purse. Partly it refl ects long-standing 
seed-saving and sharing practices by farmers that 
make it difficult for crop breeders to realize a return 
on their inventive eff ort, absent eff ective legal 
policies and practices. 
Those crop royalty schemes already in place 
vary markedly in their details. These details 
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may well have signifi cant long-run implications 
concerning who conducts and who pays for crop-
improvement R&D, the types of crop technologies 
that are emphasized, and the uptake and use of 
crop varietal innovations. A brief look at some of 
the existing schemes illustrates the diversity of 
institutions. 
The passing of the 1964 Plant Varieties and Seeds 
Act in the United Kingdom means that only 
distinct varieties approved for National Listing 
can legally be sold in that country. At the point 
of seed sale these new varieties incur a royalty 
payment, collected by the British Society of Plant 
Breeders acting on behalf of crop breeders. The 
1964 legislation was amended under European 
law in 1994 to bring the United Kingdom (and 
other European counties) into line with the 1991 
changes to the Plant Breeders Rights protocols 
agreed by member countries of the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (UPOV). These changes mean that in the 
United Kingdom, farmer-saved as well as certifi ed 
seed is now subject to a royalty payment, although 
farmer-saved seed incurs a smaller royalty rate than 
certified seed and the royalty applies only to saved 
seed of the most recent varieties (BSPB n.d.). 
A variant of this scheme is the technology-
use fee charged by multinational agricultural 
biotechnology companies for the use of seeds 
that incorporate certain biotechnology traits (such 
as resistance to corn borer or corn root worm or 
herbicide tolerance). Typically the technology-
use agreement allows for the one time use of the 
saved seed (thereby ruling out the legal use of 
saved seed subject to these conditions of sale). 
Compliance rates with these technology use 
agreements appear to be high in some countries 
such as the United States or Australia but have
proved problematic in countries, such as Argentina 
and Brazil, particularly for non-hybrid crops such 
as soybeans where seed saving and re-use is a 
practical and economic option (GAO 2000). 
With the two schemes just described, farmers 
incur royalties at the point of seed sale. The 2002 
passage of the Plant Breeders Rights Amendment 
Bill paved the way for an end-point royalty scheme 
in Australia. In this instance, based on a license 
agreement signed when they purchase the seed, 
farmers make a varietal declaration at the point 
of grain delivery (not point of seed sale) and 
pay a royalty rate based on the tonnage of grain 
sold. In any given year, grain that is consumed 
on farm for stockfeed (but not grain retained 
for future planting) is also subject to end-point 
royalties (AWB 2007). Farmers are precluded from 
commercial or “over-the-fence” sales. They are also 
held responsible for maintaining accurate accounts 
of the disposition of their production, and these 
records (and point-of grain-sale declarations) are 
subject to independent, contracted audit. The end­
point royalties cover the costs of administering the 
scheme incurred by grain handlers and a general 
goods and services tax (GST), plus the innovator 
rents—typically, 80 percent of the royalty passes 
back to the crop breeders, with any third-party
equity in the R&D undertaking being paid out of 
the crop breeders’ share. End-point royalty rates 
are set by the crop breeders and vary markedly 
by crop and by variety (Table 5). Kingwell (2005) 
observed that rates set by public plant breeding 
organizations are generally lower than those set by
private firms. Higher rates may be more in line with 
the Australian Government’s Competitive Principles 
Agreement, which dictates that no government 
business should enjoy any competitive advantage 
simply as a result of its public-sector ownership.24 
Farmers’ compliance rates with the Australian end­
point royalty scheme are estimated at around 80 
percent (Wright and Pardey 2006).25 For those crops 
(or sub sectors) in those jurisdictions where the 
bulk of the crop is consumed on the farm where 
it is grown, or where the plant breeders’ rights 
that underpin this payment system are lacking 
or ineffective, it is doubtful that such a payment 
system would be viable. However, farmers in 
developing countries may be willing to support 
such a scheme when it proves economic to do so, 
just as they have been willing to pay for hybrid 
corn and other productivity enhancing inputs. 
24 Kingwell (2005) noted that an A$8/mt royalty rate for an 
AgSeed Limited canola variety constituted less than 2 percent 
of the corresponding grain sales (valued at farm gate prices). 
Castillo, Parker and Zilberman (2000) observed that average 
royalty rates as a percent of sales for analogous R&D intensive 
output in engineering was around 6.3 percent and between 6.3 
to 9.4 percent for a range of medical materials and services. 
25 Enright (2007) reported that in 2005/6 nearly 50 percent of 
the Australian wheat crop was sown to varieties subject to end­
point royalties. 
S
C
IE
N
C
E
, 
T
E
C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
 A
N
D
 S
K
IL
L
S
 
41 
  
   
 
 
   
 
    
 
Table 5: End-Point Royalty (EPR) Rates for Australian Crop Varieties, 2007/08 
Source: Developed by Pardey from information reported in AWB (2007). 
Note: Includes royalty rates on AWB Limited seed varieties for the 2007/2008 harvest period. “Mt” designated metric tons. 
a A goods and services tax that became operational in July 2000. It is a value added tax levied on most goods and services sold in 
Australia. 
Crop/Class Variety Names Breeder Royalty Management Fee GSTa Total EPR 
(A$ per mt) (A$ per mt) (A$ per mt) (A$ per mt) 
Wheat (Durum) Arrivato 2.50 0.50 0.30 3.30 
Wheat (Durum) Jandaroi 2.00 0.50 0.25 2.75 
Wheat (Winter) EGA Wedgetail 1.00 0.45 0.15 1.60 
Wheat Sentinel 1.40 0.40 0.18 1.98 
Wheat Rees 1.05 0.45 0.15 1.65 
Wheat Bowerbird 0.70 0.30 0.10 1.10 
Wheat Drysdale 0.70 0.30 0.10 1.10 
Wheat EGA Hume 0.70 0.30 0.10 1.10 
Wheat Kukri and Lorikeet 0.65 0.35 0.10 1.10 
Wheat Goldmark,Chara,Lang, 
Silverstar, Yitipi, 
and Petrie 
0.55 0.45 0.10 1.10 
Wheat Anlace and Mira 0.50 0.50 0.10 1.10 
Barley Buloke, Fitzroy
and Grout 
1.50 0.50 0.20 2.20 
Barley (Feed) Baudin 1.00 0.50 0.15 1.65 
Oat Possum 1.20 0.50 0.17 1.87 
Chickpea Nafi ce 6.00 0.50 0.65 7.15 
Chickpea Rupali and Sonali 3.00 0.50 0.35 3.85 
Chickpea Yorker and Flipper 2.40 0.60 0.30 3.30 
Chickpea Moti 2.00 0.50 0.25 2.75 
Lentil Tiara 5.00 3.00 0.80 8.80 
Narrow Leaf Lupin Jindalee 0.95 0.30 0.13 1.38 
Field Pea Kaspa 1.70 0.30 0.20 2.20 
Faba Bean Nuru 2.40 0.60 0.30 3.30 
Faba Bean Manafest 1.75 1.25 0.30 3.30 
The advantage of an end-point royalty scheme is 
that varietal developers and farmers share in the 
yield risk associated with adopting the improved 
varieties. If the crop fails because of drought or 
hail or other factors, no royalty is paid. An upfront 
payment scheme means that farmers bear all
the risk. 
Prizes. Where property rights to invention cannot 
be made effective, or where doing so would be 
counterproductive (because the resulting price 
distortions and disincentives for adoption would 
be too expensive), inventors could be off ered 
prizes for invention as an inducement to invest. 
Such institutions have a long and interesting 
history (e.g., see Wright 1983 and other papers 
cited therein). In recent years variations on these 
concepts have been proposed with particular 
relevance for research related to staple food crops 
S
C
IE
N
C
E
, 
T
E
C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
 A
N
D
 S
K
IL
L
S
 
in less-developed countries (e.g., Masters 2003 and 
2005; Kremer and Zwane 2005). 
Tax Breaks. A number of countries have tried tax 
concessions for private research (for instance, in the 
form of expensing current R&D costs at rates greater 
than 100 percent, or accelerated depreciation of 
R&D capital costs); a form of joint-venture, public 
and private funding of research. It is generally a 
blunt instrument. It is difficult to minimize the 
transfer effect, wherein (foregone) taxpayer funds 
merely substitute for private R&D investments 
that otherwise would have taken place. More
specifically, it is difficult to design tax concessions 
that discriminate closely among alternative forms 
of research (i.e., additional investments in on­
going lines of research by existing fi rms versus 
investments in new research by existing fi rms 
versus new, start-up firms; or more strategic kinds 
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of R&D with more spillover potential versus applied 
research) or among providers of research (e.g., local 
versus foreign firms). A blunt tax concession aimed 
at stimulating new research done locally could 
simply cause research funds being used elsewhere 
to be diverted to take advantage of the local tax 
breaks (Industry Commission 1995). On the other 
hand, while tax-breaks involve some transactions 
costs (in terms of the paperwork involved, auditing 
costs, and the like) it is a funding approach that is 
comparatively inexpensive to administer, at least 
in those places (e.g., many developed countries) 
where the tax system is well-equipped for such 
purposes. 
Facilitating Collective Action 
Commodity Levies. When research benefi ts are 
contained entirely within an industry, a natural 
option is to develop an institutional arrangement 
to enable the industry raise its own research 
funds. When such options are possible there is less 
justification for the use of public funds to support 
R&D. Nevertheless there may still be signifi cant 
roles for the government to play—for a start, 
dealing with what research gets done. Where 
research costs and benefits are industry-specifi c,
there may seem to be no good reason not to leave
the question of research topics to the relevant 
industry; but there may be still problems of intra-
industry distribution of benefits and costs and 
spillovers that lead to distortions in the allocation 
of industry-based research funds (e.g., see Alston 
2002; Alston, Freebairn and James 2003). And,
once other (extra-industry) spillovers are present 
or there are other sources of a mismatch between 
industry and national optima, there are additional 
reasons for government involvement—possibly 
both in supplementing the funding and directing 
the R&D effort (e.g., see Alston, Freebairn and 
James 2004). 
When the government gives producers the 
statutory authority to set up an institution such as 
a U.S. Marketing Order (e.g., see Carman and Alston 
2005) or an Australian Research and Development 
Corporation, with powers to collect a levy or tax 
from producers to be used to fund research (e.g., 
see Alston and Pardey 1999b), the problems of 
non-excludability and non-rivalry are ameliorated. 
A greater use of levy funding could enhance 
economic efficiency in three ways. First, industry 
funding is a potential complement to other 
sources of funds which, as a practical matter, are 
likely to continue to leave total funding inadequate
from the viewpoint of both the industry and the 
nation (in terms of the economically efficient 
total investment). Second, from the point of view 
of raising funds in the least-cost way, commodity 
levies are likely to be a relatively effi  cient (and fair) 
tax base. Third, in relation to allocating the funds 
efficiently, industry funding arrangements can be 
organized to provide incentives for effi  cient use of 
levy funds and other research resources. 
Incentives for industry to adopt a levy-based 
funding arrangement may be enhanced by
an appropriate system of intellectual property
protection. Intellectual property rights are 
applicable or enforceable only for certain types 
of inventions, and come at the cost that privately 
optimal prices may exceed socially optimal prices. 
Commodity-specific levy arrangements are most 
applicable for commodity-specific R&D of a 
relatively applied nature. In those cases where the 
fruits of invention are only partially appropriable, a 
case can be made for partial support from general 
government revenues through subsidies or 
matching grants in conjunction with commodity 
levies, as used in the Australian R&D corporations. 
Matching Grants. Government could encourage 
a greater use of such funds for agricultural R&D 
by providing matching (or more than matching) 
support for programs funded using industry 
levies. When a combination of industry levy funds 
and general revenues is used to fi nance public or 
privately executed R&D, there is a clear case for 
government involvement in the administration, 
management, and allocation of those funds to
ensure that the public interest is adequately 
considered. It is important to understand that 
industry levy funding is not to be regarded solely 
as a producer “self-help” arrangement in which 
producers collectively fund research on their own 
behalf and to serve their own ends. Consumers 
and taxpayers are also affected, and they too have
a legitimate interest in such enterprises. 
When spillovers from industry-funded research fl ow
beyond the industry to the general community, the 
situation is likely to be more complicated. In the 
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case where research results exhibit classic “public 
good” characteristics—that is, both non-rivalry and 
non-excludability are severe—then the research 
should be publicly funded, although it may still be 
efficient for it to be provided under contract by the 
private sector. In this situation it is not possible to
devise a way of extracting finance from a section 
of the community, such as farmers, that is optimal 
in the sense that problems of non-excludability 
and non-rivalry are overcome. However, when a 
signifi cant proportion of the benefi ts accrue to an 
industry, that is when the research has both public 
and (collective) private good characteristics, it is 
appropriate to fund the research from both public 
and private sources. 
Questions arise about whose objectives will 
determine the setting of the levy and the allocation 
of the resources, and what is the appropriate rate
of matching government grant. Alston, Freebairn 
and James (2003, 2004) analyzed the factors 
that influence the rate of matching support 
appropriate to give a producer board incentives 
that would be compatible with the interests of the 
nation. They showed that there are no simple rules, 
even in a relatively stylized setting; but even so 
in many cases a simple rule such as 1:1 matching 
would be likely to result in enhanced economic 
efficiency compared with zero matching support. 
In practice, arrangements of this type are more 
likely to be embraced by the industry if producers 
have the major say in setting the research agenda 
and if the rate of matching government support is 
higher. At the same time, the greater is the rate of 
matching government support, the more likely is 
the government to want to set the agenda. 
Other complications arise when we recognize 
that within any group of producers interests 
will vary because the applicability of research 
findings will vary. The distribution of benefi ts and 
costs among producers within a collective action 
program may present obstacles to fairness and 
efficiency that have implications for both the 
amount of funding raised and the allocation of the 
funds among alternatives (Alston 2002 discusses 
some of these factors). Because some research 
has both public and private good components, 
the underinvestment may also be “relative” in the 
sense that the mix of research may be skewed. The 
difficulty is to devise a mechanism by which public 
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and private efficiency criteria are simultaneously 
satisfied. In short, designing a completely fair 
and efficient commodity levy arrangement for 
financing research is not simple, and perhaps 
this helps to understand the limited use of these 
arrangements in most countries in the past.26 
These drawbacks notwithstanding, a small but 
increasing number of countries have adopted 
such arrangements for financing and conducting 
agricultural research, and in some places they are 
used extensively—notably Australia and Uruguay.
Other places appear to be showing some interest 
in increasing their use of this option—for instance 
Canada and California—as a way of buttressing 
an otherwise stagnant or shrinking supply of 
public agricultural research funds. For the most 
part, however, these policies are little used in less-
developed countries. Less-developed countries 
might most stand to gain from adopting levy-
based research funding methods given (a) the 
small amount and high opportunity cost of general 
government funding, (b) the limited interest of 
the private sector, and (c) the reduced prospects 
of applicable agricultural technological spillovers 
from developed countries, compared with the past. 
But the question is more complicated, since many 
of the relevant commodities are staples, consumed 
to a great extent within the household that 
produced them and thus not traded in markets. 
Thus there may be signifi cant practical, political, 
and economic reasons (including transaction 
costs) that militate against the use of levy-based 
funding for research for at least some commodities 
produced in developing countries. 
Resource Allocation Mechanisms 
As noted above, resource allocation is to some 
extent tied to funding mechanisms, though there 
is always some choice about how to allocate the 
resources raised by any particular mechanism. 
The institutional arrangements used to apportion 
research funds among diff erent research-
executing agencies often result in research 
26 Such arrangements are used much more extensively 
in most countries as a mechanism for fi nancing commodity 
promotion programs than agricultural R&D. A likely explanation 
for this fact is that effective generic promotion programs tend 
to enhance demand faced by all producers and immediately, 
whereas research takes longer and only adopters benefi t. 44 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
resource allocations that are not based on strong 
economic foundations. High measured rates of 
return notwithstanding, a sizable share of the 
potential benefits from the agricultural research 
enterprise may have been wasted in inefficient 
resource allocation. 
Roles for Economizing. Some would say that in 
most countries the system has worked very well 
(claiming that high reported rates of return testify 
to that) and, by implication, that we should not 
spoil a good thing. There is some truth to that view. 
The public-sector agricultural R&D system has 
achieved a great deal and it would be undesirable 
to change it in ways that would diminish its 
capacity to contribute to the economy in future.
By the same token, the fact that it has done well 
in the past does not mean that it could not have
done better. Moreover, having succeeded in the 
past does not guarantee continued future success. 
The rapidly changing economic environments 
in which national agricultural research systems 
find themselves, including changed research 
technology and research opportunities, are also 
relevant in this regard. Things that worked in the 
past may not work in the future. 
Allocating scarce research resources is an economic 
problem. In practice, too little use is made of 
economic analysis, economic incentives, and the 
economic way of thinking about problems. Rather, 
systems typically emphasize politics and processes, 
the inputs side, and pay scant attention to actual 
performance, the outputs side. In most countries, 
there is a notable lack of any systematic attempt 
to undertake meaningful economic evaluations of 
agricultural research investments as an integral part 
of the resource-allocation process. Resources are 
mostly allocated according to ad hoc approaches 
that may simply serve to ratify prior prejudices. 
Funding Forms. A related issue is how the funding 
should be provided. The possibilities include gifts,
which are funds provided with no particular strings 
attached, and include certain kinds of block grants; 
more-specific grants, which entail some general 
commitments by the researchers; and contracts,
which entail specific obligations. In recent years in 
many NARSs and in the international agricultural 
research system we have seen moves towards 
proportionately greater use of contracts and grants, 
and a reduction of gifts (i.e., formula funding). 
Competitive grants have a great deal to recommend 
them as a way of allocating public-sector research 
resources. However, competing for grants is hard 
work and expensive, and if competitive grants are to
deliver the promised benefits of greater allocative 
efficiency, they have to be allocated according 
to efficiency criteria. A poorly administered and 
corrupt system of competitive grants could easily 
be worse than an inflexible system of block grants 
or funding according to some formula, unrelated 
to past or prospective performance. Managed 
competition has been proposed as a way of 
making science and scientists more responsive 
to changing public research priorities which may,
in turn, enable an expansion of (or stave off a 
contraction of ) available funds. Some (e.g., Just 
and Huffman 1992; Huffman and Just 1994) have
argued that the transactions costs involved in 
competitive grants programs—in terms of the 
costs to individual scientists of preparing proposals, 
and reporting to granting bodies, and the costs of 
evaluating the proposals and deciding which ones 
to support—are so high that the programs cannot 
be economic. That charge could be correct; but 
relevant alternatives must be compared, and on a 
comparable footing. 
Costs to Consider. Every method of allocating 
research resources involves four types of costs: (a) 
information costs (the costs of obtaining relevant 
information on the benefits from different types of 
R&D projects, on which to base decisions); (b) other 
transactions costs (the costs of applying for grants, 
managing them, and administering them); (c) 
opportunity costs of ineffi  cient resource allocation, 
because research resources are not being used 
in the projects and programs with the highest 
social payoff; and (d) rent-seeking costs (costs of 
resources being spent wastefully attempting to
cause a redistribution of grant resources). Diff erent 
research resource allocation processes will involve 
different amounts of particular types of costs. For 
instance, through the proposal process, competitive 
grants generate information about research 
alternatives for decision makers. Although they 
may lower the cost of certain types of information, 
they also involve relatively high transactions costs. 
They might also involve relatively high rent-seeking 
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costs (for instance, scientists do lobby for support). 
However, these additional costs may be justifi ed 
if competitive grants lead to a lower overall social 
cost because they reduce the (opportunity) cost 
of resource misallocation. On the other hand, 
formula funds involve relatively high resource
misallocation costs, which tend to get higher the 
longer a formula stays fixed (since circumstances 
change), and relatively low transactions costs. This 
is not to say the transactions costs are zero, or that 
rent-seeking costs are zero with formula funds 
(there is a fair bit of bureaucracy associated with 
the administration of the funds; the formulas do 
or, at least, may change from time to time; some 
resources are spent simply to preserve the status 
quo). Earmarked funds may involve the greatest 
rent-seeking and resource distortion costs, but 
they may also involve relatively small transactions 
costs. In short, the full costs should be considered 
when comparing research resource allocation 
procedures. 
A middle ground is likely to be best for many 
situations: enough competition to ensure a vigorous 
and adaptable research program, that exploits 
optimally the available information on scientifi c 
opportunity and economic implications; enough 
security and confidence in future funding so the 
scientists will take appropriate risks, pursuing long-
term opportunities; not too much cost in terms of 
the time scientists spend in drafting proposals, 
justifying expenditures, and reporting results; not 
too narrow minded so that curiosity and fl air are 
stifled. Such a Goldilockian optimum, with every 
element just right, may be hard to achieve. Part of 
the solution is likely to involve relatively long-term 
funding of particular people, or research teams, 
rather than particular projects, based on their past 
performance more than their promises about the 
future, perhaps especially for the more basic types 
of scientific work. Competition can be eff ective as 
a resource allocation and incentive mechanism 
without requiring a morass of planning processes 
and committees, which to some represent the 
antithesis of competition. 
3. STATE OF SCIENCES 
FOR AGRICULTURE 
In 2000, about $732 billion (international) dollars 
was spent on all the sciences worldwide (Pardey, 
Dehmer and el Fekki 2007).27 This represented 
about 1.7 percent of global GDP in that year, 
and double the inflation adjusted total of $362 
billion two decades ago. High-income countries 
did the preponderance (i.e., 78.5 percent) of 
this research, although R&D directed toward
agriculture—recognizing that much other research 
in basic biology, health, (bio-)informatics and 
other disciplines, for example, also has relevance 
for agriculture—constituted a small share (1.8 
percent) of their total research expenditure.28 
Among developing countries, most of the total 
R&D (63.3 percent in 2000) was concentrated in 
just three countries—China, India, and Brazil. In
contrast, these countries accounted for only 20.9 
percent of the developing country total in 1980. 
Contrary to rich-country trends where agricultural 
R&D is a declining share of total R&D, the average 
share of agricultural R&D relative to all science 
spending in developing countries increased 
from 6.9 percent in 1980 to 9.6 percent in 2000.29 
However, the intensity of investment in agricultural 
R&D of the biggest developing-countries—China, 
India, and Brazil—actually dropped over this 
period, from 12.4 to 7.4 percent, pointing to a 
sustained trend among the more technologically 
advanced developing economies in the world to
invest a greater share of R&D resources in areas 
other than agriculture. 
27 This figure includes the total spending by public and private 
entities across all areas of science (i.e., including agricultural, 
medical, and engineering R&D, information technology sciences, 
social sciences, and so on). 
28 Food and health outcomes are inextricably intertwined 
through nutrition, but in some important cases the agriculture-
human health linkages are even more immediate. See Box 4 for a 
contemporary example. 
29 According to Pardey, Beintema, Dehmer, and Wood (2006) 
in 2000 high-income countries spent $574.0 billion (international 
dollars) on R&D in total, of which $22.3 billion was spent on public 
and private agricultural research. In the same year developing 
countries spent $157.0 billion on R&D in total of which $13.7 
billion was spent on agricultural R&D. 
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Public Agricultural Research Investments 
Worldwide, public investment in agricultural R&D 
increased by 51 percent in infl ation-adjusted 
terms between 1981 and 2000 from an estimated 
$15.2 billion to $23 billion in 2000 international 
dollars (Table 6). It grew faster in less-developed 
countries, and the developing world 
now accounts for more than half of 
global public-sector spending, though 
still substantially less than half the 
world’s total (i.e., public and private) 
agricultural R&D spending (Figure 10). 
The Asia and Pacifi c region has 
continued to gain ground, accounting 
for an ever-larger share of the 
developing country total since 1981. 
In 2000, two countries from this 
region, China and India, accounted for 
39.1 percent of all developing country 
expenditure on public agricultural 
R&D, a substantial increase from 
their 22.9 percent combined share in 
1981. In stark contrast, sub-Saharan 
Africa continued to lose market share,
falling from 17.3 to 11.4 percent of the 
developing country R&D investment total between 
1981 and 2000 (Pardey et al. 2006). 
Paralleling spending patterns for all the sciences, 
agricultural R&D has become increasingly 
concentrated in a handful of countries. Just four 
countries (the United States, Japan, France, and 
Figure 10: Global Public Agricultural R&D Investment,
2000 
West Asia Sub-Saharan 
& North Africa Africa 
6.0% 6.3% China 
13.7% 
India 
8.1% 
Other Asia 

& Pacific 

10.9%
BrazilOther Latin America
 
4.4%& Caribbean
 

6.2%
 

Developed 
Countries 
44.3% 
Source: Pardey, Beintema, Dehmer, and Wood (2006). 
Notes: Data are reported in international dollars based on purchasing 
power parity conversions of local currency units in 2000 prices. 
Table 6: Total Public Agricultural Research Expenditures by Region, 1981, 1991 and 2000 
Source: Pardey, Beintema, Dehmer, and Wood (2006). 
Notes: These estimates exclude East Europe and former Soviet Union countries. To form these regional totals we scaled up 
national spending estimates for countries that represented 79 percent of the reported sub-Saharan African total, 89 percent of the 
Asia and Pacific total, 86 percent of the Latin America and Caribbean total, 57 percent of the West Asia and North Africa total, and 
84 percent of the high-income total. Data construction standards conform to guidelines presented in OECD (1993). 
Agricultural R&D spending Shares in global total 
1981 1991 2000 1981 1991 2000 
(million 2000 international dollars) (percentage) 
Asia & Pacifi c (28) 3,047 4,847 7,523 20.0 24.2 32.7 
China 1,049 1,733 3,150 6.9 8.7 13.7 
India 533 1,004 1,858 3.5 5.0 8.1 
Latin America & Caribbean (27) 1,897 2,107 2,454 12.5 10.5 10.7 
Brazil 690 1,000 1,020 4.5 5.0 4.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa (44) 1,196 1,365 1,461 7.9 6.8 6.3 
West Asia & North Africa (18) 764 1,139 1,382 5.0 5.7 6.0 
Subtotal, Developing countries (117) 6,904 9,459 12,819 45.4 47.3 55.7 
Japan 1,832 2,182 1,658 12.1 10.9 7.2 
USA 2,533 3,216 3,828 16.7 16.1 16.6 
Subtotal, high income countries (22) 8,293 10,534 10,191 54.6 52.7 44.3 
Total (139) 15,197 19,992 23,010 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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by John McDermott, Christine Jost and Jeffrey Mariner, International Livestock Research
Institute (ILRI) 
The emerging threat of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has captured the world’s attention, 
not least because of concerns that this animal disease could spark a global influenza pandemic in 
humans on the scale of the 1918 “Spanish Flu” pandemic—an influenza A strain (H1N1) that was 
believed to infect one third of the world’s population (about 500 million people) and resulted in an 
estimated 50-100 million deaths.1 
The natural hosts of avian influenza viruses are water fowl. These viruses can evolve rapidly and 
become adapted to other hosts such as pigs and human beings. Influenza viruses vary widely in their 
ability to cause disease (pathogenicity). The H5N1 strain currently circulating in poultry in Africa 
and Asia is able to kill poultry in a matter of hours and more than 50 percent of confi rmed human 
infections result in death.2 Fortunately, the disease is largely confined to birds and transmission to
humans is rare. As yet, no sustained chains of human transmission have been detected. However,
each human infection raises the chance of the virus becoming adapted for human-to-human 
transmission—the key event that could spark a global pandemic with potentially high fatality rates.
Major funding has been mobilized to control the disease in poultry and reduce the risk of the virus 
becoming adapted for human transmission. This is a major paradigm shift from previous pandemic 
influenza preparedness planning (Martinot et al. 2007). The immediate and real impact of H5N1 
avian influenza has been on the livelihoods and incomes of poultry keepers, market agents and 
consumers in a number of developing countries. Critical control points along poultry production and 
marketing chains will have highest risks for transmission of H5N1 virus to new hosts, whether birds 
or people, and are key points for integrated veterinary and public health surveillance systems. 
H5N1 avian influenza was first detected in Hong Kong in 1997, although it likely emerged some time 
before in southern China (Morris and Jackson 2006). The disease was reported sporadically in China 
and Vietnam until 2003 then spread first across Southeast Asia—during which time Indonesia, Viet 
Nam and Thailand became endemic—and then further to Southern Asia, Europe and eventually 
into Africa. H5N1 was fi rst confirmed in Nigeria in January 2006, eventually spreading to a total of 
nine countries in West and East Africa and leading to persistent foci in Egypt and West Africa (FAO
2007). 
Addressing the risks of HPAI requires a range of new science and technology skills from molecular 
biology through to modeling and risk assessment. Genetic characterization of virus isolates is 
providing knowledge about changes in circulating viruses. This kind of research has been well funded 
as HPAI early warning systems depend on knowing what genes or genetic markers may be used in 
predicting a virus’s pathogenicity in poultry, ability to infect humans, and potential for human-to­
human transmission. These tools also contribute to the race to formulate new vaccines that can 
protect human and bird populations against evolving viral strains. Such efforts bring together the 
combined skills and experience of the international public and private sector biomedical research 
establishments and their associated health science funding sources. The harvesting of virus strains 
1 This influenza strain was believed to spread initially from rural Kansas to France and then to the rest of Europe, followed 
by two much more virulent waves that spread globally in the fall and winter of 1918-19. For more comprehensive information 
on the biology, epidemiology, and policy aspect of this and other infectious diseases (including detailed information on avian 
influenza) see the Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy at the University of Minnesota (www.cidrap.umn.edu). 
2 As of June 2007, the World Health Organization (www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/) reported 313 
confirmed cases of which 191 resulted in death. One hundred of the cases were in Indonesia, 93 in Viet Nam, and 36 in 
Egypt. 
Box 4: Avian Influenza—Linking Agriculture, Human Health and R&D 
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for genetic analysis and vaccine development has raised critical issues of intellectual property rights 
related to the origins of different viral strains, and how such rights might be controlled. 
Given variations in the transmission and impact of avian influenza in diff erent developing-country 
settings, applications of technology to assess and manage risks are critical. To be useful, there 
needs to be improved integration of disease control and eradication strategies that highlight the 
synergies between epidemiological and diagnostic technologies and their application in a broader 
socio-economic, market and production system context. Moreover, for many developing countries, 
greater understanding of the interactions between different production and marketing systems 
in the transmission and distribution of disease is required both to control disease and to develop 
sustainable incentive mechanisms to promote compliance with control eff orts. 
For example, China has managed its daunting avian influenza control challenge by up-scaling 
vaccine production and delivery in its massive domestic chicken and duck populations to an 
unprecedented level. Alternatively, Thailand has focused its efforts on strategies to eradicate
the disease, particularly adjacent to its commercial export sector, and to restructure its export 
industry from exporting chilled to cooked poultry products. In Indonesia, eff orts are focused on 
building participatory capacity to identify and contain disease outbreaks using the approach of 
participatory disease surveillance (Mariner et al. 2003). Control challenges in diff erent settings 
require local solutions based on analyses of market chains and production systems, disease 
transmission dynamics, control capacities, and culturally-defined values. A greater understanding 
of incentives—both market and livelihood-based—for compliance with disease control measures 
is critical. 
Avian influenza has constantly challenged the international community with unexpected twists and 
turns. Initially, the challenge of H5N1 avian influenza was approached through calls for rapid mass 
action to contain the disease. Countries were asked to absorb significant amounts of funding and 
carry out short-term interventions. In some locations, this approach was partially successful, or at
least reduced risk while critical capacity and improved control programs were developed. However,
as the global epidemic in poultry has evolved, the emphasis is shifting to building local capacity 
that is able to deal with emerging disease threats in a more sustainable manner, such as approaches 
that are better at ensuring food security, enhancing food safety and protecting public health. The 
case of H5N1 avian influenza illustrates that human and animal health, as well as the health of the 
developed and developing worlds, are deeply intertwined. There are no quick fi xes. Agricultural 
research and development as well as research on agricultural institutions and processes have direct 
consequences for human health and well-being across the globe. 
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Germany) accounted for 66 percent 
of the public R&D conducted by
developed countries in 2000; about the
same as two decades before. Similarly, 
just five developing countries (China, 
India, Brazil, Thailand and South 
Africa) undertook just over 53 percent 
of the developing countries’ public 
agricultural R&D in 2000, up from 40 
percent in 1981. Meanwhile, in 2000, a
total of 80 countries with a combined 
population of approximately 625
million people conducted only 6.3
Table 7: Concentration of Public Expenditures in 
Agricultural Research and Development, 1995 and 2000 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on ASTI data. 
2000 
1995 2000 GDP Population 
(percentages) 
Top 5 49.5 51.3 48.9 47.6 
Top 10 64.6 66.3 57.5 51.9 
Bottom 80 8.9 9.50 6.6 12.6 
regions of the world failed to match the rapid percent of total agricultural R&D 
ramping up of public agricultural R&D spending (Table 7). 
that Pardey and Beintema (2001) reported for the 
1970s. The growth in spending for the Asia and The patterns of spending growth are uneven (Figure 
Pacific region as a whole rebounded in the late11). Notably, the more recent rates of increase in 
1990s from the slower growth rates observed for inflation-adjusted spending for all developing 
Figure 11: Public Agricultural R&D Spending Trends 
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Notes: Inflation-adjusted growth rates calculated as weighted regional averages, using the least-squares method, as described by 
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the 1980s. This was especially so in China and India 
during the 1996 to 2000 period, in both instances 
reflecting government policies to revitalise public 
R&D and improve its commercialisation prospects, 
including linkages with the private sector (Fan et 
al. 2006; Pal and Byerlee 2006). Spending growth 
throughout the Latin American region as a whole 
was more robust during the 1990s than the 1980s, 
although the recovery was more fragile and less 
certain for some countries in the region (such as 
Brazil, where spending contracted at the close of 
the 1990s). 
Overall investments in agricultural R&D in sub-
Saharan Africa grew by less than 1 percent per 
annum during the 1990s, the continuation of a 
longer-term slowdown (Figure 11) (Beintema and 
Stads 2004). Even more concerning is the fact that 
of the 27 African countries for which national total
estimates are available, approximately 50 percent
spent less on agricultural R&D in 2000 than in
1991 (Beintema and Stads 2004). 
A notable feature of the trends was the contraction 
in support for public agricultural R&D among 
developed countries. Although spending in the 
United States increased in the latter half of the 
1990s, albeit slower than in preceding decades,30 
public R&D was massively reduced in Japan 
(and also, to a lesser degree, in several European 
countries) towards the end of the 1990s, leading to
a decline in developed country spending as a whole 
for the decade. The more recent data reinforce
the longer-term trends observed earlier. Namely, 
support for publicly performed agricultural R&D 
among developed countries is being scaled back, 
or at best is slowing down. In part, this points 
to a shifting emphasis from public to privately 
performed agricultural R&D, but also to a shift in 
government spending priorities. 
Inevitably, this will affect productivity prospects in 
agriculture for the countries in question. Pardey, 
Alston and Piggott (2006) suggest a more subtle 
and arguably more important consequence is 
that a slowdown or cutback in developed-country 
spending will curtail the future spillover of ideas and 
30 According to Alston et al. (2007) the rate of growth in U.S. 
public agricultural R&D spending rebounded some in the 2000­
2004 period, but at rates well below the long-run, post-World War 
II average. 
new technologies from developed to developing 
countries. Developed-developing country linkages 
will be even more attenuated as the funding trends 
proceed in parallel with other policy and market 
developments. These include strengthening IPRs 
and biosafety regulations, and, most signifi cantly, 
a reorientation of developed country R&D agendas 
away from productivity gains in food staples 
towards concerns for the environmental eff ects 
of agriculture and food quality, as well as the 
medical, energy, and industrial uses of agricultural 
commodities.31 With developed countries as a 
group still accounting for 44 percent of public 
agricultural R&D worldwide (and nearly 80 percent 
of all science spending) the consequences of a 
continuation of these funding, policy, and market 
trends is likely to be particularly pronounced in 
terms of the productivity-enhancing eff ects on 
food staples. 
In addition to these broad trends, other aspects 
of agricultural R&D funding that have important 
practical consequences are also of concern. For 
example, variability in R&D funding continues to be 
problematic for many developing country research 
agencies. This is especially troubling for agricultural 
R&D given the long gestation period for new crop 
varieties and livestock breeds, and the desirability 
of long-term employment assurances for scientists 
and other staff (Pardey, Alston and Piggott 2006). 
Variability encourages an over-emphasis on 
short-term projects or on projects with short lags 
between investment and outcomes, and adoption. 
It also discourages specialisation of scientists and 
other resources in areas of work where sustained 
funding may be uncertain, even when these areas 
have high pay-off potentials. 
Public Agricultural R&D Intensities 
Turning now from absolute to relative measures 
of R&D investments, developed countries as a 
group spent $2.36 on public agricultural R&D for 
31 For example, Alston et al. (2007) report that only 58.7 
percent of the $3,207 million of R&D conducted by the U.S. State 
Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES) in 2004 was directly 
related to enhancing farm productivity, compared with 68.9 
percent in 1975. Environmental (including forest- and fi sh-related) 
R&D has now grown to 14.1 percent of total SAES spending, basic 
crop and livestock genomic research accounted for an additional 
4.5 percent and post-farm (including food processing) research 
was 10.8 percent of the 2004 total. 
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every $100 of agricultural output in 2000: a sizable 
increase over the $1.41 spent per $100 of output 
two decades earlier, but slightly down from the 
1991 estimate of $2.38 (Figure 12). This longer-
term rise in R&D intensity in developed countries 
starkly contrasts with the group of developing 
countries where there was no measurable 
growth in the intensity of agricultural R&D (in this 
case, agricultural R&D spending expressed as a 
percentage of agricultural gross domestic product, 
AgGDP). In 2000, developing countries spent 
just $0.53 on agricultural R&D for every $100 of 
agricultural output. 
At first glance the rise in developed country 
intensity ratios and the stagnating R&D intensities 
for developing countries appears to misrepresent 
the trends in spending, which showed that the 
growth in investments in agricultural R&D in 
developing countries signifi cantly outpaced 
the corresponding growth in investments in 
agricultural R&D in developed countries (i.e., 3.13 
percent per year vs. 2.11 percent per year from 
1981-2000). Delving deeper, agricultural output 
grew much faster in aggregate for developing 
versus developed countries over the previous 
several decades, so that the faster growth in 
aggregate agricultural R&D spending among 
developing countries had, nonetheless, barely kept 
pace with the corresponding growth in output. 
In addition, more than half of the developed 
countries, for which data were available, had 
higher R&D intensity ratios in 2000 than 1981. 
The majority of rich countries spent in excess of 
$2.50 on public agricultural R&D for every $100 of 
AgGDP. Only 10 of the 26 countries in sub-Saharan 
Figure 12: Intensity of Public Agricultural R&D 
Asia & Pacific 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 
West Asia & 
North America 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Global Total 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 
Percentage 
1981 1991 2000 
Source: Calculated by Pardey and Beintema based on Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI) initiative data. 
Agricultural GDP data are from World Bank (2005b). 
Note: The intensity ratios measure total public agricultural R&D spending as a percentage of agricultural output agricultural GDP. 
The developing-country category includes countries that also constitute regional totals. 
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Africa in the sample for which longer-run data were
available had higher intensity ratios in 2000 than in 
1981, while most countries in the Asian and Latin 
American sample increased their intensity ratios 
from 1981 to 2000 (9 out 11 Asian countries and 8 
out of 11 Latin American countries). 
Other research intensity ratios are also 
revealing. Developed countries spent $692 per 
agricultural worker in 2000, more than double 
the corresponding 1981 ratio, while developing 
countries spent just $10 per agricultural worker in 
2000, an increase of less than 50 percent over the 
1981 figure (Table 8). These developed-developing 
country differences are, perhaps, not too surprising. 
A much smaller share of the developed country 
workforce was employed in agriculture, and the 
absolute number of agricultural workers declined 
more rapidly in developed countries than it did in 
the developing ones. 
While only some segments of society are directly 
involved in agriculture as producers, everyone 
consumes agricultural outputs, therefore 
agricultural R&D spending per capita is instructive.
For developed countries, spending per capita rose 
substantially from 1981 to 1991 (a continuation of 
earlier trends documented by Pardey and Beintema 
2001), but declined thereafter so that spending 
per capita in 2000 had slipped well below 1991 
levels. This developed country reversal was driven 
mainly by developments in Japan, although only 
half the developed countries continued to increase 
their per capita spending on agricultural R&D 
throughout the 1990s. 
Per capita spending rates were much lower among 
developing compared with developed countries: 
typically less than $3 per capita for developing 
countries (especially those in Africa) whereas 59 
percent of the developed countries invested more 
than $10 per capita in 2000. Nonetheless, and 
in contrast to the group of developed countries, 
spending per capita for the group of developing 
countries continued to rise; from $2.09 per capita 
in 1981 to $2.72 in 2000. The outliers to this general 
trend are sub-Saharan Africa, where agricultural 
R&D spending per capita has continued to decline 
since 1981, and Latin America, where spending 
per capita declined from $5.43 in 1981 to $4.94 in 
1991, and $4.96 in 2000. 
Private Agricultural R&D Investments 
In agriculture, in particular, it is difficult for 
individuals to fully appropriate the returns from 
their R&D investments, and it is widely held that 
some government action is warranted to ensure an 
adequate investment in R&D (Pardey, Alston and 
Piggott 2006). The private sector has continued 
to emphasise inventions that are amenable 
to various intellectual property (IP) protection 
options such as patents, and more recently, plant 
breeders’ rights and other forms of IP protection. 
Private investments in agricultural R&D, similar 
Table 8: Alternative Public Agricultural Research Intensities, 1981, 1991, and 2000 
Source: Pardey and Beintema's estimates based on ASTI data. 
Note: See Table 6. 
Agricultural R&D spending (2000 international dollars) 
Per capita 
Per capita of economically active 
agricultural population 
Region/grouping 1981 1991 2000 1981 1991 2000 
Asia—Pacifi c 1.31 1.73 2.35 3.84 5.23 7.57 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.43 4.94 4.96 45.10 50.54 60.11 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.14 2.69 2.28 9.79 9.04 8.22 
Middle East and North Africa 3.24 3.63 3.66 19.15 27.30 30.24 
Developing-country subtotal 2.09 2.34 2.72 6.91 8.14 10.19 
High-income country subtotal 10.91 13.04 11.92 316.52 528.30 691.63 
Total 3.75 4.12 4.13  14.83 16.92 18.08 
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to investments in all forms of R&D, are motivated 
and sustained by the returns to innovation reaped 
from the investment. IP policies and practices are 
but one dimension of the incentive to innovate.
Important other dimensions include potential 
market size and the cost of servicing the market, 
which in turn are dependent on the state of 
communication and transportation infrastructure,
farm structure and size, and farm income. So too 
is the pattern of food consumption. As incomes 
rise, a larger share of food expenditure goes to
food processing, convenience and other attributes 
of food, areas where significant shares of private 
agricultural R&D effort are directed. 
The private sector has a large presence in 
agricultural R&D, but with dramatic diff erences 
between developed and developing countries 
and among countries. In 2000, the global total 
spending on agricultural R&D (including pre-, on-, 
and post-farm oriented R&D) was $36.3 billion. 
Approximately 37 percent was conducted by
private firms, and the remaining 63 percent by
public agencies. Notably, 93 percent of that private 
R&D was performed in developed counties, where 
some 54 percent of the agricultural R&D was 
private, well up on the 44 percent private share 
of 1981 (Table 9). This rich-country trend may well 
continue if the science of agriculture increasingly 
looks like the sciences more generally. In the United 
States, for example, the private sector conducted 
nearly 52 percent of agricultural R&D in 2000, 
compared with 72 percent of all R&D expenditures 
in that same year (NSF 2005). These increasing 
private shares refl ected increasing industry R&D 
by the farm-input supply and, especially, the food 
processing sectors. Around the general trend was 
much country-specific variation. According to data 
underlying Pardey et al. (2006), Japan conducted 
slightly more of its agricultural R&D in the private 
sector than the United States whereas Australia 
and Canada—both reliant on privately developed, 
technology-intensive imports of farm machinery,
chemicals and other agricultural inputs—had 
private-sector shares of agricultural R&D spending 
less than 25 percent in 2000. 
In developing countries, only 6.2 percent of the 
agricultural R&D was private, and there were large 
disparities in the private share among regions 
of the developing world. In the Asia and Pacifi c 
region, around 8 percent of the agricultural R&D 
was private, compared with only 2 percent of the 
R&D throughout sub-Saharan Africa. The majority 
of private agricultural R&D in sub-Saharan Africa 
was oriented to crop-improvement research, often 
(but not always) dealing with export crops such as 
cotton in Zambia and Madagascar and sugarcane 
in Sudan and Uganda. Almost two thirds of the 
private agricultural R&D performed throughout 
the whole region was carried out in South Africa. 
The rich/poor country disparity in the intensity 
of agricultural research noted in Figure 12 is 
magnified dramatically if private research is also 
factored in (Figure 13). In 2000, in developing 
countries as a group the ratio of total agricultural 
R&D spending to agricultural output (specifi cally 
AgGDP) was 0.57 percent (i.e., for every $100 of 
agricultural GDP, 57 cents was spent on agricultural 
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Table 9:  Estimated Global and Private Agricultural R&D Investments, Circa 2000 
Source: Pardey, Beintema, Dehmer, and Wood (2006). 
Expenditures 
(million 2000 international dollars) 
Shares 
(percent) 
Public Private Total Public Private 
Asia-Pacifi c 7,523 663 8,186 91.9 8.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean 2,454 124 2,578 95.2 4.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1,461 26 1,486 98.3 1.7 
Middle East and North Africa 1,382 50 1,432 96.5 3.5 
Developing-country subtotal 12,819 862 13,682 93.7 6.3 
High-income country subtotal 10,191 12,086 22,277 45.7 54.3 
Total 23,010 12,948 35,958 64.0 36.0 
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Figure 13: Public, Private, and Total Agricultural R&D Intensities, circa 2000 
Developing

Countries
 

Developed

Countries
 

Global Total 
Public Private Total 
Source: Pardey, Beintema, Dehmer, and Wood (2006). 
Notes: The intensity ratios measure total public and private agricultural R&D spending as a percent of agricultural output 
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 
Percentage 
(agricultural GDP). 
R&D) compared with an intensity ratio of 5.16 
percent for developed countries—a rich-to-poor 
country ratio in intensities of 8.7:1, compared with 
a 4.8:1 ratio if just public research spending were
considered. 
Rich vs Poor Countries—A Growing 
Scientific and Knowledge Divide 
Collectively these data point to a disturbing 
development—a growing divide regarding the 
conduct of (agricultural) R&D—and, most likely, 
a consequent growing technological divide in 
agriculture. Only a select few developing countries 
show signs of closing in on the higher amounts and 
higher intensity of investment in agricultural R&D 
typically found in the rich countries. Meanwhile, 
large numbers of developing countries are either
stalling or slipping in terms of the amount spent
on agricultural R&D, the intensity of investment,
or both. 
Table 10 makes more concrete the nature of that 
divide through a comparison of Africa (a region 
consisting of 42 contiguous countries plus 6 
island nations) and America (a nation of 50 states,
48 of them contiguous). The agricultural areas 
in both parts of the world are similar, but African 
agriculture uses far fewer hectares per worker 
than in the United States. Moreover, land and 
labor are still dominant components of the cost 
of production in sub-Saharan Africa, whereas in 
America the combined cost share of these two 
inputs fell considerably during the past 50 years at 
least. Purchased inputs now constitute 38 percent 
of the total cost of production in U.S. agriculture,
compared with 23 percent in 1949. 
Not only is the structure of agriculture dramatically 
different, so too is the structure of agricultural 
R&D. Africa has almost 30 percent more public 
agricultural researchers than America, but the 
training of these researchers continues to lag well 
behind that of those in the United States (and well 
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behind those researchers working 
elsewhere in the developing world). 
African public agricultural research 
agencies are heavily skewed to the 
small end of the size distribution, 
with three quarters of these agencies 
employing fewer than 20 researchers, 
whereas almost all the public agencies 
in the United States employ more 
than 100 researchers. Moreover, 
the lion’s share of public research in 
the United States is now performed 
by universities, while the average 
university share in Africa is less than 20 
percent.32 Crucially, real spending per 
researcher in the United States is more 
than four times the spending of their 
African counterparts. And the gap is 
growing. The long-run trend continues 
to show an increase in spending per 
scientist in the United States while 
inflation-adjusted spending in Africa 
has shrunk to less than half what is was 
in 1981. 
These measures suggest the immensity,
if not the outright impossibility, of 
playing catch-up, and the consequent 
need to transmit knowledge across 
borders and continents. The measures 
also underscore the need to raise current levels 
of funding for agricultural R&D throughout the 
region while also developing the policy and 
infrastructure needed to accelerate the rate of 
knowledge creation and accumulation in Africa 
over the long haul. Developing local capacity to
carry forward findings will yield a double dividend: 
increasing local innovative capacities while also 
enhancing the ability of African science to tap 
discoveries made elsewhere.33 Not least, this calls 
for increasing investments in primary, secondary,
and higher education, which is essential if the 
generation and accumulation of knowledge is to
gain the momentum required, putting economies 
on a path to lift people out of poverty. 
32 Notably, government agencies accounted for over half the 
publicly performed agricultural R&D in the United States through 
to the mid-1900s, but the university share has grown steadily in 
the decades since then. 
33 Section 4 deals with these aspects in more detail. 
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Table 10: America vs Africa, 2000 
Source: Compiled by Pardey from data underlying Beintema and Stads 
(2004) Pardey et al. (2006), and Alston et al. (2007). 
a Data refers to agricultural research spending and agencies. 
America Africa 
Agricultural (arable) area (mill ha) 175.5 181.5 
Ag land/labor ratio 
(ha per worker) 
141 5.6 
Land and labor cost shares 45% 80% 
Number of public agenciesa 51 390 
Total pblic FTEs 9,368 12,224 
Share of FTEs with PhDs 100% 25% 
Share of agencies < 200 fte 4% 76% 
Share of agencies > 100 fte 96% 3.5% 
Total public expendituresa $3,465 mil $1,085 mil 
University share of public 78.2% 19.3% 
Total private expendituresa $4,167 mil $30 mil 
Private share 54.6% 2.6% 
Spending per FTEa $369,910 $88,590 
Agricultural research intensity 
Public only 2.65% 0.72% 
Public and Private 5.84% 0.73% 
International Agricultural R&D 
In the mid-1940s, programs of internationally 
conceived and funded agricultural research 
were launched in an effort to overcome the 
biases against the development and diff usion 
of agricultural technologies among developing 
countries. Through the 1950s, these programs 
expanded as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations 
placed agricultural staff in less-developed 
countries to work alongside scientists in national 
research organizations on joint-venture research. 
These efforts became the model for subsequent 
programs in international agricultural research, as 
they evolved into the International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines in 1960 and the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center 
(CIMMYT) in Mexico in 1967. Hoping to show that 
the model of international agricultural research 
could achieve success in broad agroecological 
regions as well as specific commodities, other 
international centers were established in Nigeria 56 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
   
(the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture,
IITA) in 1967 and Colombia (the International Center 
for Tropical Agriculture, CIAT) in 1968. The further 
development of international agricultural research 
centers took place largely under the auspices of 
a collective funding instrument known as the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR, or CG for short), established in 
1971 as bilateral and multilateral donors bought 
into the model.34 
While the CG system has captured the attention 
of the international agricultural R&D and aid 
communities, through the impact of its scientifi c 
achievements and through its pivotal role in the 
Green Revolution, it has spent only a small fraction 
of the global agricultural R&D investment.35 In
2000, the CG system represented 1.5 percent
of the $23 billion (2000 prices) global public-
sector investment in agricultural R&D and just
0.9 percent of all public and private spending on
agricultural R&D. 
Figure 14 plots the nominal and real (that is, 
adjusted for infl ation) values of total expenditures 
34 Here the “CGIAR system” is used to denote the CGIAR itself 
and the international centers it funds. In his definitive history of the 
first 15 years of the CGIAR, and its antecedent operations, Baum 
(1986) left little doubt that the main impetus for the CGIAR was 
a collective funding instrument. In chapter 2, titled “Mobilizing 
the Aid Community, 1969-71,” of his book, Baum describes the 
landmark Bellagio Conference of April 1969—the oft described 
institutional genesis of the CGIAR—as “… a golden opportunity 
to bring the work of the international institutes before the heads 
of aid agencies that were potential financing partners (p. 28).” 
He continued “… Later in the discussion, Robert S. McNamara, 
president of the World Bank, mentioned the possibility of forming 
a consultative group or consortium for fund raising, and John 
Hannah of USAID promptly seconded the idea… (p.30). 
35 The CGIAR funded centers are not the only organizations 
doing agricultural R&D for developing countries. Two large French 
agencies engaged in tropical agricultural research are the Centre 
de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour 
le Développement (CIRAD), established in 1984 from a merger of 
various French institutes operating mainly in Africa, many since 
the 1940s, and the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement 
(IRD), formerly Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique 
Outre-mer, (ORSTOM). In 2005 CIRAD was structured around 
seven research departments: annual crops; tree crops; fruit and 
horticultural crops; animal production and veterinary medicine; 
forestry; territories, environment and people; and advanced 
methods for innovation in science. It employed 1,820 people, 
including 1,050 senior staff members, and had an operating 
budget of 200 million euros (CIRAD 2006). In 2005, IRD’s activities 
were clustered into six programs: natural hazards, climate and 
non-renewable resources; sustainable management of Southern 
ecosystems; continental and coastal waters; food security in the 
South; public health and health policy; and globalization and 
development. It had a total budget of 195.2 million euros and 
employed 2,256 staff , of which 43 percent were located outside 
mainland France (IRD 2006). 
by the CGIAR system. After an initial expenditure 
of $7.4 million in 1960, total spending rose to
$1.3 million per year in 1965. By 1970, the four 
founding centers—IRRI, CIMMYT, IITA, and CIAT— 
were allocated a total of $14.8 million annually. 
The progressive expansion of the total number of 
centers, and the funding per center, during the 
next decade involved a tenfold increase in nominal 
spending, to $141 million in 1980. During the 
1980s, spending continued to grow, more than 
doubling in nominal terms to reach $305 million 
in 1990. The rate of growth had slowed but was 
still impressive. In the 1990s, however, although 
the number of centers grew—from 13 to 18 at one 
point, but now 15—funding did not grow enough 
to maintain the level of spending per center, let 
alone the growth rates. 
Since 2000, funding has grown in total to $450 
million in 2006, but with a continuing trend 
toward earmarked support for specifi c projects 
and programs of research involving multiple 
centers and other research providers outside the 
CG system. In fact the period after 1983 was one 
of a continuing decline in the share of unrestricted 
funds—down to 43 percent of the total in 2005 
compared with a 1980s average of 80 percent (and 
a 1970s average of 88.3 percent for the precursor 
centers of the CG system). 
The rationale for government intervention in the 
private provision of agricultural R&D is market 
failure: individuals will under-invest, hoping that 
they may free-ride on the efforts of others. In an 
international context, countries play the roles 
of individuals to some extent. Any one country 
may under-invest in R&D if the results could 
be adopted and applied elsewhere so that the 
investing country could capture only a fraction of 
the benefits from investing in invention. In relation 
to R&D applicable to less-developed countries, 
both domestic and international market failures 
of these types have led to a major persistent gap 
between the socially desirable rates of investment 
in agricultural R&D and actual investments. 
The efficiency rationale for the CG system is to
overcome, to some extent at least, the under-
investment problem. The humanitarian rationale 
is to help the food-poor. The real reason why the 
CGIAR exists as it does combines elements of 
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Figure 14: Nominal and Real Expenditure of CGIAR-Supported Centers 
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these two rationales, with the effects of some self-
serving motives of certain donors adding further 
complications. In order to be effective in achieving 
any of these objectives the CG, given its relatively 
small resource base, should focus on the areas in 
which the market failures are greatest and where it 
has a comparative advantage relative to public and 
private research in the NARSs. 
In its first three decades, the CG system made its 
mark. The primary focus was on cereal crops, in 
an adaptation of the pre-existing centers founded 
privately. Many of the more tangible effects of the 
CG system are still those that can be identifi ed most 
clearly with the first four centers. The progressive,
dramatic expansion of the CG system over the years 
involved the addition of a further nine centers in the 
1970s and more in the 1990s. Funding per center 
grew initially, but more recently competition for 
funds among centers became more pronounced. 
The total funding has become more uncertain in a 
number of ways. And, of the total funding, a much 
less secure, and less flexible, form of restricted 
or project funding. Like the U.S. agricultural R&D 
system, the CG system is becoming more subject 
to earmarking by those who fund it. In addition, 
with expansion of the number of centers and the 
broadening mandate, the management of the CG
system has progressively become more complex, 
top-heavy, administratively burdensome, and 
expensive, notwithstanding some recent attempts 
to streamline operations. 
With the rise in the number of centers, the 
mandates of the system have changed, and the 
emphasis has shifted away from crop productivity 
toward the newer areas that have also risen in 
prominence in the national agricultural research 
systems of richer countries—emphasizing things 
such as sustainability, nutrition, and income 
distribution, at the expense of productivity.
The comparative advantage of the CG system 
does not appear to have been a major criterion 
greater proportion is now provided in the much 58 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
in more recent decision-making.36 An apparent 
abundance of research resources may have led 
to a perception that there was no opportunity 
cost to accommodating the newer political 
agendas in the system. This perception was clearly 
wrong. As noted above, similar patterns have
been apparent in the agricultural R&D systems 
of the world more generally, perhaps for similar 
reasons. The consequence has been a reduction 
in the resources available for the more-traditional, 
productivity-enhancing investments. Thus, over 
time, the priorities of the CGIAR have shifted in 
the same direction as the rich country agendas 
for agricultural R&D—that is, towards “luxury” 
goods such as safer, higher-quality food and 
enhanced environmental amenities—which the 
poorest people of the world might not choose 
to emphasize at the expense of the availability of 
food and the ability to pay for it. 
Alston, Dehmer and Pardey (2006) suggest it is time 
to rethink international approaches to agricultural 
R&D, both because of the changes that have taken 
place within the CG system and the changing 
context in which it will have to operate. Rich-
country NARSs are changing how they do business 
in ways that will have important implications for 
the types of technologies that will be available for 
the poor countries. Poor country NARSs will have
to change what they do, accordingly, and clearly 
so will the international agricultural research 
centers (IARCs). The potential role of international 
cooperative ventures such as the CG system is 
likely to be even greater than in the past, but this is 
happening at a time when the CG system is losing 
ground. 
To re-energize the CG system it may have to
be re-engineered. Such re-engineering could 
contemplate a narrower constitution of the system, 
a different set of mandates for the IARCs that the 
CG supports, and different modes of operation, 
but would retain the concept of multinational 
collective action—including charitable support 
from the richer countries—to provide agricultural 
36 See Alston, Dehmer and Pardey (2006), for a more complete 
elaboration of this point and others raised in this and the 
subsequent paragraph. 
R&D for poor countries.37 It is important to defi ne 
clearly the limits of the role of the CGIAR and to
understand the links between the CG system and 
other institutions. Universities and other public 
elements of national agricultural research systems, 
and, perhaps, increasingly, private for-profi t and 
private nonprofit enterprises are engaging in 
myriad collective R&D eff orts. 
More concretely, one option is to refocus the CGIAR 
on its original core concept—that is, a collective 
funding instrument for internationally conceived 
and conducted agricultural R&D. Arguably, the 
transactions costs of collectively financing an entire 
system of centers in which more than half the funds 
are now earmarked by donors may exceed the 
benefits (at least to some if not many of the centers, 
their scientists, and the developing-country clients 
they serve). A reassertion of the independence of 
the IARCs, but, perhaps, with a subset of funding 
for IARC research being pooled and subject to
CGIAR oversight funding, could free up the IARCs 
to pursue different forms of engagement with 
different agencies—be they research funders, 
research partners, or technology delivery agents— 
that best suit the circumstances.38 In particular, the 
notion of a “CG-wide” budget is now, in essence,
a fiction. In fact, the critical details of much of 
that budget are already set bilaterally between 
donors (or groups of donors) and the IARCs 
(either individually or in groups, and increasingly 
with other research providers). Throwing off the 
remaining vestiges of the “CG member approved” 
agenda or budget formulation processes is likely 
to foster innumerable institutional innovations 
that are presently stymied by the consensual and, 
in certain key aspects, infl exible decision-making 
structures that still persist in the CGIAR system.39 
37 In 2006, the developing countries collectively contributed 
$15 million (3.3 percent) to the overall funding of the CGIAR 
system (CGIAR Secretariat 2007). 
38 In his history of the CGIAR, Baum (1986, p.310) observed 
that “... it is useful to distinguish between the activities of the 
IARCs and those of the CGIAR itself.” Over time, this distinction 
has become blurred, if not lost to many. 
39 A sampling of some of the newer forms of collective action 
regarding R&D is described in Section 2.3. Some CGIAR-supported 
centers are engaged in some of these undertakings, but much 
more institutional innovation seems possible, and present CG 
governance structures and administrative requirements appear 
to impede rather than facilitate the necessary institutional 
experimentation. 
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A looser federation of IARCs could also be the means 
to substantially reduce the signifi cant transactions 
costs currently being incurred by the various 
centralized CG priority setting, accountability and 
administrative functions. Retaining sufficient, 
perhaps collectively-administered, core funding 
is likely to be critical, for a number of reasons, not 
least as a means for ensuring the right share of 
longer-term, more risky, scale sensitive, and less 
site-specific R&D is retained in the international 
agricultural research portfolio. Centralized 
provision of some multi-center services may persist, 
but with the latter ideally provided on a fee-bid 
basis. These multi-center services might include 
such things as collective financial reporting, shared 
communication and information services, joint 
representation at international funding agencies 
and fora, and occasional, perhaps biennial or 
triennial, joint scientifi c meetings. 
4. TECHNOLOGICAL 
DISTANCE, SPILLOVERS, AND 
KNOWLEDGE STOCKS 
R&D spillovers across disciplines (or fields of inquiry 
more generally construed), institutions (e.g., public 
vs private), economic sectors, agroecologies and 
countries are pervasive but poorly understood. In
a geographic (or geo-political) sense, R&D spillins 
entail the local adoption of new knowledge and 
technologies developed in other countries or 
other regions. Analyses of agricultural productivity 
gains have shown that spillins are a major source
of productivity gains, accounting for up to half 
of local productivity increases. The potential for 
technological “spillovers” is diffi  cult to quantify, but 
may be approximated by measures of similarity 
among countries or regions. 
Because agricultural production is especially 
dependent on natural resources and climatic 
conditions (i.e., suitability of particular crops or 
production practices), the degree of agro-ecological 
similarity can facilitate or limit the degree to which 
spillins can be exploited. Countries that share agro­
ecological characteristics are likely to have high 
potential for spillovers—i.e., technologies or crop 
varieties developed in one country may be readily 
adopted in the other. Similarly, spillins would tend 
to flow more readily among countries that produce 
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similar crop mixes. In contrast, technological 
spillovers will be limited among countries that are 
technologically distant, or dissimilar in their agro­
ecological characteristics or production patterns. In
the section to follow we present new metrics of the 
agricultural technology distance among countries 
and regions of the world as a means of refi ning our 
understanding of research spillover potentials. 
Measuring International Spillover Potential 
Since there are numerous agro-ecological zones 
and numerous agricultural commodities, either 
type of similarity is multi-dimensional and requires 
a measure more complex than a simple correlation 
coefficient that compares just one dimension 
against another. Jaffe (1986, 1989) developed a 
measure he called the “angular separation of the 
vectors,” which is adapted for this study. Following 
Jaff e’s approach, we define for each country or 
region i a vector fi = (fi1, fi2, … fiM), where fik  is the share 
of attribute k in country or region i. In measuring 
the similarity of agro-ecological resources, fik is the 
share of cultivated land in agro-ecological zone k in 
country i. In measuring the similarity of agricultural 
production, fik is the value share of agricultural 
output k for country i. By definition, the shares 
sum to one over all attributes. The vector fi locates 
each country i in M-dimensional space, and Jaff e’s
measure of the technological distance between 
countries i and j is equal to the cosine of the angle 
between the two vectors. More formally, Jaff e’s
measure is calculated as: 
∑ ƒ ƒim jm 
mωij = ½ ½ 
2 2∑ ƒ ∑ ƒim( )  jm( )m m 
Like a correlation coefficient, ωij varies between 0 
(indicating no similarity) and 1 (indicating perfect
similarity), and is symmetric (i.e., ωij = ωij). 
To make the idea behind this distance metric 
concrete, consider three countries whose only 
agricultural outputs are wheat and milk. The value 
shares of wheat and milk for the three countries 
are plotted in panel a of Figure 15. Clearly, country 
a specializes in milk production, while country 
b produces a more balanced mix and country 
c specializes in the production of wheat. Jaff e’s
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Figure 15: Illustrative Example of Jaffe s Angular Separation of Vectors 
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measure is the cosine of the angles between the 
vectors representing the input mixes. Panel b of 
Figure 15 shows the cosine function as the degrees 
in an angle increases. Over the relevant range 
of angles (0 to 90, since all value shares must be 
positive), cosine varies between 1 and 0, where the 
wider the angle, the more dissimilar are the input 
mixes and the closer the cosine is to zero. Jaff e’s
formula applies the same idea to M dimensions. 
Technological Distance by Income 
We present measures of similarity for the 
distribution of land among 26 agro-ecological 
zones (AEZs) and for the distribution of agricultural 
production value among 185 outputs (averaged 
over the 2002-2004 period).40 Calculations are 
based on a data set including 156 countries—31 
high-income countries, 47 African countries, and 
78 low- or middle-income countries in other parts 
of the world. In addition to country-to-country 
comparisons, countries are also aggregated using 
diff erent rules so that region-to-region similarities 
could be assessed. Patterns in the measures 
of technological distance reveal potential for 
spillovers as well as some particular challenges 
40 The commodity value shares were developed by the authors 
using quantity data taken from FAO (2006) and unpublished 
average world prices denominated in 2000 international prices 
that Africa and other low-income regions face in 
exploiting spillover potential. 
Table 11 shows the ωij values for regions aggregated 
on the basis of income. Two important patterns are 
revealed. First, in every case, there is more similarity 
among regions in their agricultural production 
than in their agro-ecological resources. This is true 
in most cases, whether pairs of countries or regions 
were considered, and regardless of how countries 
are aggregated. The second notable pattern is the 
dissimilarity in both dimensions between low-
income countries and those with higher incomes. 
Low- to high-income regions share very little in 
terms of agro-ecological characteristics, with an 
ω AEZ LowInc,HighInc  of just 0.06. Agricultural production 
is more similar ( ω AgProdLowInc,HighInc = 0.38), but is still the 
least similar pair in Table 11. The low-income region 
is more similar in both dimensions to the upper-
middle income region, and even more so to the 
lower-middle income region. This lack of similarity 
with the high-income countries highlights the 
difficulty one would expect low-income regions to
encounter in exploiting spillins. 
Since around two-thirds of the world’s agricultural 
R&D is conducted in high-income countries, it 
is instructive to look at the similarities between 
individual countries and that aggregate. For 
each country i there are 31 country-to-country 
ωij measures (where j indexes the 31 countries 
classified as high income). Taking an average of 
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country i’s 31 country-to-country ωijs 
would give equal weight to each, 
regardless of the size or agricultural 
importance of country j. On the other 
hand, forming an aggregate of the 31 
high-income countries and calculating 
the ωij between that aggregate and 
individual countries yields a ωi,HighInc 
value that is larger than an average of 
the 31 country-to-country ωijs (since 
by construction, the high-income 
aggregate will be more diverse than 
each of the 31 countries). In order to
avoid systematically overstating the 
similarity between individual countries 
and the high-income aggregate while 
giving each country-to-country ωij 
appropriate weight, we constructed 
Table 11:  Measures of Similarity in Agro-Ecological 
Zones and Agricultural Output Between Regions 
Defined by Income 
Source: James, Pardey and Wood's calculations. 
High Upper-Middle 
Lower-
Middle Low 
High Zone 1.00 
Output 1.00 
Upper-Middle Zone 0.81 1.00 
Output 0.95 1.00 
Lower-Middle Zone 0.56 0.69 1.00 
Output 0.74 0.71 1.00 
Low Zone 0.06 0.13 0.44 1.00 
Output 0.38 0.38 0.64 1.00 
a weighted average of ωij. For each 
country j in the high-income category,
ωij is assigned a weight equal to country j’s share 
of agricultural R&D spending in rich countries. The 
weighted ωijs are then summed over j. The result 
is a composite index of country i’s similarity with 
technology-producing rich countries. 
Figure 16 shows ag-producing areas overlaid with 
a color code to show each country’s composite 
index of similarity with high-income countries. 
Panel a maps the ω AEZ  index. The closer the i,HighInc 
color is to pink, the more technologically distant 
is the country from the high-income aggregate in 
terms of agro-ecology. African countries are among 
the most agro-ecologically distant from the high-
income region. Panel b is constructed similarly 
using an output based measure of similarity in 
agricultural production. Here, we see that many 
more countries are similar in their production to
the high-income aggregate (dark red shading), but 
that Africa and parts of Southeast Asia are the least 
similar. 
Another way of looking at the technological 
distance from high-income regions is shown in 
Figure 17. Panel a includes the average value of 
ω AEZ i,HighInc  across all countries in the data set (0.19), 
African countries (0.02), and non-African countries 
(0.27). It also shows the cumulative distribution 
of land with respect to the agro-ecological 
similarity with high-income countries. The solid 
blue line shows the distribution for all countries 
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combined. For example, approximately 60 percent 
of cultivated land area has an ω AEZ i,HighInc  less than or 
equal to 0.10, and less than 20 percent has ω AEZ i,HighInc 
greater than 0.40. The green and orange lines 
show separate distributions for African and non-
African countries. Not only do the average ω AEZ i,HighInc 
values differ between Africa and the rest of the 
world, but the distributions diff er substantially 
as well. Specifically, all agricultural land in Africa 
has an ω AEZ i,HighInc  less than 0.20, while less than half 
of the agricultural land in the rest of the world 
is so technologically distant from high-income 
countries. 
Panel b shows the averages and cumulative 
distribution of technological distance as measured 
by similarity in agricultural output mixes. Once 
again, African countries are, on average, less similar 
ω AgProd to high-income countries (average i,HighInc  of 
0.30 in Africa, compared with 0.50 in non-African 
countries, and 0.44 for all countries combined). 
In addition, the cumulative distribution of the 
value of agricultural production by technological 
distance is very different for Africa than for the rest 
of the world. For instance, half of the agricultural 
production value in Africa is produced in countries 
with ω AgProdi,HighInc  less than or equal to 0.40, compared 
with only 23 percent of agricultural value in the 
rest of the world. 
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Figure 16: Technological Distance from High-Income Countries 
Panel a: Technological Distance Measured by Agro-Ecological Zones 
Panel b: Technological Distance Measured by Agricultural Output Mix 
Agricultural Distance Metric 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
technologically distant technologically close 
outside the extent of agricultural areas 
no data 
Source: Developed by James, Pardey and Wood with assistance of Sebastian. 
Technological Distance within Africa 
The substantial differences between African 
countries and high-income countries make 
it difficult to exploit technological spillovers. 
Heterogeneity among countries within Africa 
compounds the problem. Table 12 shows region-
to-region ωijs for regions of Africa. As in Table 
11, there is more similarity in production than 
Agricultural Distance Metric 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
technologically distant technologically close 
outside the extent of agricultural areas 
no data 
agro-ecology. The differences in agro-ecological 
resources are startling. For instance, countries in 
the Northern region of Africa are more similar to
the non-African world than to other regions in 
Africa. Even within the Southern region, there is 
a great deal of variation. When comparing South 
Africa to other countries in Africa, the ω AEZij  for 
agro-ecological zones is only 0.17, just slightly 
higher than the ω AEZij  between South Africa and 
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Figure 17: Cumulative Distribution Functions for Technological Distance from High-Income 
Aggregate 
Panel b: Share of Agricultural Production Value with Panel a: Share of Land with ω AEZ i,HighInc  in Specifi ed Range ω AgProdi,HighInc  in Specifi ed Range 
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Table 12: Measures of Similarity in Agro-Ecological Zones and Agricultural Output Between 
Regions of Africa and the Rest of the World 
Source: James, Pardey and Wood's calculations. 
North West East South w/o S. Africa South Africa South Rest of World 
North Zone 1.00 
Output 1.00 
West Zone 0.00 1.00 
Output 0.21 1.00 
East Zone 0.00 0.85 1.00 
Output 0.41 0.52 1.00 
South w/o 
S. Africa 
Zone 0.01 0.91 0.84 1.00 
Output 0.33 0.53 0.73 1.00 
South Africa Zone 0.27 0.13 0.12 0.17 1.00 
Output 0.58 0.24 0.56 0.59 1.00 
South Zone 0.13 0.81 0.75 0.90 0.58 1.00 
Output 0.53 0.40 0.70 0.85 0.93 1.00 
Rest of World Zone 0.27 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.14 0.29 1.00 
Output 0.73 0.31 0.60 0.52 0.72 0.71 1.00
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the non-African world ( ω AEZ SouthAfrica,ROW 
= 0.14). Although the ωijs are larger for 
agricultural production, they are still 
Figure 18: Technological Distance Within Africa and 
Across the Atlantic 
1.0fairly small, with five of the six ω AgProdij 
values less than 0.60. 
0.8 
of the world. The particularly small and 0.2 
fragmented national entities engaged 
in agricultural R&D in Africa (see 0.0 
Ethiopia, 
Mexico 
South Africa, 
Mexico 
South Africa, 
Kenya 
South Africa, 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia, 
Kenya 
Kenya, 
Mexico 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
Section 2.1 of this report) have further Zone Omegas 
spurred regionalized approaches to
Source: James, Pardey and Wood's calculations.R&D in sub-Saharan Africa. However 
Geographic proximity as well as cross-
O
ut
pu
t O
m
eg
as
0.6border geo-political initiatives and 
infrastructural linkages have led to a 
plethora of R&D networks and more 
formal joint action throughout regions 
0.4 
the technological distances among 
countries within the continent 
suggests that geographic proximity 
may not necessarily translate into spillover 
potential, and so regional cooperative agreements 
may not be the most effi  cient way to capitalize 
on spillovers. A closer look at South Africa, often 
considered a potential engine of innovation within 
(Southern) Africa, is instructive. Table 12 shows
that South Africa shares little in common with 
other African countries. Figure 18 shows the ωijs 
for agro-ecological zone (on horizontal axis) and 
agricultural output (on vertical axis) for all possible 
combinations of South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, and 
Mexico. Looking at the three points that include 
South Africa, it is clear that South Africa is more 
similar in both dimensions to Mexico than it is to
either Ethiopia or Kenya. In fact, of all countries 
in the data set, South Africa is the most similar to
Mexico in terms of its agricultural production (and 
to Iran in its agro-ecology). Ethiopia and Kenya 
are also similar to Mexico, but are more similar to
each other in their agro-ecology. These types of 
relationships may suggest where to focus eff orts to
identify and capitalize on technological spillovers. 
Local and Spill-in Stocks of 
Agricultural Knowledge 
The benefits from agricultural R&D accrue as 
research investments, and the new know-how 
and innovations they make possible, accumulate
over time. This is especially so for crop and animal 
improvement research, which is intrinsically 
cumulative by nature—for example, today’s crop 
breeders stand firmly on the shoulders of the 
scientists and farmers who bred the improved 
crop varieties of yesteryear. Here, we examine the 
knowledge stock of Africa while incorporating 
spillins into the stock calculations. The intensity 
of the knowledge stock, calculated as the stock 
of knowledge divided by agricultural GDP, is 
compared to that of the United States under several 
assumptions. Knowledge stocks are formed fi rst by
compiling public spending on agricultural R&D 
each year from 1956 to 2000 for all countries in the 
data set.41 Spending over time is accumulated into
stocks of productive knowledge stemming from 
science by assuming a lag structure where the 
value of a dollar spent increases over twelve years, 
when it reaches its full value (i.e., until innovations 
are adopted), and then decreases over time (i.e., 
as past innovations are gradually replaced), until it 
reaches zero (i.e., innovations are obsolete).42 Each 
country’s stock was calculated, and spillins to Africa 
41 Actual spending data are not available prior to 1981 (and 
less data are available for some countries), so in order to backcast, 
the ratio of R&D spending to agricultural GDP is calculated for each 
year. R&D spending is approximated by holding the spending 
intensity equal to the average value over the fi ve earliest years 
of spending data, and multiplying by agricultural GDP for the 
relevant year. Since agricultural GDP was only available as early 
as 1961, spending levels for 1956 through 1960 were assumed to 
equal those for 1961. 
42 Drawing on the work by Alston et al. (2007) for their study 
of returns to U.S. investments in agricultural R&D we modeled this 
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and the United States were found by multiplying 
ω AEZ ω AEZeach country j’s stock by Africa, j  or U.S., j  so 
that spillins are determined by the technological 
distance between the country where spending 
occurs and the country where spillins are realized. 
The first row of Table 13 shows the knowledge stock 
intensities in this base scenario. Ignoring spillins, 
the U.S. stock of agricultural knowledge for 2000 
from public R&D spending was approximately 89 
percent of its agricultural GDP. In contrast, Africa’s
own-knowledge stock was only 24 percent of its 
agricultural GDP. Even with knowledge stocks 
normalized to adjust for the size of their respective 
agricultural sectors (measured by output value), the 
United States has a knowledge stock that is nearly 
four times that of Africa. Accounting for spillins 
exacerbates the difference. Spillins increase both 
intensities, but the U.S. intensity increases more 
when spillins are included, causing its intensity to
increase to over four times that of Africa. 
The accumulation of knowledge depends not only 
on the total amount of research spending, but 
also on a host of institutional factors, such as the 
stability of research budgets and communication 
infrastructure (Pardey et al. 2006). In areas rife with 
political tension and war or where researchers 
have comparatively less training and less spending 
per scientist (such as Africa), we would expect the 
generation and accumulation of knowledge to be 
less efficient.43 Assuming these effi  ciencies in Sub-
Saharan Africa are half those of the United States, 
the resulting intensities of productive knowledge 
stocks are shown in the second line of Table 13. 
Africa’s own-knowledge stock intensity decreases 
by roughly half, doubling the U.S. intensity relative 
to Africa. Applying the same scaling to all regions 
and recalculating spillins, both knowledge stock 
intensities decrease. However, because the majority 
of the U.S. spillins originate from the relatively 
43 A meta-analysis conducted by Alston et al. (2000) identifi ed 
over 1,700 estimates of the rate of return to different types of 
agricultural research conducted in different parts of the world. 
The average estimate of the rate of return for research conducted 
in developed countries was 98.2 percent, while the average 
measured rate of return for research conducted in Africa was 
49.6 percent (i.e., just 50.5 percent of the average for developed 
countries). One option (as done here) is to use these average rate-
of-return-relativities as indicators of regional differences in the 
efficiency of knowledge generation and accumulation. However, 
when doing so one should bear in mind that Alston et al. (2000) 
found low signal to noise ratios in these rate of return estimates 
(and so comparatively little confidence can be placed in any one 
estimate or the idea that these statistical averages are indicative 
of the overall rate of return in a given region). Moreover, the 
efficiency with which R&D is transformed into knowledge stocks 
is unlikely to be simply related to the rate of return to R&D. 
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Table 13:  Knowledge-Stock Intensities for U.S. and Africa 
Source: James, Pardey and Wood's calculations. 
a U.S. / Africa ratios are calculated as the U.S. knowledge stock intensity divided by Africa’s knowledge stock intensity. 
b Rates of return for regions are averages taken from the meta-analysis conducted by Alston, et al. (2000). 
c To approximate private spending, knowledge stocks for 2000 were increased using the shares of public/private spending for 
2000 (included elsewhere in this report). 
Own Knowledge Stock Total Knowledge Stock 
Intensity 
U.S. / 
Africaa 
Intensity 
U.S. / 
AfricaaU.S. Africa U.S. Africa 
(percentage) (ratio) (percentage) (ratio) 
Public R&D Spending only 
Assuming all countries accumulate
knowledge with same effi  ciency 
89 24 3.76 273 60 4.55 
Assuming countries accumulate knowledge 
in proportion to rates of returnb 
89 12 7.44 266 38 7.08 
Public and Private R&D Spendingc 
Assuming all countries accumulate
knowledge with same effi  ciency 
200 24 8.22 578 69 8.41 
Assuming countries accumulate knowledge 
in proportion to rates of return 
200 12 16.28 570 45 12.57 
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efficient developed countries, the U.S. knowledge 
stock intensity decreases only slightly (from 273 to
266 percent), while Africa’s decreases by nearly 40 
percent (from 60 to 38 percent). 
Accounting for R&D spending from private sources 
adds another dimension to the knowledge stock 
intensities. As shown in Table 7 of this report, 
public R&D spending accounted for only 44.8 
percent of agricultural R&D spending in developed 
countries in 2000, while it accounted for nearly 
all (98 percent) of African R&D spending. In the 
last two lines of Table 13, the knowledge stocks 
are scaled up to reflect total (public and private) 
R&D spending, assuming the shares of public and 
private spending for 2000 were constant over the 
time when the knowledge stock was accumulated.
Not surprisingly, incorporating private spending 
amplifies the difference between United States 
and African knowledge stocks, roughly doubling 
the relative U.S./Africa knowledge stock intensity 
to 8.41 (accounting for spillins). Adjusting the 
knowledge stocks for diff erences in effi  ciency, the 
relative intensity increases even more, with the U.S. 
knowledge stock intensity more than twelve times 
that of Africa. 
These disparities in the intensity of knowledge 
stocks are much larger than the diff erences in 
the intensity of research spending presented 
in Figure 13. A multitude of science policy 
and institutional implications flow from these 
knowledge stock differentials. For one, persistence 
pays. It is a steady stream of R&D investment 
over the long haul that produces the stocks of 
knowledge necessary for productivity growth in 
agriculture. Moreover, purposefully tapping into
other people’s technologies and know-how is an 
effective way to expand the pool of potentially 
productive knowledge. Africa has institutional and 
agro-ecological impediments to harnessing R&D 
spillovers. Figures 4 and 16a reveal that Australia 
suffers from the same agro-ecological impediments. 
However, while contemporary rates of land 
productivity in Africa and Australia are similar, 
Australia has adapted other people’s technologies 
and invested intensively in developing home­
grown technologies suited to local conditions that 
have given rise to labor productivity rates that are 
40-50 times higher than those in Africa. 
These new findings have important, and perhaps 
poorly understood, policy implications. Investing 
in research elsewhere in the world and spurring 
the necessary institutional innovation to enhance 
technological spillins into Sub-Saharan Africa may 
be just as critical to technical progress in Africa as 
enhancing the capacity to develop home-grown 
technologies throughout the region. However,
these technological distance metrics indicate that 
for any particular country in Sub-Saharan Africa 
the spill-in potentials for relevant agricultural 
technologies may be higher from elsewhere in the 
world than from elsewhere in Africa. This suggests 
a radical rethinking of research networks and other 
similar institutional initiatives that simply rely on 
regional clusterings within Sub-Saharan Africa. 
5. RISK AND REGULATION OF 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
5.1 AGRICULTURAL AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL RISK 
Sources of Agricultural Risk 
A multitude of production, market, and health 
factors expose farmers to signifi cant risk. Crop 
production is subject to the vagaries of weather, 
which interact in complex ways with soils and 
landscape. Livestock production’s reliance on 
adequate feed, water, and land means it is also 
subject to the vagaries of the complex interactions 
between weather, soils, and landscapes. These 
complex abiotic interactions make it diffi  cult for 
farmers to know precisely how their eff orts will 
ultimately affect the quantity and quality of their 
output. Agricultural production is also subject to
numerous biotic sources of risk. Insect and animal 
pests feed on crops, which can reduce biomass or 
degrade quality. Weed pests compete with crops 
for precious water, nutrient, and solar resources.
Pathogens disrupt the normal physiology of crops 
and livestock resulting in limited growth or death. 
Furthermore, these biotic factors can interact
with abiotic factors to further disrupt production. 
For example, a mild winter can foster the survival 
of overwintering insects, resulting in increased 
pest pressure during the growing season. Even 
when a farmer achieves some reasonable level of 
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control in production, he must still contend with 
the volatility of agricultural markets arising, for 
example, from boom and bust production cycles, 
finicky consumers, and transitory government 
policies. Farming is also a physically demanding 
occupation that can be taxing on individual health. 
The handling of livestock and farm equipment 
can result in acute or debilitating physical injury 
or death. Exposure to farm chemicals can lead to
acute and chronic health problems or death. 
Agricultural Technology 
 
and Production Risk
 

Technological change has been responsible for 
impressive gains in agricultural productivity 
throughout most of the world. Through increased 
productivity, technology is generally believed 
to have decreased production risk from the 
common perspective. From an economic 
perspective, some technological advances have
been found to decrease risk, while others have
been found to increase it.44 Understanding the 
effect of technological advance on risk is further 
complicated by the fact that it can depend on, for 
example, the crop (e,g., Ramaswami 1992), crop 
attribute (e.g., Kim and Chavas 2003), time (e.g., 
Traxler et al. 1995), and space (e.g., Kim and Chavas 
2003 and Dalton et al. 2004). 
Technical change in agriculture has taken a variety 
of forms: mechanical, biological, chemical, and 
informational. Of these different forms of change, 
the most studied in terms of production risk have
been genetic crop improvement, fertilization, 
irrigation, and pest control. Production risk in cereal 
crops has drawn special attention because of the 
importance of stable production to food security 
and emerging evidence that the production 
gains of the 1960s and 1970s were accompanied 
by increased production variability or increased 
risk. To identify policies to reduce this increased 
production risk, a better understanding of the 
sources of risk and their relationship to technical 
change was sought. The results of this research 
have been mixed. 
44 Risk from an economic perspective is based on what is 
referred to as the risk premium, which depends on the variance 
of the loss as well as the expected loss. Box 5 discusses alternative 
perspectives on risk. 
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For technical change that resulted in the genetic 
improvement of crops, Anderson and Hazell (1989) 
reported that under controlled experimental 
conditions most improved crop varieties of maize,
pearl millet, rice, and wheat tended to exhibit 
higher yield variability when measured in terms of 
the variance, but the same or lower yield variability 
when measured in terms of the coeffi  cient of 
variation. Using controlled experimental data 
collected by the International Maize and Wheat 
Center (CIMMYT), Traxler et al. (1995) found that 
varietal development in wheat tended to increase 
the variability of yields in Mexico between 1950 
and 1970, but tended to decrease variability 
between 1970 and 1986. Pingali et al. (1990) 
found a similar trend for rice using data collected 
by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). 
Using more recent crop insurance data, Carew and 
Smith (2006) found that between 1995 and 2003 
canola yield variance in Manitoba, Canada was not 
affected by improved varieties. 
Roumasset et al. (1989) reviewed seven fertilizer 
studies published between 1969 and 1986 
covering potatoes in Peru, rice in the Philippines, 
and wheat in Australia, and concluded that the 
application of fertilizer generally increased the 
variance of crop yields. Traxler et al. (1995) found 
no independent effect of nitrogen on wheat yield 
variance in Mexico between 1950 and 1986, but 
did find an interaction between nitrogen and 
varietal development that reduced yield variability.
Ramaswami (1992) reports that relatively low 
rates of application of nitrogen are risk increasing 
for cotton, but relatively high rates may be risk 
increasing or decreasing depending on how an 
individual dislikes variability. Alternatively, for corn, 
relatively low rates of application of nitrogen may 
be risk increasing or decreasing, while relatively 
high rates are risk increasing. Hurley et al. (2004) 
found that the variance of corn yields from an 
on-farm experiment in the United States was 
influenced by the amount of applied nitrogen. 
The yield variance was lower for relatively low and 
relatively high nitrogen applications and higher 
for more moderate applications. Villano and 
Fleming (2006) found fertilizer was risk increasing 
using data from 46 rice farmers in the Philippines 
between 1990 and 1997, while Carew and Smith 
(2006) found that potassium fertilizer reduced 
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by Terrance Hurley, University of Minnesota 
Risk is commonly defined as the exposure to the chance of loss (or injury). There are two important 
and distinct elements to this definition that deserve greater specifi city. The first is the idea that the 
outcome is unknown, but the range of possible outcomes is known—either there is a loss, or there 
is not. The second is the idea that the unknown outcome is a matter chance, which in statistical 
terms means probabilities can be assigned to the range of possible outcomes. In the context of this 
definition, risk is interpreted as undesirable and beneficial reductions in risk can be thought of in 
terms of either decreasing the chance or severity of loss. 
This notion of risk is not always particularly useful when trying to understand risky behavior 
because if individuals only care about the chance and severity of loss, they will always choose 
activities to reduce them. But, individuals often engage in activities that increase rather than 
decrease the chance or severity of loss: many people use cigarettes even though it increases the 
chance of developing lung cancer or dieing prematurely. What this notion of risk fails to account 
for is the opportunity cost of reducing the chance or severity of loss: the physical and psychological 
discomfort of nicotine withdrawal from discontinuing the use of cigarettes. 
Two important assumptions play a key role in interpreting risk from an economic perspective: (i) 
individuals prefer more to less, and (ii) individuals do not like variability. In the simplest terms, this 
interpretation implies individuals will make decisions based on the tradeoff between the expected 
outcome (what will happen on average) and what is referred to as the risk premium. Chambers 
and Quiggin (2000) provide a rigorous definition of the risk premium, but for present purposes, it 
is enough to say that the risk premium reflects the variability of possible outcomes and the degree 
to which an individual does not like this variability. The risk premium is the fundamental measure 
of risk from an economic perspective. The difficulty with using the risk premium is that individuals 
have different tolerances for risk, so it can be difficult and costly to measure. To circumvent this 
difficulty, the variance of possible outcomes (or some other notion of variability like the coefficient 
of variation) is often substituted for the risk premium because variability is an important component 
of the risk premium and in some circumstances, the two are directly related. 
It is important to note that these two perspectives of risk can lead to different conclusions regarding 
the risk consequences of engaging in a particular activity. From the common perspective, activities 
that decrease the expected loss are interpreted as reducing risk regardless of whether the variability 
of the expected loss (or risk premium) has increased or decreased. From the economic perspective,
activities that decrease the variability of the expected outcome (or risk premium) are interpreted as 
Box 5: What is Agricultural Risk? 
continued u
the variance of canola yields in Manitoba, Canada 
between 1995 and 2003. 
Pandey (1989) reviewed the literature on the eff ect 
of irrigation on yield variability but did not fi nd any 
consistent trends due to wide variation in irrigation 
practices and policies. More recently, Dalton et al. 
(2004) found the risk reduction benefits of irrigation 
for potato production in the Northeastern United 
States are dependent on scale, location, and the 
cost of developing adequate water sources. 
Carlson (1989) suggested pesticides typically 
decrease yield variability, however, he noted that 
there are reasons and cases to suggest pesticides 
could actually increase yield variability. Hurd (1994) 
found that pesticide use in cotton production 
in the Western United States was risk increasing. 
Alternatively, Villano and Fleming (2006) obtained 
results for herbicide use in rice production in the 
Philippines that support Carlson’s conclusion that 
pesticides typically reduce yield variability. Hurley 
et al. (2004) showed that transgenic Bt corn with 
built in pesticides likely increased risk in terms of 
the profitability of corn production for Midwestern 
U.S. farmers, even though it has likely decreased 
the risk associated with yield variability. 
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reducing risk regardless of whether the expected outcome increases or decreases. These diff ering 
perspectives are a common source of confusion and miscommunication. 
Another source of confusion and miscommunication with economic risk is the distinction often 
drawn between the risk premium and the marginal risk premium. The marginal risk premium refers 
to how the risk premium changes as an individual engages in more of a risky activity. The risk 
premium is important for assessing the welfare effects of risk. When the risk premium is positive,
individual welfare is diminished, while when the risk premium is negative, individual welfare is 
enhanced. Alternatively, the marginal risk premium determines how much of a risky activity an 
individual will engage in. If the marginal risk premium is positive, engaging in an activity is said 
to be risk increasing because an individual who does not like variability will engage in less of the 
activity than an individual who does not care about variability. Alternatively, if the marginal risk 
premium is negative, engaging in an activity is said to be risk decreasing because an individual 
who does not like variability will engage in more of the activity than an individual who does not 
care about variability. There is not always a direct correspondence between the risk premium 
and marginal risk premium. That is, engaging in an activity can be risk increasing even if the risk 
premium is negative. For example, a farmer may use less fertilizer when fertilizer increases yield 
variability because he does not like variability (i.e., the marginal risk premium increases as fertilizer 
applications increase), yet the risk implications of his fertilizer use can still be welfare enhancing (i.e., 
the risk premium decreases). Many studies of economic risk focus on estimating the risk premium or 
some approximation, while others focus on estimating the marginal risk premium. 
A final caveat worth mentioning when talking about risk is the risk of what: crop yields, crop prices, 
farmer profits, farmer health, public health, or environmental health. The effects of pesticides on a 
farmer’s yield risk can differ from the effect of pesticides on profit risk, even though yields are an 
important determinant of profi t. The reason for this is that yield risk does not include the cost of 
pesticides, the price received for the crop, and other important determinants of profit. If crop yields 
are all a farmer cares about, then measuring yield risk is suffi  cient to understand the implications 
of risk on the farmer, but if the farmer cares about crop yields only to the extent that these yields 
infl uence profit, then measuring yield risk may not provide an adequate understanding of the 
implications of risk on the farmer. 
References 
Chambers, R. G. and J. Quiggin. Uncertainty, Production, Choice and Agency: The State Contingent Approach. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Box 5 (continued) 
Agricultural Technology and Other Risks 
Technical change in agricultural has increased 
production. In terms of production risk, the 
results are mixed. Some technical improvements 
have reduced production risk, while others 
have increased it. Furthermore, the eff ects of 
technological change on production risk have
varied over time, space, and production activities. 
What is important to realize is that the eff ects of 
technical change in agriculture extend beyond 
quantity and quality of agricultural output. It has 
also had important health and environmental 
effects. Some of these side effects of technological 
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change have been detrimental to individual and 
public welfare, while others have been welfare 
enhancing. 
Pesticides have improved crop yields and tended 
to reduce yield risk. But many pesticides have
been shown to pose significant risk to human and 
environmental health. The health risks of pesticides 
have been shown to be particularly pervasive in 
developing countries where pesticide use is less 
regulated and farmers have less information on 
the potential hazards and tend to be less cautious 
in their use. Based on data collected from 152 
rice farming families in the Philippines between 
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1989 and 1991, Pingali et al. (1994) concluded 
that reductions in pesticide use could enhance 
farmer welfare because any cost in terms of lost 
productivity could be more than compensated 
by improved health. Antle and Pingali (1994) 
found similar results using data collected between 
1989 to 1991 from 73 farmers and 40 pesticide 
applicators in two major rice producing regions in 
the Philippines. Using data collect from 40 potato
farmers in Ecuador, Crissman et al. (1994) also 
found important tradeoffs between pesticide use 
and farmer health. Increased pesticide use has 
also increased public and environmental exposure 
to pesticides. For example, Barbash et al. (1999) 
reported that six common herbicides were found in 
ground water and aquifers used for drinking water 
in a number of agricultural and non-agricultural 
regions of the United States. 
Similarly, while increases in the use of fertilizers like 
nitrogen have had a positive impact on agricultural 
production, they have also had notable negative 
effects on human and environmental health. 
Nitrogen is a particularly mobile nutrient that is 
carried into surface water supplies with rainfall 
runoff and is also leached into groundwater 
supplies. Nitrogen reaching drinking water supplies 
is a public health risk because at high concentrations 
it can cause conditions like methemoglobinemia, 
where hemoglobin cannot carry suffi  cient oxygen 
through the blood. Furthermore, available evidence 
indicates that too much nitrogen is reaching some 
drinking water supplies. For example, the U.S. 
Geological Survey (1996) found that 12 percent of 
domestic wells in agricultural regions of the United 
States exceeded the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s drinking water standards. Important 
environmental problems are also associated with 
too much nitrogen reaching waterways. When 
there is too much nitrogen in water dissolved 
oxygen can be depleted, resulting in what is 
called hypoxia, which can be harmful to aquatic 
animals. A prominent example of hypoxia is the 
“Dead Zone” that appears in the Gulf of Mexico 
every summer (Beardsley 1997). Nitrogen fertilizer 
runoff from agricultural production is believed to
be a significant factor contributing to this annual
“Dead Zone.” 
Recent transgenic crop varieties off er good 
examples of technical changes that have resulted 
in increased production and reduced human and 
environmental risk. For example, new varieties 
of herbicide tolerant crops such as Roundup 
Ready soybean have promoted reduced tillage 
production practices. Reduced tillage reduces the 
amount of sediment and agricultural chemicals 
that are carried to surface water supplies in 
the form of runoff. The use of Roundup Ready 
soybeans has also resulted in the substitution of 
glyphosate for other herbicides that are believed 
to pose greater health and environmental risks. 
Plant-incorporated-protectants like Bt corn have
been found to reduce the level of mycotoxins such 
as fumonisin in corn (Munkvold et al. 2001; Wu
2006). The incidence of human esophageal cancer 
has been related to fumonisin consumption in 
Africa, Asia, Central America, and the United States. 
Additionally, mycotoxin poisoning of livestock can 
result in increased incidence of disease, reduced 
reproductive capacity, and other deleterious 
health issues. 
While transgenic crop varieties provide some 
good examples of reductions in risks to health and 
the environment associated with technological 
change in agriculture, they also provide a good 
example of when technical changes have resulted 
in increased marketing risk for farmers. Transgenic 
crops have been controversial because of concerns 
regarding unknown and unpredictable side 
effects. This has led some consumers to reject 
transgenic crop products and lobby for regulations 
to limit their market access. Regardless of the 
validity of consumer concerns, farmers who plant 
transgenic crops can risk losing market access 
or face selling their output at a discounted price.
These risks were particularly salient in 2000 after 
the European Union adopted a moratorium on 
approving new transgenic crop varieties, which 
led to a substantial slowdown in the adoption 
of Bt corn by U.S. farmers and the adoption of Bt 
corn and other transgenic crops in developing 
countries. As consumer acceptance has improved, 
the marketing risk faced by farmers has subsided
and the adoption of Bt corn and other transgenic 
crops is again increasing rapidly. 
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Risk Implications of Technical 
 
Change in Agriculture
 

Two broad conclusions can be drawn regarding 
technical change in agriculture and its eff ect on 
production, health, and environmental risk. First, 
technical change has increased the quantity and 
improved the quality of agricultural products, but it 
has also had varied effects on production risk. These 
varied effects on production risk may be as much 
of a blessing as a concern. Farmers have diff erent 
tolerances for risk. When farmers can choose from 
a variety of technologies that have varied eff ects 
on risk, they can choose combinations of technical 
practices to manage production risk (Just and 
Zilberman, 1983; Chambers and Quiggin, 2000). 
Fostering access to improved technologies is thus 
a key objective for policies targeted to helping 
farmers manage production risk. 
Second, the effect of technical change in
agriculture extends beyond improvements in the 
quantity and quality of output. Some technologies 
have had unintended negative impacts within 
and beyond the farm gate, while others have had 
unintended positive impacts. These external eff ects 
have fueled increased regulatory activity, which is 
having important implications in terms of further 
technical development in agriculture. 
5.2 REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES 
Changes in agricultural technology drive 
economic growth in developing countries and 
contribute significantly to economic well-being 
in rich countries. While they generally provide net 
economic benefits new technologies almost always 
involve some losers, and some of the negative 
consequences may involve external eff ects on 
human health or the environment. 
The actual or perceived existence of externalities— 
associated with food safety, environmental 
pollution, animal welfare, farm-worker safety, 
costs of product segregation, or loss of market 
access—provides a justification for regulation 
(or other government intervention) aimed at 
increasing national net benefits from production 
and consumption. It also provides a rationale 
that can be used to defend regulation when the 
main purpose is redistribution, benefi ting some 
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at the expense of others and possibly involving 
deadweight losses to the national welfare. 
Whether it is primarily for efficiency or
distributional reasons, the development,
release, adoption, and application of agricultural 
technologies is increasingly subject to public 
scrutiny and regulatory approval or other controls. 
Technological regulations and the attendant 
regulatory processes differ among countries and 
within countries, across industries, and across 
types of technologies. The regulatory requirements 
and the associated costs of compliance diff er 
significantly, for instance, between biotech crop 
varieties and the technologies that they might 
replace, including products of conventional crop 
breeding or chemical pest-control technologies. 
The regulations therefore modify the rate and form 
of technological change and the distribution of 
benefits and costs. There can be no doubt that the 
economic consequences are very signifi cant, but 
the full consequences of technological regulation 
in agriculture are not well understood. 
Rationalizing Regulation 
The conventional economic argument for 
government intervention in the economy is based 
on the idea of market failure—that the unfettered 
working of the free market mechanism has given 
rise to an inefficient allocation of resources or an 
unsatisfactory distribution of income—and that 
government intervention can make things better. 
The argument for regulation, as opposed to other 
policies, is that it will work better than the next-
best intervention that might be applied to correct 
the perceived market failure. 
Various types of market failures can and do arise 
in agriculture, often associated with the use of 
particular technologies, giving rise to arguments 
for government intervention. Examples include 
various kinds of pollution externalities (such as 
pollution of air or groundwater associated with 
the use of agricultural chemicals); incomplete,
ill-defined, or ill-enforced property rights to
assets such as irrigation water or other natural 
resource stocks, or to intellectual property
including plant varieties or other inventions; 
incomplete or asymmetric information about 
product characteristics including how a product 72 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
was produced and whether it is safe to consume; 
market distortions arising from the exercise of 
market power by agribusiness firms in the supply 
of inputs or technology, or in the marketing of 
agricultural products. 
Government regulations to address concerns 
such as these are pervasive, and largely taken for 
granted, but evolving as knowledge and other 
factors change. Various agricultural chemicals, for 
instance, have been banned (e.g., DDT is only one 
of many pesticides that are no longer allowed to
be used in U.S. agriculture) or are only allowed 
to be used in particular applications; and there 
are environmental and occupational health and 
safety regulations over how they may be applied 
and so on. Similarly, the laws and rules governing 
rights to natural resources and to intellectual 
property are constantly evolving as circumstances 
and institutions change. In particular, expanded 
intellectual property rights applied to plant 
varieties have contributed importantly to the 
development of the agricultural biotechnology 
industry as a predominantly private enterprise in 
the United States. And with rising affl  uence, and in 
the wake of various food scares, we have witnessed 
increasing attention to the public provision of 
information and food-safety assurance, and an 
attendant rise in food-safety regulation. 
In contemplating the economics of regulation of 
agricultural technologies, one set of questions 
concerns understanding the nature of the costs 
and benefits, and obtaining measures of the 
costs and benefits and their distribution. To get 
this right it is important to get the counterfactual 
right, in terms of the nature of the pre-existing 
distortions that the regulation may be designed 
to address, but also to deal with the complications 
of further distortions created by the intervention. 
Government intervention that purports to correct 
one distortion may create another, and all such 
interventions have redistributive consequences. 
Consequently the full effects may be diffi  cult to
discern. For instance, the provision of patents or 
comparable intellectual property rights to the 
firms that invent new agricultural chemicals or 
new genetically modified crop varieties has two 
somewhat off setting effects: it enhances the 
incentives for firms to invest in R&D, reducing the 
market distortion associated with too slow a rate
of invention; at the same time it allows the fi rms 
to charge monopoly prices for their inventions, 
resulting in too low a rate of adoption of given 
inventions. Moreover, as well as having mixed 
effects on the rate of technological change and 
total benefits, intellectual property rights have
consequences for the distribution of the benefi ts 
and costs of consumption and production of the 
aff ected commodities. 
A second set of questions relates to explaining 
the policy choices, which to some extent turns 
on understanding their consequences. The 
question of who bears the costs and who reaps the 
benefits may be difficult to answer precisely but is 
nevertheless likely to be worth asking if we want to
understand why particular regulations are applied. 
It seems likely in many cases that the redistributive 
consequences have more to offer as an explanation 
of particular regulatory choices than any theory 
based on a simple notion of correcting market 
failures. The distribution of benefits and costs within 
a country may help explain choices of particular 
regulatory instruments, and the choice to regulate
versus alternative policies including laissez faire; 
and differences in these aspects among countries 
may help account for differences among their 
policies. Similarly, the distribution of benefi ts and 
costs among countries may help account for some 
international differences in policies, especially 
as they pertain to commodity trade policy as an 
element of technological regulation. 
Causes and Consequences of 
Biotechnology Regulation 
The regulation of agricultural biotechnology 
is an important contemporary example that 
serves also to illustrate the main issues in the 
regulation of agricultural technologies more 
generally.45 Biotechnologies are regulated from 
the point of initial experimentation, through the 
stages of field trials, and ultimate release, and the 
processes of compliance with these regulations 
add considerably to the costs borne by biotech 
companies and to the number of years consumed 
in the process (Kalaitzandonakes, Alston, and 
45 This discussion draws significantly on the recent book by 
Just, Alston, and Zilberman (2006). See also Josling, Roberts and 
Orden (2003). 
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Bradford (2006) estimated that compliance with 
regulatory requirements added between 6 and 16 
million dollars to the cost of developing a single new 
biotech crop product). Even after the technologies 
are “deregulated,” such that farmers are allowed 
to grow biotech crops, further regulations govern 
where and how the crops may be grown, and how 
and where the products may be sold. 
It is notable, that the substantial adoption of 
agricultural biotechnology to date has been 
concentrated in a small number of countries and 
confined to a small number of traits in a small 
number of crops: specifi cally, pest-resistance and 
herbicide tolerance in feed grains, oil seeds, and 
cotton.46 Biotech food products emphasizing 
output traits (e.g., long shelf-life tomatoes) or input 
traits (e.g., Bt potatoes or sweet corn) have been 
ignored or dis-adopted by food manufacturers or 
retailers in the face of perceived market resistance 
or political opposition. The fact that adoption of 
the available biotech products has been limited to
a small number of countries reflects a combination 
of market resistance, legal barriers to adoption and 
trade barriers against importation of biotech crop 
products. The same barriers also have reduced 
incentives for biotech companies to invest in the 
development of new biotech products, and the 
same factors may have contributed to the erection 
of regulatory barriers to the development and 
adoption of biotech crops, which themselves 
provide a further disincentive for biotech 
companies. 
One set of regulations governs the R&D process 
and whether a new biotech crop variety is 
allowed to be grown commercially. Prior to the 
development and release of a new genetically 
modified crop variety, a biotech company must 
satisfy a host of regulations that govern what is 
allowed to be done in the lab and in the fi eld. In
the United States “deregulation” to allow a crop 
to be grown commercially requires separate 
authorization from the Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
reflecting the separate roles played by these 
agencies in relation to the environment, food 
46 Box 6 provides an overview of the uptake of crop 
biotechnologies worldwide. 
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safety, and agricultural production. To obtain these 
approvals requires a very signifi cant investment in 
testing, evaluation, and reporting, in a process that 
adds a number of years and millions of dollars of 
costs to the commercial process of research and 
development, all borne by the biotech company 
(Kalatizandonakes, Alston, and Bradford 2006). 
Even though the U.S. policy explicitly is to evaluate
the product not the process of invention, it seems 
to discriminate against biotechnology (Miller 
and Conko 2005). Presently the requirements on 
biotech crops are much more onerous than the 
corresponding requirements as they apply to
competing technologies, such as crop varieties 
developed by conventional techniques (including 
mutagenesis and selection) or chemical pest 
control technologies. Concern about the potential 
implications for market acceptance mean that 
U.S. biotech firms in many cases also go through 
regulatory approval processes in other countries, 
such as Japan, before they will release a new 
biotech crop variety for production in the United 
States. The cost of compliance with international 
regulations is additional to the domestic cost. 
Concern about international market acceptance 
and the loss of access to some markets owing 
to inability to segregate GM and non-GM crop 
products has also led some countries that depend 
on exports to regulate against the adoption of 
biotech crops, even though they might otherwise 
find them profitable to grow. The fact that some 
consumers want to avoid biotech crops has led 
some countries to ban them altogether, and other 
countries to require segregation and labeling, 
which in some instances is a de facto ban. 
The development of resistant pests or herbicide 
tolerant weeds is an important potential 
consequence of the adoption of biotech crops. 
The U.S. government has opted to treat this 
as an externality—apparently presuming that 
the biotech firms would not have appropriate
incentives to manage the problem, even with 
proprietary technologies—and therefore it 
has imposed refuge requirements as part of its 
regulatory approval process for biotechnologies, 
although it has not done likewise with chemical 
pesticides. 
74 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
    
   
by Philip Pardey, University of Minnesota 
Where the crop varieties and bioengineered traits embodied in them perform well and are given 
approval for commercial use, the rate of uptake has been rapid, although contrary to some claims, 
not entirely unprecedented, even for biological innovations used in agriculture.1  In 2006, twelve
years after bioengineered crops were first grown, an estimated 102 million hectares were planted to
them worldwide (about 10 percent of the world’s harvested crop area), an increase from 90 million 
hectares in the previous year and well up on the 2.8 million hectares planted in 1996.2 
Despite this growth, the agricultural, geographical and technological scope of commercially grown 
bioengineered crops is still small.  In 2006, the preponderance of the area under these types of crops 
consisted of bioengineered soybeans, which accounted for 57 percent of the total bioengineered 
cropping area.  Around 25 percent of the total bioengineered area was sown to bioengineered 
maize, 13 percent to cotton, and 5 percent to canola.  Just 4 countries accounted for 88 percent of 
the global total in 2006—55 percent of this global total was planted in the United States, 18 percent
in Argentina, 11 percent each in Brazil, and 6 percent in Canada (Panel a).  Two traits dominate the 
picture, namely, herbicide tolerance mainly in soybeans and canola, and insect tolerance mainly in 
corn and cotton, though there are some limited use of bioengineered viral resistance in papaya and 
squash. 
The developing country’s share of global bioengineered crop area has grown from 14 percent of 
the world total in 1997 to 40.9 percent in 2006.  Notably, plantings in just 5 countries, soybeans in 
Argentina and Brazil, and cotton in China, South Africa, and India, account for the lion’s share (95 
percent) of the developing-country bioengineered acreage.  Finding bioengineered traits that deal 
successfully with local production constraints is one thing, expressing them in specifi c crop varieties 
that compete well against locally grown landraces and conventionally bred varieties of the same 
crop, absent the bioengineered trait, is another thing.  Not surprisingly, the bioengineered traits 
are being grown in developing-country areas that are agroecologically similar to the rich countries 
for which the traits were first developed, and in many cases involve the identical crop varieties.3 
This is precisely where the spillover costs are smallest and consist mainly of local screening and 
regulatory approval costs along with the costs of marketing the technology.  That is, disseminating 
these particular bioengineered crop varieties involves only adaptive or imitative technology 
development costs beyond the initial discovery costs, a much smaller cost than inventing entirely 
new bioengineered traits and successfully expressing those traits in locally superior varieties of 
locally important crops. 
1 For example, hybrid corn technologies—another crop genetic change that was controversial at the time of its 
invention—went from 0 to 50 percent of Iowa’s corn acreage in just six years following its release in 1932; by 1940, 90 percent
of the corn area in Iowa was sown to hybrid varieties (Griliches 1957). 
2 In 1994 the Flavr-SavrTM tomato, genetically engineered to delay softening so the tomato could ripen on the vine and 
retain its “fresh picked” flavor, became the first bioengineered crop to be grown commercially. As Marra, Pardey and Alston 
(2003) described, the technology was a scientifi c success, but a colossal business failure.  Although the tomatoes achieved 
the delayed-softening and taste-retention objectives of their developers, yields were poor, mechanical handling equipment 
turned most of them into mush before they got to market, and consumers weren’t willing to pay enough of a premium over 
conventional fresh tomatoes to cover costs. 
3 For example, all the officially approved Monsanto/DeltaPine bioengineered cotton varieties grown in China are the same 
varieties grown in the United States, while most of the bioengineered Chinese varieties are based on older DeltaPine varieties 
introduced into China in the 1940s and 1950s. Likewise the transgenic cotton varieties grown in Mexico are from the United 
States; and in South Africa, NuCotn 37-B, an American variety, is widely used. 
Box 6: Uptake of Bioengineered Crops 
continued u
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Box 6 (continued) 
Given that the United States dominates the world totals, its trends are worth scrutinizing.  Ranked 
in terms of total acreage, the world and U.S. crop relativities for 2006 are the same—soybeans 
dominate, followed by corn and cotton.  However, the intensity of use of bioengineered versus 
classically bred crops differs markedly between the United States and the rest of the world.  The 
United States uniformly makes more intensive use of bioengineered crops than the rest of the world 
(Panel b).  While almost all the U.S. canola crop was sown to bioengineered varieties in 2006, the 
corresponding rest-of-world share was just 3.4 percent.  Likewise, bioengineered soybeans covered 
89 percent of the U.S. soybean acreage compared with nearly 44 percent of the rest-of-world soybean 
area.  For cotton the corresponding shares were 83 percent for the United States and 13.3 percent 
for the rest of the world; for corn it was 61 percent for the United States and 16.5 percent elsewhere.
This reflects both technology and market realities.  While the dominant bioengineered traits such 
as those that target mainly budworm/boll weevil complexes in cotton and European stem borers 
and rootworm in corn, as well as Roundup® and Liberty Link® resistance in soybeans and canola 
have yield-enhancing or cost-reducing consequences for rest-of-world farmers, they are especially 
consequential for United States producers.  In addition, given their earlier regulatory approval in 
the United States, these traits are now incorporated into an increasing number of crop varieties that 
are optimized for ever more refined agroecological growing conditions, thus contributing to their 
widespread use. 
H
ec
ta
re
s 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
 
Year 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
Canolaa Soybean Cotton Corn 
Panel a: Area Planted to Biotech Crops,
1995-2006 
Source: James (various issues). 
Panel b:  Biotech Cropping Intensities— 
United States vs. Rest-of-World, 2006 
Source: Pardey’s calculations based on James 
(various issues), USDA (various issues), Fernandez-
Cornejo and McBride (2002), and FAO (2006). 
a Canola includes rapeseed.
References 
FAO. FAOSTAT Classic 2006. Rome: FAO (downloaded June 2006). 
Fernandez-Cornejo, J and W.D. McBride. Adoption of Bioengineered Crops. USDA, ERS Agricultural Economic 
Report No. AER810. Washington D.C.: USDA, ERS, May 2002. 
Griliches, Z. “Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technological Change.” Econometrica 25(4)(1957): 
501-522. 
James, C. Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops (various annual issues). Ithaca, N.Y.: International 
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications. 
Marra, M.C., P.G. Pardey, and J.M. Alston. “The Payoffs to Transgenic Field Crops: An Assessment of the Evidence.” 
AgBioForum online 5(2)(2003), available at <http://www.agbioforum.org./v5n2/v5n2a02-marra.htm>. 
USDA, NASS. Acreage reports, June issue downloaded from (http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/nassr/fi eld/ 
pcp-bba/) (various issues). 
99.5 
89 
83 
U.S. 
Rest of World 
61 
43.8 
16.5 
3.4 
13.3 
Other Developing Countries 
China 
Brazil 
Argentina 
Other Developed Countries 
Canada 
U.S. 
S
C
IE
N
C
E
, 
T
E
C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
 A
N
D
 S
K
IL
L
S
 
76 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
These various regulatory interventions have
impeded development and adoption of biotech 
crops, especially for food crops and particularly 
for minor crops since biotech firms will require a 
large potential market and a high rate of adoption 
to justify the large overhead cost of R&D and 
regulatory compliance (Alston 2004; Bradford,
Alston, and Kalaitzandonakes 2006). One can 
speculate about the roles of diff erent interest 
groups in promoting this outcome, and why. 
Consumers in some countries may believe— 
for whatever reason and possibly without any 
scientific basis—that genetically modifi ed foods 
are unsafe to eat, or that the processes used to
produce them are environmentally unsafe. Such 
consumers may favor a ban on biotechnology or 
a labeling requirement (see Huffman and Rousu 
2006; McCluskey, Grimsrud and Wahl 2006). In
general the consumer lobby as such has not been 
a very potent force in the political economy of 
regulation of agricultural technologies in the past, 
and the same observation may apply in the case 
of biotech food crops. It seems more likely that the 
real pressure giving rise to regulation and market 
resistance (by retailers and food manufacturers) 
has been exerted by other groups, such as 
environmentalists, some of which purport to
represent the interest of consumers even though 
they are not a consumer lobby per se. 
Environmental groups such as Greenpeace have
opposed the introduction of biotech crops, in 
spite of compelling evidence that they will allow 
a substantial reduction in the environmental 
burden of chemical pesticides, and in the absence 
of any evidence of a serious environmental risk 
(at least with regard to the currently available 
crops). It seems likely that their opposition refl ects 
a coalition of interest of environmentalists and 
others (such as those who oppose capitalism or big 
business generally) rather than a simple objective 
of environmental conservation. 
Farmers in some countries, or in some parts of 
a country, may be aided by regulation, since 
agricultural biotechnology may infl uence the 
strength (or even the direction) of comparative 
advantage, favoring one group of farmers over 
another. Anderson (2006) suggests that while 
farmers in Europe as a whole would find it profi table 
to adopt currently available biotechnology, they 
would be worse off if they had to compete in a 
world in which farmers worldwide were free to
adopt compared with a world without biotech 
crops. Hence, European farmers might naturally 
oppose the development of biotech crops 
generally. But Anderson also shows that European 
farmers can be even better off, even if they do not 
adopt biotechnology themselves, if the adoption 
of biotech crops in other countries leads to the 
erection of new regulatory barriers on imports by
the EU that amount to trade protection against 
competition from both conventional and biotech 
crop producers. 
Agricultural technology firms clearly have an 
interest. Graff and Zilberman (2004) speculated 
that agricultural technology firms in Europe had a 
comparative advantage in chemical technologies 
whereas agricultural technology firms in the 
United States had a comparative advantage in 
biotechnology. Hence, firms in Europe (perhaps 
in coalition with European farmers) would oppose 
biotech and influence their governments to
regulate accordingly, whereas firms (and farmers) in 
the United States would do the opposite. A possibly 
contradictory view is that regulatory compliance is 
a barrier to entry, that the successful biotech fi rms 
in the United States have a comparative advantage 
in meeting the requirements (see Heisey and 
Schimmelpfennig 2006). The implication is that 
incumbent U.S. biotech firms may have encouraged 
the introduction of more stringent and costly 
regulations so as to preserve their market power.
These questions are made more complex when 
we observe that the major firms are involved in 
both chemical technologies and biotechnologies, 
that they are integrated with non-agricultural 
applications of biotechnology, and that they are 
multinational. 
6. THE ROLE OF SKILLS AND 
EDUCATION IN AGRICULTURE 
The impact of scientifi c and technological 
progress in improving agricultural production in 
developing countries is intimately related to the 
skills and education of the populations in those 
countries. There are three key groups whose 
skills and education levels are of fundamental 
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importance: farmers, information providers and 
researchers. This section examines the role of skills 
and education for all three groups, focusing on the 
skills and education of farmers. 
Skills and Education of Farmers 
T. W. Schulz (1975) persuasively argued that farmers 
obtain little benefit from education, at least in 
terms of their agricultural productivity, in settings 
that are stable; that is, where there is little or no 
technological progress. In such settings trial and 
error over many years (and even many generations) 
will eventually lead farmers to the best methods 
to maximize productivity, or more specifi cally to
maximize farm profits. Yet if there are changes, 
especially rapid changes, in scientifi c knowledge 
and agricultural technology, then education helps 
farmers to adopt, and to adapt, new agricultural 
technologies that will make them better off . Several 
empirical studies have provided support for this 
claim; farmers’ education has been shown to have
a positive impact on technology adoption in China 
(Lin 1991) and India (Foster and Rosenzweig 1996), 
although a study of Indonesia yielded inconclusive 
results (Pitt and Sumodiningrat 1991). 
As discussed in other chapters in this report, the 
days of slow technological progress are long gone. 
Instead, technological progress in agriculture and 
related fields is proceeding at a rapid rate. This 
implies that the skills and education of farmers 
will become more important determinants of farm 
income and, more generally, social welfare in rural 
areas of developing countries (for recent evidence,
see the review by Huffman 2001). In this process, 
farmers (and even entire countries) with low levels 
of education will be left behind. Indeed, prices for 
their products may drop, so that farmers who do 
not adopt new technologies may see their incomes 
decline. Fortunately, schooling levels in developing 
countries have increased dramatically in the past 
40 years, as shown in Table 14. 
This raises two fundamental questions: 
1.	 What policies will increase school enrollment, 
and learning while in school, for children in 
rural areas, both those who will eventually 
become farmers and those who are likely to
work in other occupations? 
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2.	 What kinds of skills should be taught in primary 
and secondary schools to children who are 
likely to become farmers? 
Of course, these two questions are interrelated. If
the “wrong” skills are taught, rural households will 
be less likely to enroll their children in school. 
Turning to the first question, research in the past 
10-15 years has reached some conclusions about 
what policies are most effective in increasing 
school enrollment in rural areas. Glewwe and 
Kremer (2006) provide a recent assessment of the 
literature. Some evidence shows that increased 
school quality, measured in a variety of ways, 
increases school enrollment and eventual years 
of completed schooling. In addition, there is very
strong evidence that reduction in tuition and other 
costs of attending school, as well as subsidies to
parents to keep their children enrolled in school 
(and regularly attending), lead to increases in school 
enrollment and years of schooling completed. 
The second question has received less attention. 
One may think that primary and secondary schools 
in rural areas should teach students detailed 
information about the most recent technological 
advances in agriculture, but this may not be very
useful because new technologies will arise soon 
after the students have left school, rendering 
obsolete much of what the students would have
learned from this type of curriculum. Instead, it is 
better for schools to teach general basic skills, such 
as literacy, numeracy, and basic science knowledge. 
This will provide students with a foundation 
that they can use to learn on their own the latest 
technologies as they become available. Empirical 
support for this recommendation is seen in the 
strong evidence that general education raises farm 
productivity, while in contrast there is only mixed 
evidence that extension education raises farm 
productivity (see, inter alia, Hussain and Byerlee 
1995). This finding is consistent with studies of job 
training programs in the United States; programs 
that focus on teaching specific skills for specifi c 
types of jobs have little effect on the employment 
and wages of program participants (see Heckman, 
Lalonde and Smith, 1999, for a recent review). 
A second reason for schools in rural areas to focus 
on basic skills is that those skills can reduce the cost 
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Table 14: Average Years of School of Adults, Age 15+ 
Source: Barro and Lee (2001). 
Note: Countries with populations of less than 1 million are excluded. 
a Data are based on between 25 percent and 50 percent of the total 
population of the country group or region. 
b Data are based on between 10 percent and 25 percent of the total 
population of the country group or region. 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Country group 
Low-income 1.6a 2.2a 3.7 4.6 5.2 
Middle-income 2.8 3.5 4.2 5.1 5.9 
High-income 7.4 7.9 9.2 9.5 10.1 
Region 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.7 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.4 
Middle East/North Africa 1.4 2.2 2.9 4.1 5.4 
Latin America 3.2 3.7 4.4 5.3 6.0 
South Asia 1.5 2.0 3.0 3.8 4.6 
East Asia 2.5b 3.4b 4.6 5.6 6.2 
East Europe/FSU 6.5b 7.6b 8.5b 9.0b 9.7b 
OECD 7.3 7.8 9.1 9.5 10.1 
Returning to the issue of the impact 
of skills and education on agricultural 
productivity, the returns to human 
capital in agriculture are unlikely 
to decrease, and most likely will 
increase, as more sophisticated 
methods are developed to increase 
farm efficiency. In particular, the 
advent of “knowledge-intensive crop 
management technologies” requires 
more skills, and greater ability to learn 
new skills, on the part of farmers. 
These technologies emphasize 
the timing of applying agricultural 
inputs, and the measurement of soil 
conditions and other site-specifi c 
factors for determining which inputs 
to apply, when, and in what quantities 
(see Byerlee 1998). Indeed, the more 
sophisticated methods may require 
of providing extension services. Extension agents 
can provide written materials to literate farmers 
who have a good grasp of basic science, which will 
greatly reduce the amount of time that extension 
agents need to spend with those farmers. Indeed, 
general farmer education may serve as a substitute 
for extension services, since more-educated 
farmers can acquire information directly from a 
variety of sources, including sources that extension 
agents rely on. 
A third important reason for focusing on basic 
skills, instead of teaching the details of the 
latest agricultural methods, is that it provides 
an alternative to farming for rural residents. In
developing countries, as farmers become more 
productive, less farm labor will be demanded, 
and thus many children of farmers will either 
work in rural areas in nonagricultural occupations 
or migrate to urban areas to work in activities 
unrelated to farming. Returns to education in 
nonagricultural activities are certainly sizable, but 
the precise size is still a matter of debate (Behrman 
1999). This movement of labor out of agriculture is 
economically efficient and will help avoid low rural 
incomes resulting from an “oversupply” of farmers 
and farm output. 
different production strategies for 
each plot of land operated by a given 
farmer, and even variation in inputs 
on different sections of a single plot of land (this is 
known as “precision agriculture,” as recently survey 
by Norton and Swinton 2001). This increasing 
importance of education in determining farm 
productivity could lead to increased inequality in 
rural areas, at least in countries where education is 
unequally distributed in rural areas, and to income 
gaps between countries with high (e.g., East Asia) 
and low (e.g., South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa) 
levels of education in rural areas. 
Another difficult issue regarding schooling in 
rural areas of developing countries is that many 
schools in those countries are not very eff ective 
at teaching basic literacy, numeracy and science 
skills, as explained in Glewwe and Kremer (2006). 
This is especially true in sub-Saharan Africa, where 
years of school attendance often lead to little 
learning. Research to date has provided some clues 
as to how to increase school quality, but much 
remains to be learned. Progress on providing skills 
to farmers will be slow until more is learned about 
how to make schools more effective in rural areas 
of developing countries. 
A final issue regarding the skills and schooling 
of farm households is that there are potentially 
important information problems that retard the 
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adoption of new agricultural technologies. Even 
when farmers have adequate skills to adopt 
a new technology there is an externality that 
keeps initial adoption rates below their optimal 
levels. This occurs because new technologies are 
somewhat risky, and the first farmer to try a new 
crop technology in a given community provides 
information to neighboring farmers on how well 
the new technology is suited for that locality.
The first farmer to try the new technology is 
not compensated for the social benefit of the 
information he or she provides to other farmers, 
since the result of trying the new crop is public 
knowledge (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995). This 
implies that the government should provide 
subsidies to farmers who are among the fi rst 
to adopt new technologies, even if the new 
technology proves to be unprofi table. 
Skills and Education of Providers 
 
of Agricultural Information
 

Farmers rarely obtain information about new 
developments in agricultural technology from 
the researchers who develop the new technology. 
Instead, they obtain it from intermediaries, of 
whom there are two main types: government 
employees, such as agricultural extension agents, 
and private sector marketing agents, such as 
sellers of new technology items and purchasers of 
farmers’ crops. The services provided by both types 
of intermediaries are likely to depend on their 
levels of education. This subsection briefl y reviews 
the role of education and skills for both types of 
intermediaries. 
The Ministries of Agriculture in almost all 
developing countries train and deploy large 
numbers of agricultural extension agents, who 
are responsible for providing useful information to
farmers on a wide variety of topics, including new 
technologies relevant for agricultural production. 
These agents typically have at least a secondary 
school education, and often several months, or 
even 1-2 years, of training in agricultural science.
The training varies widely across countries, and 
more generally the impact of agricultural extension 
agents, and other government employees charged 
with providing information to farmers on new 
technologies, also varies widely. 
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Some economists have argued that government 
extension agents often perform poorly in providing 
useful services to farmers because they have little 
incentive to do so. In contrast, vendors of new 
methods have a direct fi nancial motive to provide 
farmers with new, more productive, technologies. 
Indeed, in many developing countries most farmers 
obtain hybrid seeds and other inputs related to
new technologies from private sector vendors, 
and the role of private providers (relative to the 
role of agricultural extension agents) is steadily 
increasing in many developing countries. On the 
other hand, relying solely on private sector sources 
for information could lead to serious inefficiencies 
and possible negative consequences for the 
environment because private vendors have strong 
incentives to provide only the information that 
is favorable to the success of their businesses. As
farmers’ levels of education increase, governments 
should develop systems that allow them more 
direct access to recent research results. This could 
take the form of brochures, magazines, books and 
(eventually) websites operated by the government. 
This is another example of how farmer education 
can be a substitute for extension services. 
Skills and Education of Researchers 
The smallest, but arguably the most important, 
group in the process of providing new technology 
to farmers are the researchers who develop those 
technologies, who are found in both developed 
and developing countries. This subsection focuses 
on research capacity in developing countries. 
Appropriately trained scientists and engineers are 
critical for effective national (and international) 
agricultural research programs. The most rigorous 
training is often obtained in developed countries, 
although large developing countries may have one 
or more universities with strong departments in 
fields of science relevant to agriculture (examples 
include China, India and Brazil). There are at least 
two problems with obtaining skilled scientists with 
graduate degrees by sending them to developed 
countries for training. First, they need to have strong 
math and science skills to succeed in graduate
programs in developed countries, requiring the 
requisite undergraduate training to be off ered in 
developing countries. Second, individuals who 
obtain graduate training in developed countries 80 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
may be reluctant to return to their own countries 
because their training enables them to earn much 
higher incomes in developed countries than they 
are likely to obtain in their home countries (Eicher, 
2006). Three possible remedies to the second 
problem are: 1) increases in salaries for researchers 
who return to work in their home countries; 2) 
development of programs (coordinated with 
immigration authorities in both countries) that 
require students in developing countries who 
obtain graduate degrees in developed countries 
to return to their home countries for several years 
after obtaining their degrees; and 3) enabling 
developing country students to obtain advanced 
degrees in those developing countries that have
strong programs, such as Brazil, Chile, India and 
Thailand. 
In the medium to long term, more developing 
countries need to develop strong programs to
train scientists and engineers to conduct research 
that is relevant for their home countries. Countries 
with large populations can each develop their 
own program, but it may be more eff ective for 
small countries to pool their resources to develop, 
or at least be able to access, the training capacity 
they require. A very recent example of the latter 
is found in Sub-Saharan Africa (which includes 
many countries with small populations), namely 
the Education Initiative of the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa.47 These programs are just 
in their beginning stages, but nonetheless have
important potential for increasing the quantity and 
quality of agricultural researchers in developing 
countries. 
7. IMPLICATIONS 
During the 1900s, the world’s agricultural economy 
was transformed remarkably, fuelled by agricultural 
productivity growth, primarily generated by
agricultural R&D that was fi nanced and conducted 
by a small group of developed countries, especially 
the United States, but also France, Germany, and 
Japan. In an increasingly interdependent world,
both developed and developing countries have
been dependent on agricultural R&D conducted 
in the private and public laboratories of these few 
47 More information on this program can be found at http:// 
www.agra-alliance.org/revitalising/experts.html. 
countries, even though they have not contributed 
to financing the activity. 
Diverging Research Agendas 
However, dietary patterns and other priorities 
change as incomes increase. As a result, developed 
country research agendas are shifting; in particular, 
the past emphasis on simple productivity 
enhancement and enhancing the production 
of staple foods is declining in favour of interest 
in enhancing certain attributes of food (such as 
increasing demand for processed and so-called 
functional foods) and food production systems 
(such as organic farming, humane livestock 
production systems, localised food sources and ‘fair 
trade’ coffee). In contrast, food security concerns 
are still pervasive among less affl  uent communities, 
predominantly in developing countries. 
In addition, to growing differences in consumer 
demand for innovation between developed and 
developing countries, R&D agendas may diverge 
because of differences in producer and processor 
demands. Farmers in developed countries are 
demanding high technology inputs that often are 
not as relevant for subsistence agriculture (such 
as precision farming technology or other capital-
intensive methods). Agribusiness in developed 
countries is demanding value-adding processes 
designed to meet consumer demands, and farm 
production technologies designed to satisfy 
evolving demands for farm products with specifi c 
attributes such as particular food, feed, energy, 
medical, or industrial applications. 
As developed countries’ agricultural R&D programs 
respond to these changing patterns of demand 
for innovations, the emphasis of the science is 
being skewed in ways that could undermine the 
international spillovers that have traditionally 
contributed significantly to gains in food 
production throughout developing countries 
of the world. These spillovers are not generally 
well understood and their importance is under-
appreciated. 
Other aspects of agricultural science policy,
and the context in which it is conducted, are 
changing as well. In particular, the rise of modern 
biotechnology and enhanced intellectual property
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rights (IPRs) regimes mean that the types of 
technologies that were once freely available will 
be more difficult to access in the future. Moreover, 
the new technologies may not be as portable as 
in the past. Biotech companies are mostly located 
in developed countries, particularly in the United 
States, and tend to emphasise technologies that 
are locally applicable. These and other factors limit 
incentives for companies to develop technologies 
for less-developed countries. Hence some fear less-
developed countries may become technological 
orphans, abandoned by their former private- and 
public-sector benefactors in developed countries. 
New Pressures for Self-Reliance 
International spillovers of public agricultural R&D 
results are extremely important as they have
profound implications for the distribution of R&D 
benefits between consumers and producers, and 
thus among countries (Alston 2002). They have
also contributed to a global underinvestment in 
agricultural R&D, which the existing public policies 
have only partly succeeded in correcting. The stakes 
are high because the benefits from agricultural 
technology spillovers are worth many times more 
than the investments that give rise to them. 
The world’s least affl  uent countries have depended 
on spillovers of technologies from industrialized 
countries (especially from the United States, but 
also the United Kingdom, France, and others), both 
individually and through their collective action via 
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR). Until recently, much of the 
successful innovative effort in most developing 
countries was applied at the very last stage of 
the process, selecting and adapting varieties for 
local conditions using breeding lines and other 
materials developed elsewhere. Only a few larger 
countries, such as Brazil, China, and India, were
able to achieve much by themselves at the more 
upstream stages of the research and innovation 
process, even for improved crop technologies for 
which conventional breeding methods are widely 
applied. Until recently, that strategy of conducting 
adaptive research and relying on spillovers for 
basic material was reasonable, given an abundant 
and freely accessible supply of suitable materials; 
at least for the main temperate-zone food crops. 
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Changes in the emphasis of developed country 
agricultural R&D, combined with new IP rules and 
practices in conjunction with an increased use of 
modern biotechnology methods, have already 
begun to spell a decline in the public pool of 
new varieties. In addition, the other main source
of varietal materials, the CGIAR, has changed its 
emphasis and is scaling back its role of providing 
finished material or advanced breeding lines. 
The reduction in spillovers from these traditional 
sources will mean that less-developed countries 
will have to find new ways of meeting their 
demands for new varieties. 
Pervasive Underinvestment 
Although investment in agricultural R&D has high 
returns and has played a major role in helping to
provide food for large and expanding populations, 
support for this form of R&D is declining. 
Underfunding of agricultural R&D is pervasive,
especially in developing counties. This trend is 
alarming given: 
•	 the continuing and substantive growth of 
populations, especially in developing countries 
•	 an increasingly scarce and deteriorating natural 
resource base 
•	 the pervasive pockets of hunger and poverty 
that persist in developing countries, in many 
cases despite impressive national average 
productivity increases 
•	 the growing divergence between developed 
country research agendas and the priorities of 
developing countries. 
The problem of underfunding may worsen, 
especially for R&D that is related to the production 
of food staples in less-developed countries, as 
evidenced by the recent funding trends. 
Agricultural R&D is at a crossroads. The close 
of the 20th century marked changes in policy 
contexts, fundamental shifts in the scientifi c basis 
for agricultural R&D, and shifting funding patterns 
for agricultural R&D in developed countries. These 
changes imply a requirement for both rethinking of 
national policies and reconsidering multinational 
82 
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
approaches to determine the types of activities to
conduct through the CGIAR and similar institutions 
and how these activities should be organised and 
financed. Even though there is no evidence to
suggest that the world can afford to reduce its rate
of investment in agricultural R&D and there is every 
indication that more should be invested, it cannot 
be assumed that developed countries will play the 
same roles as in the past. In particular, countries 
that in the past relied on technological spillovers 
may no longer have that luxury available to them in 
the same ways or to the same extent. This change 
can be seen as involving three elements: 
1.	 The types of technologies being developed in 
the developed countries may no longer be as 
readily applicable to less-developed countries 
as they were in the past. 
2.	 Those technologies that are applicable may 
not be as readily accessible because of IP 
protection of privately owned technologies. 
3.	 Those technologies that are applicable and 
available are likely to require more substantial 
local development and adaptation, calling for 
more sophisticated and more extensive forms 
of scientific R&D than in the past. 
In short, different approaches may have to be 
devised to make it possible for countries to achieve 
equivalent access and tap into technological 
potential generated by other countries, and in 
many instances countries may have to extend their 
own agricultural R&D efforts farther upstream, to
more fundamental areas of the science. 
Epilogue 
The balance of global agricultural R&D investments 
is shifting in ways that will have important long-
term consequences, especially for the world’s least 
affluent countries. The primary reason is changes 
in supply and demand for agricultural technologies 
in developed countries, which have been the main 
producers of agricultural technologies. These 
countries seem unlikely to provide the quantities 
of productivity-enhancing technologies, suitable 
for adaptation and adoption in food defi cit 
countries, that they did in the past. This trend has 
been compounded by a scaling back of developed-
country support for the international agricultural 
R&D system, which has already diverted its 
own attention away from fi nished productivity-
enhancing technologies, especially for staple food 
crops. 
A shift in R&D agendas is forcing a rethinking of 
some national and multinational policies. National 
governments can take some initiatives in national 
agricultural R&D policy, such as enhancing IP and 
tailoring the institutional and policy details of IPRs 
to best fit local circumstances; increasing the total 
amount of government funding for their national 
agricultural R&D systems; introducing institutional 
arrangements and incentives for private and 
joint public-private funding; and improving the 
processes by which agricultural R&D resources are 
administered and allocated. 
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